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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Agricultural development is considered an important, if not necessary, condition for alleviating 
poverty around the world (e.g. Duflo and Kremer 2005; World Bank 2007; De Janvry 2010; 
Diao et al. 2010; Christiaensen et al. 2011: 486). An estimated 75% of the world’s poor live in 
rural areas and depend on agricultural or related activities for their livelihoods (World Bank 
2007). Moreover, the agricultural sector is the backbone of many developing economies. In 
2012, agriculture provided 30% of GDP in low income countries (World Bank 2012). 
Considering the important contribution of small-scale producers to this sector, growth in GDP 
from the agricultural sector might be more pro-poor than growth in other sectors. In fact, 
Christiaensen et al. (2011) show that growth in agriculture is especially favourable for the 
poorest of the poor.  
Despite the importance of agriculture, Official Development Aid (ODA) invested in 
agriculture has decreased dramatically since 1980. This change was mainly inspired by the “dual 
economy” models where the development of the agriculture sector is viewed to come at the 
cost of the development of a more productive, progressive and dynamic industrial sector 
(Christiaensen et al. 2011). However, after the turn of the century agriculture was brought back 
on the development agenda.  
This increased interest in agriculture was mainly inspired by the increasing pressure 
on the agricultural sector for increased food quantity and quality (Godfray et al. 2010). In fact, 
in 2009 the G8 member nations agreed that the decrease in ODA investment in the 
agricultural sector had to be reversed in order to address the persistence of food insecurity. 
Even though official ODA spending is still lower than in the 1980s, the share of ODA spent 
on agriculture has begun to increase again in 2007, as did the absolute share of government 
spending in developing countries (Lowder et al. 2012). Consequently many development 
agencies invest their resources in the agricultural sector. 
Parallel to the revived investment in agriculture has been an increased interest in 
measuring the impact of these investments, and of development aid more generally (Duflo and 
Kremer 2005; Deaton 2009; De Janvry 2010). Two of the most apparent reasons why impact 
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evaluation takes place is to account for resources used and to generate knowledge to improve 
the design and implementation of future programs (Mackay and Horton 2003). The literature 
contains several suggestions to improve not only the quality of impact assessment but also its 
usefulness in practice. First, more attention should be paid to differences in impact across 
different groups and to gain insight into what determines these differences in impact (Deaton 
2009). Second, impact evaluation should more explicitly state the pathways through which 
impact is to be expected (Mackay and Horton 2003). Stating such impact pathways helps 
forming beliefs about causal linkages between inputs, outputs and impacts, and the 
mechanisms linking them. The mechanisms of impact can be adapted to other situations rather 
than the exact outputs, outcomes or impacts as such (Hawkins et al. 2008; Deaton 2009). 
Third, more attention should be given to address the institutional context in which 
development initiatives are implemented (e.g. Mackay and Horton 2003; Raina 2003). This is in 
line with the large literature that identifies institutions as a key factor in development (North 
1990; Williamson 2000; Rodrik et al. 2004). Finally, impact should not be attributed to 
individual agents, but rather to the characteristics of the network of agents involved (Ekboir 
2003). This especially applies to initiatives that focus on agricultural development and 
innovation. Therefore, to improve the quality and usefulness of impact assessment for 
development interventions, it should be realized that impact results from a combination of the 
mechanisms, the institutional context and the agents involved. 
One of the factors that can be used to capture this complexity in impact evaluation is 
social capital. Intuitively, social capital can be understood by the idea that the people around 
you are an important asset that can be “called upon in a crisis, enjoyed for its own sake, and/or 
leveraged for material gain” (Woolcock 2010). A large literature identifies social capital as a 
factor conducive to growth and development at macro and micro level (Knack and Keefer 
1997; Narayan and Pritchett 1999; Zak and Knack 2001; Fafchamps and Minten 2002; 
Grootaert and Bastelaer 2002; Isham 2002; Karlan 2005; Ahlerup et al. 2009; Baliamoune-Lutz 
and Mavrotas 2009). 
From an early stage, social capital theory has been criticized for being an elusive 
concept without clear guidelines for measurement (e.g. Mansuri and Rao 2004; Durlauf and 
Fafchamps 2005; Poder 2011). Robison et al. (2002) conclude that many of these criticisms 
arise from the fact that scientist have mixed up social capital with what it determines, where it 
resides or what it can be used for. In “The rise and routinization of Social Capital, 1988-2008” 
Woolcock (2010) argues that these criticisms might be inherent to the concept and we should 
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not aim for a common definition. He refers to the term “essentially contested concepts” from 
Gallie (1956) to emphasize that the utility of the concept lies in facilitating constructive 
discussion on the importance of social relationships, rather than on forging consensus on how 
it is defined exactly. Indeed, the number of articles with reference to social capital and 
development continued to rise until 2012 (Scopus search results “Social Capital” & 
“Development”).  
In this thesis, I broadly define social capital as the participation of individuals in 
formal and informal networks, the norms that define these networks and the trust these 
individuals have within and outside these networks. I distinguish between structural and 
cognitive social capital (Uphoff and Wijayaratna 2000) and between bonding and bridging 
social capital (Putnam 2000). Cognitive and structural social capital refer to the type of social 
capital used: norms and trust are cognitive social capital, whereas formal and informal 
networks are structural social capital. Bonding capital refers to ties between people with similar 
characteristics, and bridging social capital refers to ties across different groups.  
One area where social capital, impact evaluation and agricultural development meet is 
in agricultural innovation. Agricultural innovation is widely viewed as an important factor for 
economic growth and development of developing countries (Bhandari and Yasunobu 2009; 
World Development Report 2009). Agricultural innovation can have a direct influence on 
poverty by increasing productivity, decreasing production cost, or reducing risk for those 
adopting (De Janvry and Sadoulet 2002). Moreover, it can have an indirect effect on poverty by 
lowering food prices, creating employment opportunities or stimulating the non-farm economy 
(De Janvry and Sadoulet 2002). In this thesis, I investigate the link between social capital and 
improved land and crop management practices, an important area of agricultural innovation 
for small scale producers. 
It is increasingly recognized that agricultural innovation does not happen in isolation. 
Rather it is “the outcome of collaborative networks where information is exchanged and 
learning processes happen” (Knickel et al. 2009). Such notions of networks and 
interconnectedness gave way to the “innovation systems” view. This view stipulates that 
agricultural innovation results from the integration of knowledge from various actors and 
stakeholders, implying a focus on interdependence, networks, learning, and social interaction 
(Leeuwis and Ban 2004; Röling 2009). This shift in the interpretation of innovation is clearly 
characterized by an increasing importance of networks, norms and trust, and thereby the 
concept of social capital. In fact, one of the potential channels via which social capital affects 
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poverty is through adoption of improved agricultural practices (e.g. Narayan and Pritchett 
1999; Isham 2002; Bandiera and Rasul 2006).  
Considering the important role of social capital for development, agricultural or 
otherwise, many development initiatives increasingly pay attention to the importance of social 
capital. Many development initiatives aim to enhance economic development indirectly by 
promoting cooperation in networks and by encouraging trust and norms of behaviour that 
involve mutual beneficial action. Mansuri and Rao (2004) estimated that the World Bank alone 
increased its lending to “community driven” and “participatory” projects from $325 million in 
1996 to $2 billion in 2003. These projects include beneficiaries in the design and management 
of the project and stress the importance of information sharing, capacity building, and 
strengthening the civic societies that represent them (Mansuri and Rao 2004). In many projects 
in the agricultural sector these characteristics are also evident. 
However, it is far from clear whether external development initiatives can actually 
influence social capital, especially in the short term. Many authors argue that social capital is a 
result of long-term historical processes (Bowles and Gintis 2001; Nunn and Wantchekon 
2011). On the other hand, some empirical evidence also indicates that social capital can be 
influenced (e.g. Bebbington and Carroll 2002; Krishna and Uphoff 2002), even in the short 
term (Fearon et al. 2009; Labonne and Chase 2011). On balance however, social capital 
research has been more successful in documenting its potential role in development than 
identifying whether, how, and to what extent external initiatives can contribute to social capital 
accumulation (Grootaert and Bastelaer 2002).  
Moreover, it is unclear to which extent the existing level of social capital matters for 
the success of development initiatives (Isham and Kähkönen 2002; Mansuri and Rao 2004; 
Deaton 2009). When we view agricultural innovation as part of an innovation system, the 
impact of these initiatives might depend quite extensively on the existing level of social capital. 
However, there is still a lack of understanding regarding the influence of social capital in 
agricultural innovation (Landry et al. 2002; De Hoop and Van Kempen 2010).  
Two examples of initiatives where social capital is important, and that form the 
empirical basis of this thesis, are the implementation of agricultural research at farm level 
through interactive, multi-stakeholder innovation platforms (FARA 2009), and the 
implementation of sustainable certification schemes through group-based experimental 
learning approaches. The first initiative, and the one upon which most of this thesis is based, 
adopted the Integrated Agricultural Research for Development (IAR4D) perspective as its 
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main approach in eight Sub Saharan African countries. The core of this approach is the 
development of Innovation Platforms (IPs), which can be described as an informal coalition 
and alliance of conventional agricultural research and development actors. The second 
initiative relates to four sustainable coffee projects implemented in Vietnam, of which two 
adopted the interactive Farmer Field School training approach. 
It is important to highlight that these development initiatives, and many other, make 
implicit or explicit assumptions on the role of social capital. Yet, there is little evidence on the 
relationships between social capital, agricultural innovation and development initiatives. This is 
crucial for development initiatives that try to foster social capital, or at least to prevent these 
same initiatives from undermining it. An improved understanding is also crucial for those 
initiatives that rely on existing levels of social capital for the success of their initiatives. This 
dissertation enriches the academic debate in a twofold manner. The first contribution is 
theoretical by identifying the relationship between social capital and agricultural innovation. 
The second contribution is empirical and methodological by testing these relationships in 
multiple development initiatives using several dimensions of social capital. 
1.2 Objectives and research questions 
From the background section it becomes clear that social capital is an important factor in 
economic development. Yet it is still unclear whether enhanced agricultural innovation is one 
of the mechanisms through which this effect materializes, and to which extent social capital is 
important for development initiatives that aim to enhance agricultural innovation. In this 
thesis, I argue that social capital is important for these initiatives in at least three ways. First, (i) 
social capital can influence the level of agricultural innovation. Second, (ii) development 
initiatives trying to stimulate agricultural innovation can influence social capital. Third, (iii) the 
existing level of social capital can influence the success of these initiatives.  
Therefore, the main objective of this thesis is to understand and investigate different 
ways in which social capital matters for development initiatives that aim to enhance agricultural 
innovation. I formulate three research questions: 
1. How are social capital and agricultural innovation related?  
2. Can development initiatives increase agricultural innovation by building social 
capital? 
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3. Does the initial level of social capital increase the success of these development 
initiatives in enhancing agricultural innovation?  
The relationships between the different research questions and the chapters in which they are 
addressed are depicted in figure 1. Please note that I do not address the relationships implied 
by the dashed arrows. Furthermore, the arrows in the figure depict hypothesized causality but 
do not indicate that I addressed this for all relationships. Considering the data at hand, I rely 
on associations rather than causal relations for chapter 3 and 6, and partly for chapter 5 and 7. 
 
 
Figure 1: relationship between the different concepts, research questions, and chapters 
1.3 Outline 
This thesis is structured into eight chapters, including this introductory chapter.  
In chapter 2, I elaborate on the main concepts underlying this thesis including social 
capital, how it relates to development initiatives in the agricultural sector, and how it can be 
measured. In chapter 3 until chapter 6, I use data collected by the Sub Saharan African 
Challenge Program (SSA CP) to empirically test these relationships.  
In chapter 3, I investigate the link between social capital at village level and 
agricultural development in the three African sub-regions; (i) the border region between 
Rwanda, Uganda and the DRC, (ii) the central border region between Nigeria and Niger; and 
(iii) various sites in Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Malawi. I use baseline data from the IAR4D 
initiative collected among more than 2500 households. I find that structural bridging social 
capital is associated with more extensive adoption of agricultural innovations, while the reverse 
is true for cognitive bonding social capital. 
In chapter 4, I narrow my focus to the border region between Rwanda, Uganda and 
the DRC. Because the IAR4D data set consist of randomized data of participating and none 
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participating villages, before and two years after implementation, I can investigate the impact 
of the program. I show that IAR4D has had an impact on structural bridging social capital in 
DRC and Uganda. There was no significant impact on structural bridging social capital in 
Rwanda, or on the other dimensions of social capital.  
In chapter 5, I use data from a survey I conducted among IP coordinators to measure 
the extent to which IPs were implemented according to the principles of IAR4D across the 
three sub regions. Linking these data to the main survey data, I find that the “IAR4Dness” 
index is associated with the success of IAR4D in increasing the level of household food 
security, although not through increased adoption of agricultural innovation or increased levels 
of social capital at the household level. I also find tentative evidence that the IAR4Dness index 
can be explained by the initial level of social capital at village level. 
In chapter 6, I make a methodological contribution to the social capital literature by 
analysing how different indicators used to represent social capital are related in the border 
region between Rwanda, Uganda and DRC. I focus on the relationship between various 
indicators of trust, an important component of cognitive social capital, and group membership, 
an important component of structural social capital. These data are based on questions I added 
to the follow up survey in 2010. I find that the two components cannot be empirically captured 
by an overarching social capital factor, and are not even necessarily associated to each other.  
In chapter 7, I present evidence that the relationship between social capital and 
agricultural innovation is not only evident for the IAR4D, but also for a different development 
imitative in a different context: sustainable coffee certification in Vietnam. I use data collected 
among 240 randomly selected project participants and 150 comparable farmers that did not 
participate in the projects. I focus on the role of bonding and bridging cognitive social capital, 
defined as trust. I find a significant positive association between trust and the uptake of 
sustainable agricultural training practices. This effect mostly stems from bridging trust, and is 
even higher in combination with high levels of bonding trust. I also find tentative evidence that 
participation in the sustainable coffee projects positively influenced bonding trust in one 
project whereas it negatively influenced bridging trust in another project. 
In chapter 8, I summarize the main findings, discuss the implications for policy and 
research, and offer some recommendations for future research.
8 
 
9  
Chapter 2 Social capital, agricultural 
innovation and development initiatives 
 
In this chapter, I introduce and discuss the concept of social capital and its relationships to 
agricultural innovation and development initiatives. In section 2.1, I give a brief overview of 
the history of social capital. In section 2.2, I discuss the definition, level and types of the 
concept of social capital and elaborate how I define it in this thesis. In section 2.4, I introduce 
development initiatives as a potential determinant of social capital. In section 2.3, I discuss the 
consequences of social capital by linking social capital to economic development and 
agricultural innovation, and I introduce social capital as a potential catalyst for the success of 
development initiatives. In section 2.5, I give an overview of how social capital can be 
measured, followed by a conclusion in section 2.6. 
2.1 History and critique 
For many years standard economic theory ignored the role of socio-cultural factors in 
explaining economic growth. Instead rational choice models, such as Solow growth models 
and the Walrasian equilibrium model, were to account for all economic variation within and 
between countries. Over time this simplistic view was criticised in various ways (Bhandari and 
Yasunobu 2009). Economist failed to explain differences in economic performance and the 
negative externalities associated with it, such as inequality or environmental degradation. 
Furthermore, they failed to account for social value systems assuming human beings are 
rational and that their utility-maximizing behaviour is the same everywhere.  
By the end of the 1990s it became more generally accepted by economist that “ 
economic activity is deeply embedded in the social structure, and agents’ decisions are 
influenced by a wide range of social and cultural factors” (Gugerty and Kremer 2002:1). 
Following the influential work by Bourdieu (1986), Coleman (1988), Putnam (1993) and 
Fukuyama (1995), the concept of social capital became increasingly used to capture such 
factors. Woolcock (2010) identified at least nine fields of studies where social capital has played 
an important role: families and youth behaviour problems, crime and violence; schooling and 
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education, community life, work and organisations, democracy and governance, collective 
action problems, democracy and governances, and economic development. 
However, the development of the concept of social capital has also led to criticism. 
First, several authors argue that social capital should not be labelled a capital at all, because it 
does not fulfil some of the essential characteristics of capital. For example, Arrow (2012) 
argues that social capital is not a capital because it is not transferable in terms of ownership 
and does not require a deliberate sacrifice for future benefit. Second, many authors refer to 
critiques of measurement, where the literature mixes up social capital with what it determines, 
what its consequences are or where it resides (Robison et al. 2002). Research that uses the 
outcomes of social capital as an indicator, such as voter turnout or blood donation (Guiso et 
al. 2004) necessarily find it to be related to that outcome. Third, empirical models including 
social capital are often problematic because social capital is not exogenous to the model; it is 
correlated with unobserved factors, it is reverse-caused by current economic factors, or it 
reflects the working of institutions (Guiso et al. 2010). Fourth, the potential harm of social 
capital is not always recognized. For example, strong intra-group social capital can be 
associated with conservatism and conformity (e.g. Dakhli and De Clercq 2004; Kaasa 2009) or 
conflict with the interests of wider society (Knack and Keefer 1997; Bowles and Gintis 2001). 
Finally, some argue for a more complex interpretation of social capital, where it should be 
viewed as “a deeply contextual and endogenous construct” (e.g. Mansuri and Rao 2004:10). By 
simply aggregating indicators of social capital at community or even country level the indicator 
can easily lose its contextual value (Sabatini 2005). The definition of social capital and the way 
in which it is measured thus remains very incoherent (Sabatini 2005). This also implies that it is 
challenging to synthesize the outcomes of social capital research. 
Some of these criticisms have been addressed in the literature and some are addressed 
in this thesis. For example, Robison et al. (2002) give a convincing overview of why some 
forms of social capital should indeed be labelled capital. They argue that social capital is 
transformable to other services, possesses different degrees of durability, can be flexible or 
inflexible, is subject to decay, can be transposed to other capitals and has opportunity cost 
related to investment. Also, it is increasingly recognized that social capital is a multidimensional 
concept, and it is measured as such by a limited but increasing number of authors (also see 
chapter 4 and chapter 5). Yet, it is still unclear how the different components are related to 
each other (e.g. Claibourn and Martin 2000, Quibria 2003, chapter 6). Despite the criticism and 
conceptual vagueness social capital remains an important construct maybe because, as 
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Woolcock (1998) argued, it is in this concept that scientist from many different disciplines have 
once again found a “common language”. Indeed, social capital has become a well-known 
concept and is used in scientific and policy-related discussions.  
2.2 Social capital defined 
Based on a recent literature review, Bhandari and Yasunobu (2009: 486) summarise social 
capital as “a multidimensional phenomenon encompassing a stock of social norms, values, 
beliefs, trusts, obligations, relationships, networks, friends, memberships, civic engagement, 
information flows, and institutions that foster cooperation and collective actions for mutual 
benefits and contributes to economic and social development”. This broad definition probably 
already took its roots in the various ways in which social capital was used by early researchers. 
Bourdieu (1986) for example stressed the importance of social networks; Fukuyama (1995) that 
of trust and norms of cooperation; and Coleman (1988) defined social capital by its function, 
i.e. an aspect of social structure that facilitates action of the individuals within (see Bhanderi 
and Yasunobu for an overview of different views). In this thesis, I broadly define social capital 
as the participation in formal and informal networks, the norms that guide behaviour in these 
networks and the trust within and outside these networks. 
The imprecise definition of social capital makes it unclear whether social capital 
resides at the individual or collective level. Even though social capital is something which exists 
between people, it has a clear individual attribute (Poder 2011). Moreover, when social capital 
is defined at collective level, the question arises as to what defines the collective (Lancee 2012). 
Different networks are clearly overlapping and some individuals might have a more central 
role, and thus benefit more, than others. In this thesis, I consider network participation and 
trust as individual attributes of social capital, which may or may not be aggregated at village 
level. The norms of cooperation I include in chapter 3-5 are shared village norms.  
Social capital can be classified along two well-known dimensions: bonding versus 
bridging social capital (Putnam 2000) and cognitive versus structural social capital (Uphoff and 
Wijayaratna 2000). Bonding social capital refers to ties between people of similar characteristics 
and is essentially horizontal in nature. Bridging social capital refers to ties across different 
groups and often across different power lines, thereby being essentially vertical in nature. In 
this thesis, I classify ties inside the village as bonding social capital, and ties between villages 
and in institutions as bridging social capital. Cognitive and structural social capital on the other 
hand refer to the type of social capital used. Norms and trust form the cognitive of social 
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capital whereas formal and informal networks form the structural social capital. Considering 
the exploratory nature of this thesis, I consider four dimensions of social capital: structural 
bonding, structural bridging, cognitive bonding and cognitive bridging 
2.3 Social capital and its determinants 
As was argued in section 1.1, many community driven and participatory projects can be seen as 
efforts to enhance economic development indirectly by stimulating cooperation in formal or 
informal networks, and by stimulating trust and norms of behaviour towards mutual beneficial 
action (arrow A, Figure 1 in chapter 1). Most of these projects have their foundation in the 
“community-driven development” approach; an umbrella term for projects and programs that 
actively include their beneficiaries in processes such as design, management and evaluation. 
This is also apparent in one of the initiatives investigated in this thesis (chapters 4 and 5): the 
Integrated Agricultural Research for Development (IAR4D) approach as adopted by the Sub 
Saharan African Challenge Programme (FARA 2004). The core of the approach relies on 
Innovation Platforms (IPs) which, although operating at various administrative levels, are 
positioned at the local governmental level and are active at the village level. They represent an 
institution that brings together stakeholders in the agricultural sector, including farm 
households, local government agencies, scientist, NGOs and traders. To abide with the IAR4D 
approach, the IPs have to fulfil several criteria that stipulate that IPs should, amongst others, 
be diverse, representative, collaborative, participatory and set their own priorities (Hawkins et 
al. 2008). This illustrates that the main aim of IAR4D is not to directly influence certain 
development outcomes (e.g. agricultural innovation or income), but to create a setting to 
enable these outcomes.  
In a critical review, Mansuri and Rao (2004) show that the evidence on the 
effectiveness of the community driven development approach is very limited. Therefore, it is 
unclear whether the benefits of social capital community driven development initiatives try to 
stimulate - i.e. reducing information problems, expanding resources available to the poor and 
strengthening the organisations that represent them - is actually successful. Some even argue 
that the rapid expansion of these projects has resulted in severe waste of development 
resources (Yujiro 2009).  
More generally speaking, it is still a topic of debate whether external initiatives can 
actually influence social capital, especially in the short term. A large literature suggest that social 
capital is historically derived (Putnam 1993), is a result of long-run evolutionary process 
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(Bowles and Gintis 2001) or shaped by critical junctions in history such as the extraction of 
slaves from Africa (Nunn and Wantchekon 2011). Others have empirically verified that 
development assistance was not successful in enhancing social capital. Gugerty and Kremer 
(2002) show that a program in Kenya was unsuccessful in enhancing participation of 
marginalized women, their target group, in community associations. Instead the program 
resulted in higher participation of men and educated younger women, and less participation of 
older women. In a recent study, Casey et al. (2012) exploit the random assignment of a 
community driven development program in Sierra Leone. Even though the program improved 
local public goods and economic outcomes, there was no effect on the social capital indicators 
the program targeted including collective action, decision making, or the involvement of 
marginalized groups.  
That does not mean social capital cannot be created. An increasing number of studies 
indicate that social capital can in fact be influenced by external initiatives, even on the short 
term. A number of studies suggest social capital can be influenced by development initiatives 
in the short term (Uphoff and Wijayaratna 2000; Bebbington and Carroll 2002). Using a 
clustered randomized trial Pronyk et al. (2008) show that a group-based microfinance project 
combined with participatory training on HIV and gender was successful in creating higher 
levels of social capital after two years. Work by Fearon et al. (2009), using a randomized field 
experiment to analyse the impact on community reconstruction groups, supports this. 
It should be noted that social capital, like most capitals, is also susceptible to 
degradation. Degradation could for example result from intrastate conflict (Colletta and Cullen 
2002). Likewise, it can be argued that external initiatives, such as development programs, can 
degrade existing social relations, trust or norms of cooperation (also see chapter 7). Gugerty 
and Kremer (2002) for example demonstrate that encouraging collective action, in a women’s 
group program, created opportunities for rent seeking and actually weakened existing social 
capital (also see Mansuri and Rao 2004).  
2.4 Social capital and economic development 
There has been an enormous increase in empirical literature measuring the economic benefits 
of social capital. Classical examples in the economic development literature are the cross 
sectional country studies by Knack and Keefer (1997) and Zak and Knack (2001) in which 
certain dimensions of social capital are used to explain differences in economic development. 
Also at micro level, there has been an increase in the use of social capital as an explanatory 
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variable in issues such as household income (Narayan and Pritchett 1999), agricultural 
innovation (Isham 2002; Bandiera and Rasul 2006), access to credit (Besley et al. 1993) or 
transaction costs (Fafchamps and Minten 2002).  
Depending on the way social capital is defined, or the theoretical perspective one 
chooses, different mechanisms of impact are identified. From a typical economic rational 
choice perspective, social capital becomes an input in the utility or production function 
(Gugerty and Kremer 2002). The effects would be modeled in similar ways as other factors 
that reduce transacation or production cost. The argument underlying this theory is that social 
capital provides the structure required to maintain beliefs of 
mutual expectations about reputation and rules of behavior (Dasgupta 2005). Granovetter 
(2005) summarisis four core principles how social capital, which he refers to as social ties and 
networks, are linked to economic outcomes from a sociological theory perspective. First of all, 
dense social networks help to overcome free rider problems in collective action. In dense 
networks norms of behaviour are clearer and easier to enforce. Second, weak social ties 
enhance the flow of novel information, and thus innovation. This is referred to as the so-called 
“strength of weak ties”. Third, and related to this, is the position specific individuals have in a 
network by bridging the gap between different groups, referred to as “structural holes”. 
Fourth, economic and non economic actions are often interlinked. This is referred to as the 
“social embeddeness” argument and implies that the cost of economic action depends on non-
economic institutions and processes. Using these principles Granovetter explains the link 
between social networks and labour markets, prices, compliance, productivity and innovation - 
the latter being the focus of this thesis (chapter 3 and 7). 
I argue that enhanced agricultural innovation is one of the mechanisms through 
which social capital materializes in economic impact (arrow B, Figure 1 in chapter 1). 
Innovation results from the integration of knowledge from various actors and stakeholders, 
implying a focus on interdependence, networks, learning, and social interaction (Leeuwis and 
Ban 2004; Röling 2009; Conley and Udry 2010). Social capital contributes to an innovative 
milieu (Dakhli and De Clercq 2004) and becomes a “factor of innovation” (Kaasa 2009). For 
example, participation in formal and informal networks is expected to facilitate the exchange of 
information, create synergy among actors, and stimulate access to resources. Trust and shared 
norms can promote cooperation and coordination, and reduce transaction costs. Norms 
further help to prevent misunderstanding, which in its turn enhances productive cooperation 
Social capital, agricultural innovation and development initiatives | 15  
(Knack and Keefer 1997; Boahene et al. 1999; Bandiera and Rasul 2002; Isham 2002; Landry et 
al. 2002; Dakhli and De Clercq 2004; Kaasa 2009).  
Social capital can also influence economic development indirectly by influencing the 
success of development initiatives (arrow C, Figure 1 in chapter 1). Various scholars identify 
the importance of social capital for the effectiveness of aid at macro level (e.g. Baliamoune-
Lutz and Mavrotas 2009) or micro level (Isham and Kähkönen 2002; Mansuri and Rao 2004; 
Deaton 2009). Monge et al. (2008) for example show that households who are better 
embedded in social networks in rural Bolivia are more likely to adopt the agricultural 
innovations brought to them by various development initiatives. Another example is by de 
Hoop and van Kempen (2010) who find that households with higher levels of trust in health 
providers adopt more bed nets as provided by health providers.  
The role of social capital as a catalyst for the success of development initiatives might 
be especially true for initiatives that try to enhance agricultural innovation through group 
processes. This is also evident in the development of IPs as part of the IAR4D approach 
(chapter 5). Another example investigated in this thesis relates to the role of trust in facilitating 
training uptake in sustainable coffee initiatives (chapter 7). If a certain country, region or group 
of people is generally not inclined to cooperate and faces overall low levels of trust, for 
example as the result of ethnic conflicts or corruption, it might be hard to develop a program 
that requires cooperation or trust from the very first stage. It can therefore be argued that the 
existing level of social capital is essential in the success of these programs.  
At the same time it should be realized that social capital does not necessarily have 
positive outcomes for economic development, agricultural innovation, or for initiatives that 
depend on its initial level for success. Quibria (2003) summarizes four downsides of social 
capital. First of all, while creating opportunities for those inside the network, it can also create 
barriers for those outside the network. Second, social capital in combination with norms of 
redistribution can prevent incentives to accumulate capital or successful entrepreneurship. 
Third, high levels of, especially bonding social capital can promote conformity to existing ways 
and thereby reduce innovative behaviour (also see chapter 3). Fourth, strong social capital can 
also be used to maintain bad equilibriums of norms and values. Clearly these downsides also 
apply to development initiatives that implement their programs in communities with high 
levels of bonding social capital. 
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2.5 Measuring social capital 
One way to measure social capital, and probably the one most often used, is by conducting 
surveys. Survey measures of social capital are very diverse and cover structural and cognitive 
indicators of social capital. Measures vary from single proxy indicators of associational activity 
to inclusive sets capturing information and communication, groups and networks, trust and 
solidarity, collective action and cooperation, social cohesion and inclusion, and empowerment 
and political action (Grootaert et al. 2004). Others, like Kaasa (2009), identify measures of 
social capital using a factor analysis. His 6 factors are based on 20 indicators and associated 
with general trust and networks, institutional trust, norms of helping and decency, norms of 
active social participation, norms of orderliness and civic participation. Grootaert and Bastalaer 
(2002) categorise the variety of social capital indicators used into three types of proxies: 
membership in local associations and networks, indicators of trust and adherence to norms, 
and indicators of collective action. This diversity results from the multidimensional character 
of the concept and the variety of definitions used (see section 2.2). 
Another way to measure social capital is by experimental games. Experimental games 
are particularly useful to capture the cognitive dimension of social capital including trust, 
trustworthiness and norms of cooperation. These experimental games include trust games (e.g. 
Glaeser et al. 2000; Karlan 2005), ultimatum games (e.g. Carpenter 2002) and public goods 
game (e.g. Anderson et al. 2004). The trust game is designed to measure trust by the amount of 
money passed on from player A to player B, and trustworthiness by the amount passed back to 
player A after this amount has been increased by a third party. In the ultimatum game player B 
can either accept or reject the proposed distribution of a certain amount of money by player A, 
and is set up to measure fairness. The public goods game is designed to capture group norms 
of cooperation by creating an incentive to invest money in the group account rather than the 
individual account.  
Both methods have advantages and disadvantages (see Carpenter 2002 and Guiso et 
al. 2010 for an overview). The main critique on survey questions is that they do not provide the 
right incentive to report true behaviour or attitudes. This is especially true for questions related 
to the cognitive dimension of social capital. In contrast, experiments measure actual behaviour 
rather than self-reported behaviour. However, participants in experimental games might also 
present more pro-social behaviour to give a good impression to the experimenter. The main 
critique on experimental games involves their external validity; it is unclear how the setting 
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created in the game replicates real life situations and to which extent the respondents are 
representative for the entire population. The different methods, but also different questions 
and games, clearly result in different indicators of social capital. Therefore, it remains a topic of 
debate whether or not the measures from experiments and surveys are related, and which ones 
better capture social capital (Guiso et al. 2006; Guiso et al. 2010; Thöni et al. 2012).  
In this thesis, I rely on surveys to measure social capital because it allowed me to 
capture social capital among a large population and across all dimensions of social capital. Thus 
far few authors recognize the multidimensionality of social capital in their empirical measures 
(also see chapter 4 and 5). This is partly caused by the sometimes conflicting effect social 
capital can have on economic development (chapter 3) and the lack of theoretical or empirical 
arguments linking the different dimensions and indicators to each other (chapter 6). 
2.6 Summary 
In this thesis, I broadly define social capital along three types of indicators: (i) the participation 
of individuals in formal and informal groups, (ii) the norms that define cooperation in these 
groups, and (iii) the trust individuals have within and outside these groups. All these indicators 
are considered social capital as such; rather than what it determines (e.g. development 
initiatives) or what its consequences are (e.g. agricultural innovation or leveraging the impacts 
of development initiatives). Because this is an exploration of the potential role of social capital 
for development initiatives, I chose not to limit the study to one specific type of social capital. 
Instead, I focus on four dimensions of social capital, being structural bonding, structural 
bridging, cognitive bonding and cognitive bridging. Except for norms, which are shared within 
a group, I consider group participation and trust as individual attributes of social capital. This 
may or may not be aggregated at a higher level depending on the purpose of the specific 
chapter. Where I largely consider the aggregate effect of social capital I define it at village level. 
All measures of social capital are based on surveys. 
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Chapter 3 Social capital and agricultural 
innovation in Sub Saharan Africa 
  
 
Abstract: In this paper we use a novel and extensive dataset to explore the association 
between different forms of social capital and innovation in agriculture, for a sample of African 
countries. We find mixed evidence. While structural social capital, especially in the form of 
connections beyond the village, is associated with more extensive adoption of innovations, the 
reverse is true for cognitive social capital (capturing shared norms and trust within the local 
community).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Paper by Fédes van Rijn, Erwin Bulte and Adewale Adekunle published in the Journal of 
Agricultural Systems (2012): “Social capital and agricultural innovation in Sub-Saharan Africa” 
(2012). Agricultural Systems, 108, 112-122.  
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3.1 Introduction 
A rapidly growing literature identifies social capital as a factor conducive to growth and 
development (e.g. Knack and Keefer 1997; Zak and Knack 2001). Positive growth effects may 
materialize via various channels, including reduced transaction costs (precluding the necessity 
to write contracts that capture all contingencies), facilitated exchange of information, and 
enhanced trust (enabling communities to overcome social dilemmas). A recent study by 
Ahlerup and Olsson (2009) suggests that social capital and formal institutions are substitutes in 
development, so that social capital is especially important for the poorest countries where 
formal institutions are of the lowest quality (for other treatments of the interaction between 
social capital and institutions, refer to Dasgupta 2005; and Tabellini 2005). Sub-Saharan Africa 
leaps to mind as an example of a region with strong social ties between community or kin 
members and weak (macro) institutions.  
Indeed, and complementing the macro-style analyses mentioned above, micro 
analyses confirm the important economic role of social capital in Africa (Narayan and Pritchett 
1999; Bigsten et al. 2000; Woolcock and Narayan 2000; Narayan and Cassidy 2001; Fafchamps 
and Minten 2002; Isham 2002; Misselhorn 2009). One of the potential channels via which 
social capital affects farmers’ livelihoods is enhanced adoption of new agricultural technologies 
(e.g. Narayan and Pritchett 1999; Isham 2002; Bandiera and Rasul 2006).  
Agricultural innovation is widely viewed as an important factor for economic growth 
and development in Sub Saharan Africa (World Development Report 2009). Yet agricultural 
innovation among smallholders has progressed slowly, and programs to promote the adoption 
of new technologies, even if occasionally successful locally, have largely proven unsuccessful. 
While many aspects of innovation remain poorly understood (see Landry et al. 2002 for an 
overview), some argue that an important cause of limited impact of traditional research and 
extension in Africa is the simplistic yet dominant view on innovation processes. Recent work 
emphasizes interdependence among actors, network effects, joint learning, and social 
interaction (e.g. Leeuwis and Ban 2004; FARA 2008; Röling 2009). According to this 
perspective, social capital and innovation are naturally linked. 
The overarching objective of this paper is to analyse the role of social capital in the 
adoption of agricultural innovations for a large sample of African smallholders. To this end we 
aim to “unbundle” social capital, and distinguish between different dimensions of it. 
Prominently, this includes a distinction between structural and cognitive social capital, and 
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between bonding and bridging social capital (see below). As evident from the theoretical 
discussion that follows, not all dimensions of social capital are conducive to innovation. We 
are the first to explore this issue comparing a sample of different African countries. However, 
there are limits to what we can do with our data. The nature of our data (cross-section, non-
experimental) implies that potential endogeneity concerns emerge (reverse causality, omitted 
variables). We are careful to emphasize that the results on these pages are correlations, and 
need not necessarily reflect causal relationships.  
The paper is organised as follows. In section 3.2 we outline our theoretical framework 
and discuss the main concepts. In section 3.3 we introduce our data and empirical strategy. 
Section 3.4 presents our regression results, focusing on the association between different 
dimensions of social capital and innovation, as well as an extensive robustness analysis. The 
conclusions and discussion ensue in section 3.5. 
3.2 Social capital and innovation 
We defined social capital at community level and distinguish between cognitive and structural 
social capital (see sections 2.1 and 2.2). We also distinguish between bonding and bridging 
social capital (see section 2.2). Bonding capital refers to horizontal ties between people with 
similar characteristics – think of relationships among a group of farmers within a village. In 
contrast, bridging capital refers to ties across groups. Often such ties are vertical in nature – 
think of the relationship between the government or extension officers and farmers.  
Besides quantifying social capital (see section 2.5 on measurement of social capital), 
analysts should try to relate it to economic behaviour or outcomes. In section 2.4 we 
introduced the idea that enhanced agricultural innovation is a potential mechanism via which 
social capital can impact economic development. Structural social capital can spur innovation 
via enhanced information flows and reduced transaction costs (e.g. Dakhli and De Clercq 
2004; Kaasa 2009). Engagement in networks may also yield a synergy effect, as it fosters the 
combination of different ideas or skills, and a “realisability effect” due to enhanced access to 
different resources (including political or financial support). For evidence of the impact of 
structural social capital on innovation in developing countries, refer to Boahene et al. (1999) 
and Bandiera and Rasul (2006). Also in a developed country setting various studies confirm the 
leveraging role of structural social capital (see for example Landry et al. 2002; Kaasa 2009).  
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Cognitive social capital might matter for innovation as well. Trust can increase the 
overall tendency to cooperate and lower transaction costs (e.g., bargaining and decision cost, 
policing and enforcement cost). Moreover, sufficiently high levels of trust may allow groups of 
individuals to self-insure against risk. In the presence of informal insurance mechanisms – a 
key component of social capital – individual farmers are better able to adopt (potentially risky) 
innovations as downside risks can be overcome (Narayan and Pritchett 1999). Finally, it is easy 
to imagine how shared norms may affect innovation. According to Knack and Keefer (1997), 
norms may capture a general tendency of individuals to cooperate and subordinate self-interest 
to that of society. Like trust, shared norms may lower transaction costs and facilitate 
cooperation and self-insurance (e.g. Isham 2002). But norms may also discourage innovation. 
Norms of good citizenship or orderliness that promote conservatism and conformity can 
reduce creative thinking and reaching for out-of-the-box solutions (e.g. Dakhli and De Clercq 
2004; Kaasa 2009). Moreover, in-group norms of specific groups that conflict with the 
interests of wider society could be detrimental to development (Knack and Keefer 1997; 
Bowles and Gintis 2001). The net impact on innovation, therefore, is ambiguous. 
Perspectives on the link between social capital and innovation are evolving. The 
mainstream view on innovation is shifting from innovation as a “mere technical device” 
towards a “novel working whole” (Leeuwis and Ban 2004). The latter idea emphasizes the 
importance of the human practices involved as well as the context within which innovation 
takes place. The evolution of the concept of innovation is summarized as a progressive shift 
from a “linear and exogenous” conception of innovation to a “systemic and endogenous” 
approach, defining innovation as a “learning process.” (Brunori et al. 2008 cited in Knickel et 
al. 2009). In this study we will analyse the role of social capital on the adoption of agricultural 
innovations for a large sample of African smallholders.  
Unfortunately, we lack the necessary data to study the innovation process in detail. 
Instead, we will study the role of social capital in the adoption of agricultural technologies and 
techniques that have at some stage emerged from the end of the technology pipeline. That is, 
we analyse whether various forms of social capital are correlated with the adoption of a very 
specific type of knowledge (knowledge embodied in varieties, inputs and production 
techniques). The use of this knowledge is confounded by many other factors, such as 
effectiveness of input markets and other supply mechanisms, and price incentives via output 
markets. Other forms of innovation—i.e., the product of interactive, participatory and 
embedded processes—are perhaps not captured by our innovation data, implying we may 
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underestimate the full effect of social capital on innovation. This is a caveat to the analysis that 
follows.  
3.3 Data and empirical strategy 
To analyse the relation between social capital and innovation we use a novel data set, collected 
between mid-2008 and 2009 in seven African countries as part of the Sub Saharan African 
Challenge Program (FARA 2008). The sample area was designed to capture the diversity of 
Sub Saharan Africa and consists of three regions; (i) the central border region between Nigeria 
and Niger; (ii) the border region between Rwanda, Uganda and DRC; and (iii) various sites in 
Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Malawi. However, the data collected in Zimbabwe, during a 
period of political and economic turmoil, were so scanty (less than 100 complete responses) 
that we will not include them in this study. To obtain a representative sample for these regions, 
data collection was based on two-stage sampling. First, stratified sampling to obtain a 
representative collection of villages and, second, random selection of ten households per 
village. These data were collected as part of a large randomized experiment. After collection of 
the data, a random sub-sample of villages was part of an (on-going) experiment aiming to 
promote participatory learning and bottom-up innovation. The current set of cross-section 
data essentially is the baseline against which the impact of the intervention will be measured. 
This implies that in the future we will be able to analyse innovation as a process, and its 
interaction with social capital.  
The survey consisted of two components: a household survey and a village survey 
(focus-group style). Our social capital variables are based on data from both types of surveys. 
However, the village survey was often-times incompletely administered, and upon matching 
the available household and village data our total sample includes 2518 households. This 
sample adequately covers seven countries (that is, the eight countries minus Zimbabwe). When 
testing for non-random sample reduction, we obtain mixed evidence. Some variables indicate 
that it is especially well-off households and villages that have dropped out of the sample, other 
variables suggest the opposite.1  
                                                          
1 First we check whether the reduction of our sample resulted in a bias towards specific households. We 
regress a dummy variable (1 if included in the reduced sample) on covariates, and find that age (–), 
education (–), experience (+), and assets (+) enter significantly. However the coefficients are very small. 
Moreover, they suggest a “bias” towards factors traditionally favouring innovation (assets and experience) 
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We now discuss our data in more detail, and first introduce our main dependent 
variable. We construct an agricultural innovation index based on a variety of available 
innovations in the domains of land management, post-harvest management and production 
enhancing innovations such as improved crop varieties. These innovations are listed in 
Appendix 3.1. They represent the majority of potential technological innovations a small farm-
household in SSA can adopt to enhance the production process. This includes various 
methods to improve the management of soil (fertility), water resources, crops and post-harvest 
losses. As is evident from the list, the great majority of these innovations are typically “end of 
the pipeline” products, and do not capture the innovation process as such. Instead, we focus 
on the link between social capital and the adoption of innovations.  
The index sums the adoption of agricultural innovations, and ranges from 0 (i.e. the 
household has not adopted a single type of innovation) to 20 (implying the household has 
adopted all 20 types of innovations included in the survey). Ideally, we would construct an 
index based on those innovations that are applicable in a certain agro-ecological context (i.e. 
bench terraces are not a viable innovation in swampy areas or on the plains). Unfortunately 
such data are not available. As an alternative, however, we will construct an index that includes 
only universally applicable innovations – innovations we expect to be applicable across all 
agro-ecological contexts. Moreover, country fixed effects should capture some of the agro-
ecological context, allowing us to zoom in on differences between villages within a country. 
Summary statistics for both innovation indices are provided in Panel A in Table 1. 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                   
as well as impeding it (negative sign for education). The same holds for the village covariates. Access to 
schools (+), health care (–), radio (–) and wells (+) enter significantly, again providing a mixed picture. 
We have also tested if social capital data at village level was missing randomly. Farmers with a higher age 
(+) and education level (+), and smaller household size and asset index (–) or experience (–) seem to have 
more missing social capital data. We also observe that missing values increase with radio access and 
mobile phone access but decrease with access to schools and access to wells. Overall, this mixed evidence 
does not suggest a particularly strong bias towards a specific type of household or community. 
Social capital and agricultural innovation in Sub Saharan Africa | 25 
Table 1: Summary statistics innovation and social capital (n=2518) 
Mean Sd Min Max
Panel A: Innovation
Innovation Index 8.07 4.36 0 20
Essential Innovation Index 3.07 1.78 0 7
Panel B: Social Capital
Section I
SC_ I1.1 Village came together for a social function 2.24 1.36 0 4
SC_ I1.2 Village came together to carry out community project 1.67 1.24 0 4
SC_ I1.3 Made financial contributions to help a village member 0.88 1.02 0 4
SC_ I1.4 Came together for a village meeting 1.43 0.96 0 4
SC_ I1.5 Made a field trip to agricultural R&D activity 0.46 0.67 0 4
SC_ I1.6 Gone to another village to see R&D project 0.43 0.62 0 4
SC_ I1.7 People from another village came to see R&D project 0.37 0.58 0 4
SC_ I1.8 Training by an outside organization or field extension staff 0.80 0.85 0 4
SC_ I1.9 Been visited by researchers, staff from NGOs or extension 0.75 0.76 0 4
Section II
SC_ I2.1 Participation in community activities 2.60 1.00 0 4
SC_ I2.2 Extent of trust among people 2.48 0.93 0 4
SC_ I2.3 Cooperation among people 2.64 0.91 0 4
SC_ I2.4 Extent of giving or exchanging gifts 2.21 1.09 0 4
SC_ I2.5 Extent of financial contribution for community activities 2.20 1.14 0 4
SC_ I2.6 Extent of financial contribution to group activities 2.12 1.16 0 4
SC_ I2.7 Spirit of helping others especially the poor 1.96 1.31 0 4
SC_ I2.8 Extent of settling conflicts or disputes among people 2.78 0.97 0 4
SC_ I2.9 Extent of abiding by the norms and byelaws 2.49 1.16 0 4
SC_ I2.10 Women confidence to speak in public 2.30 1.12 0 4
SC_ I2.11 Men's respect and consideration of women 2.71 0.99 0 4
Section III (mean village values)
SC_ I3.1 Participation in community development projects 0.76 0.27 0 1
SC_ I3.2 Financial contribution for community activities or actions 0.71 0.31 0 1
SC_ I3.3  Involvement in settling conflicts or disputes among people 0.67 0.27 0 1
SC_ I3.4 Visiting other farmers within community to learn about agric. 0.54 0.30 0 1
SC_ I3.5 Visiting other farmers outside community to learn about agric. 0.38 0.31 0 1
SC_ I3.6 Visiting a research station to learn about agriculture 0.15 0.22 0 1
SC_ I3.7 Visiting an extension office to learn about agriculture 0.19 0.24 0 1  
The survey contains three sets of social capital questions (taken from both the household 
surveys and the village surveys). These questions are summarized in Panel B in Table 1. The 
first set captures the frequency of certain events. Most indicators are related to structural 
capital. The data was categorized from 0 to 4, where a score of 0 refers to “never happens” and 
a score of 4 refers to “happens more than 5 times a month, on average”. The second set of 
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indicators describes aspects of social life in the village. These indicators are also measured on a 
0-4 scale where a score of 0 now refers to “never happens” and a score of 4 refers to excellent 
(or: “happens very often”). Many of these indicators capture cognitive social capital indicators, 
and are related to norms of cooperation. We expect none of these indicators to be directly 
related to agriculture –– they are of a more general nature. Both sets are based on village focus 
group discussions. The third set of social capital indicators represents the village average of 
household’s involvement in some of the events and aspects covered in the village survey. 
These indicators are converted to a continuous 0-1 scale, indicating the share of the 
households in the village involved.  
Our long list of social capital indicators, some of which are obviously strongly 
correlated, enables us to capture different dimensions of social capital. Following the 
discussion in section 2.2, we distinguish between structural social capital and cognitive social 
capital (trust and norms). In addition, and building on a literature that dates back to Putnam 
(2000), we further sub-divide structural social capital into two sub-classes and distinguish 
between bonding and bridging social capital. Bonding social capital refers to trust and norms 
within a well-defined (horizontal) social group, in our case fellow farmers (typically in the same 
village, but possibly kin members living elsewhere). Bridging social capital, in contrast, refers to 
linkages across groups, and for example captures whether individuals can hook up with wider 
networks. Figure 1 summarizes the classification of social capital dimensions that ensues, and 
how they are matched to the various indicators in Table 1. The resulting categorization, 
summarized in Table 2, represents the average of the social capital indicators within each 
category (where village indicators are first normalized on a 0-1 scale).  
As another approach to reduce the multidimensionality of our social capital variables 
we have done a principal factor analysis using a varimax rotation. The Kaiser criteria suggest 
retaining 4 factors, and the resulting clustering of indicators is partly consistent with the 
theoretically-informed approach summarized in Table 2. Alternative rotation methods and 
model specifications result in similar categorizations. In what follows we use the theoretically-
informed social capital proxies as the benchmark variables, and use the proxies based on factor 
analysis in a robustness analysis (section 3.4.3). 
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Figure 1: Classification social capital 
 
Table 2: Measures of social capital (n=2518) 
Mean Sd Min Max
SC1 Total Index of Social Capital 0.45 0.12 0.05 0.84
SC2a Index Cognitive Social Capital 0.58 0.15 0.03 0.95
SC2b Index Structural Social Capital 0.34 0.12 0.04 0.78
SC3a Index Cognitive Social Capital 0.58 0.15 0.03 0.95
SC3b Index Structural Bonding Social Capital 0.55 0.15 0.08 0.96
SC3c Index Structural Bridging Social Capital 0.18 0.12 0.00 0.64  
 
One concern with these categorizations is that cognitive and structural social capital are not 
necessarily separate dimensions. Instead, they may reinforce each other non-trivially—norms 
and relationships are interdependent (Snijders et al. 2007). As a first attempt to probe into this 
issue we have estimated models that include interaction terms (i.e. the product of our measures 
of cognitive and structural social capital). However, we found this did not change our main 
results (see below).  
Another concern is that our data places restrictions on what we can do to gauge 
structural components of social capital. Specifically, we have access to a measure of how 
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individuals are connected to others, but of course such network properties are relational 
(“joining social units”) and one’s network cannot be independent of those of others in the 
community (Wasserman and Pattison 1996; Bramoullé et al. 2009). To fully capture networks 
requires the use of census data (Marsden 1990). These notions have given rise to a rapidly 
growing literature on statistical social network modelling (see Robins et al. 2007 for a recent 
review). Forced by data constraints, however, we adopt an academic shortcut, and 
conceptualise networks (structural social capital) as the average connectivity in groups at the 
village level. Arguably this measure is exogenous to individual innovation measures. 
Next, we introduce our control variables. These include household and village 
characteristics (Table 3). Household variables are age and education of the household head, 
household size, farming experience, and land (as well as other assets) owned by the household. 
This list of covariates was motivated by the existing innovation literature (e.g. Isham 2002, 
Bandiera and Rasul 2006). Village variables capture the availability of public services (school, 
health care, infrastructure) and means of communication. Finally, we include a set of country 
dummies in our pooled models.  
 
Table 3: Summary statistics of household and village control variables (n=2518) 
Mean Sd Min Max
Panel A: Household control variables
Age Head Household 46.31 14.74 18 105
Education Head Household 3.22 2.27 0 22
Size Household 9.10 8.72 1 150
Farm Experience Household 24.56 15.82 0 300
Land owned by Household 6.94 35.06 0 1600
Total Number of Surveyed Assets 3.78 2.59 1 15
Panel B: Village control variables 
School 0.69 0.45 0 1
Health Post 0.37 0.47 0 1
Radio Connection 0.72 0.43 0 1
Mobile Phone Connection 0.85 0.35 0 1
Water Bodies 0.71 0.44 0 1
Boreholls and Wells 0.67 0.45 0 1  
 
To empirically test the ideas discussed in section 3.2 we first estimate several pooled country 
models (models 1-3). In model 1 we estimate agricultural innovation     for household i as a 
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function of the average level of social capital (   ) in village j. To control for potential country 
effects we add a set of country dummies     in model 1b.  
             (1a) 
               (1b) 
In models 2a-2b we unbundle our social capital indicator in accordance with the classification 
in Table 2: 
                      (2a) 
                            (2b) 
In model 3 we add the set of household control variables     for household i and     for 
village j as defined in Table 3: 
                                 (3) 
As a final step we investigate whether social capital influences innovation differently across 
Sub Saharan Africa, and test model 3 for each country separately (referred to as model 4). All 
models are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with errors defined at the household 
level2. 
3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Pooled Model  
Before presenting the regression results we will have a closer look at the data patterns. Farmers 
in our sample appear to have higher endowments of bonding social capital than of bridging 
social capital. Table 4 suggests that, on average, higher levels of social capital are associated 
with higher levels of agricultural innovation (even if there are exceptions). On average, when 
comparing farmers with 0 innovations with farmers with 20 innovations, the aggregate social 
capital index goes up with some 0.10 points. This is considerable, given that the minimum 
aggregate score is only 0.134.  
Table 4: Average values social capital by innovation size  
                                                          
2 We cannot include village-level fixed effects as our social capital variables are also measured at the 
village level. However, our results are qualitatively robust to estimating a random effects model with 
village dummies (details available on request). 
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0 1-4 5-8 9-12 13-16 17-20
(n=88) (n=529) (n=687) (n=784) (n=382) (n=48)
SC1 Total Index 0.394 0.396 0.456 0.472 0.498 0.502
a: Index Cognitive 0.507 0.519 0.588 0.598 0.621 0.606
b: Index Structural 0.288 0.282 0.332 0.355 0.385 0.406
a: Index Cognitive 0.507 0.519 0.588 0.598 0.621 0.606
b: Index Structural Bonding 0.479 0.480 0.551 0.573 0.599 0.613
c: Index Structural Bridging 0.145 0.134 0.168 0.191 0.224 0.250
SC2
SC3
Number of innovations
 
We now explore the relation between social capital and innovation with aid of regression 
analysis. Table 5 presents results of our pooled models (models 1-3 above). Model 1a indicates 
that, overall, social capital is strongly and positively correlated with the adoption of innovations 
in Africa. When we add country dummies, model (1b), the coefficient of social capital falls 
from 10.47 to 3.12, but is still significant at the 1% level. All country dummies enter significant 
at the 1% level as well (details not shown). In the remaining pooled models we include country 
dummies.  
Because different dimensions of social capital may have different impacts on 
innovation, we next unbundle our social capital indicator and distinguish between cognitive 
and structural social capital. According to model (2a), these types of social capital have 
opposite effects. Specifically, while structural social capital is associated with more adoption of 
innovations, the reverse is true for cognitive social capital3.
 
 
 
  
                                                          
3 Following up on the suggestion of one anonymous referee to look at the interaction between norms and 
relations, we have also estimated this model including a variable capturing the interaction between 
cognitive and structural social capital. This interaction term did not enter significantly in the pooled 
model and six of the seven country models (Uganda excluded), suggesting that interdependence of norms 
and relations is not a great problem for our data. 
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Table 5: Regression results model 1-3 (n=2518) 
Innovation index (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3) 
10.474*** 3.122***
(0.691) (0.706)
-2.273***
(0.633)
6.174***
(0.741)
-1.488** -1.478**
(0.643) (0.626)
-0.737 -0.954
(0.653) (0.637)
7.541*** 7.071***
(0.798) (0.786)
-0.006
(0.007)
0.081**
(0.032)
0.024***
(0.009)
0.017***
(0.006)
0.003
(0.002)
0.331***
(0.036)
-0.502***
(0.176)
0.059
(0.181)
0.038
(0.202)
1.045***
(0.199)
-0.379**
(0.166)
-0.193
(0.191)
3.316*** 1.566*** 2.228*** 2.858*** 1.383***
(0.324) (0.316) (0.327) (0.342) (0.456)
adj. R-sq 0.083 0.380 0.392 0.400 0.439
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10,  ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01
constant
Vil-water bodies
Vil-wells
country dummies no yes yesyes
Hh-age head 
Hh-education head
Hh-size
Hh-experience
Hh-land owned
Hh-assets index 
yes
Vil-schools
Vil-health
Vil-radio
Vil-mob
SC3c_StrBrid
SC1_Total
SC2a_Cognitive
SC2b_Structural
SC3a_CogBon
SC3b_StrBond
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The finding that participation in wider networks correlates with more innovation could be due 
to enhanced information or better access to resources. In contrast, norms of trust may result in 
inward-looking modes of behaviour, emphasizing conformity and reducing willingness to 
innovate. It could also be that building and maintaining cognitive social capital is especially 
time-consuming, displacing time and resources otherwise allocated to exploring opportunities 
for innovation. Another reason could be that the impact of social capital depends not only on 
the different dimensions, but also on the relative size of the different dimensions. Knack and 
Keefer (1997) for example argue that high levels of bonding capital, without bridging capital 
can result in limiting the flow of inputs or information beyond local networks, one of the main 
mechanisms through which innovation is expected to influence innovation. 
The results are made more precise in models (2b) and (3). These models both further 
unravel social capital into three distinct sub-types: cognitive -, structural-bonding -, and 
structural-bridging social capital. Strong intra-community trust and norms are associated with 
fewer innovations, and participating in vertical networks with “outsiders” is associated with 
enhanced adoption of innovations. Participation in horizontal (intra community) networks 
does not appear to be significantly correlated with innovation, regardless of whether we 
control for a list of covariates (model 3), or not (model 2b).  
Note that the coefficients of interest do not change much when we add the controls. 
The household controls themselves are related to innovation in way that conforms to 
expectations. Adoption of agricultural innovations is positively related to level of education, 
experience of the household in farming, and household wealth (proxied by the number of 
assets owned). At the village level, three control variables are significant. The availability of a 
mobile phone network has the expected positive sign. The coefficients for the other two 
variables (presence of a school and water bodies–streams, ponds and rivers) are negative.  
3.4.2 Country Models 
The African countries in our pooled sample differ across many dimensions –– agro-ecological, 
economic, social and institutional conditions. Table 6 summarizes social capital and agricultural 
innovation for the countries in our sample, confirming that the countries are different in these 
domains as well. Because it is not evident that this heterogeneity is fully captured by the 
country dummies, we also estimate the main innovation model for each country separately. 
Interestingly, casual inspection suggests that the overall tendencies discussed above vary 
considerably from country to country—the pooled model masks considerable heterogeneity at 
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the country-level. For example, while DRC scores for most of the social capital proxies are 
rather average, its innovation score is much lower than the score of the other countries. Upon 
comparing rows and columns, however, it appears as if within-country variation of social 
capital scores is greater than cross-country variation in terms of scores for specific forms of 
social capital. In particular, the bonding social capital scores appear much higher than the 
bridging scores, confirming anecdotal evidence about strong micro-institutions (based on 
kinship or otherwise) and weak integration of rural communities into greater networks. 
 
Table 6: Social capital by country 
DRC MW MZ NE NG RW UG
(n=441) (n=318) (n=277) (n=356) (n=533) (n=186) (n=407)
2.763 10.097 6.418 9.339 9.757 10.608 8.854
SC1 Total Index 0.383 0.482 0.377 0.442 0.576 0.453 0.410
a: Index Cognitive 0.503 0.630 0.475 0.563 0.716 0.583 0.527
b: Index Structural 0.272 0.344 0.287 0.329 0.445 0.332 0.301
a: Index Cognitive 0.503 0.630 0.475 0.563 0.716 0.583 0.527
b: Index Structural Bonding 0.459 0.566 0.470 0.542 0.641 0.649 0.527
c: Index Structural Bridging 0.132 0.177 0.150 0.169 0.299 0.095 0.132
Innovation index
SC2
SC3
Country
 
Across the board, the country-data appear consistent with the results of the pooled data 
discussed above –– innovation levels appear to “match” relevant social capital levels. However, 
there are serious exceptions. For example, Nigeria has the highest level of structural and 
bridging social capital, yet it only ranks third in terms of the innovation index. In contrast, 
Rwanda’s innovation score ranks first, but it also scores at the bottom in terms of bridging 
social capital. In Table 7 we aim to analyse the relationship between unbundled social capital 
and innovation for each country separately, controlling for our complete list of covariates (note 
that many entered significantly in the pooled model, improving its explanatory power).  
The country-specific results tend to support those of the pooled model. As before, 
cognitive bonding social capital is negatively associated with adoption of innovations for three 
out of seven countries at a 1% or 5% confidence level (Mozambique, Nigeria, Niger). Similarly, 
structural-bridging social capital is positively associated with innovation for Mozambique, 
Niger, Nigeria and UgandaError! Bookmark not defined.. This is expected, as it captures agriculture-
related links to the broader world through extension agents, NGOs and other institutions, 
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increasing access to knowledge and resources. But there are also new results that challenge the 
robustness or the general validity of the findings of the pooled data. 
 
Table 7: Regression results model 4 
Innovation index (4-DRC) (4-MW) (4-MZ) (4-NE) (4-NG) (4-RW) (4-UG)
1.952* -1.863 -4.206* -5.402** -8.929*** -10.694 1.624
(1.125) (1.536) (2.285) (2.390) (1.739) (7.397) (1.641)
-2.015 2.421 4.649** 0.091 3.009* -5.471** -7.981***
(1.329) (2.270) (2.275) (1.460) (1.644) (2.639) (1.827)
1.391 1.496 12.191*** 15.277*** 4.085*** -3.325 10.279***
(1.693) (2.756) (3.410) (2.246) (1.510) (7.856) (2.514)
0.007 -0.007 0.023 -0.047*** -0.007 -0.005 -0.014
(0.015) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.034) (0.018)
-0.046 0.237** 0.448*** -0.033 0.005 0.680*** 0.156*
(0.053) (0.106) (0.154) (0.110) (0.059) (0.143) (0.090)
0.025 -0.001 0.122** -0.001 0.018* 0.178* 0.061
(0.037) (0.043) (0.061) (0.031) (0.010) (0.101) (0.067)
0.002 -0.001 -0.009 0.060*** 0.027 0.048 0.027
(0.015) (0.019) (0.012) (0.017) (0.017) (0.030) (0.018)
0.089*** 0.002 0.093* 0.021 0.003 -0.017 -0.013
(0.016) (0.038) (0.048) (0.023) (0.002) (0.039) (0.027)
-0.006 0.408*** 0.191 0.295*** 0.397*** 0.561*** 0.034
(0.091) (0.117) (0.132) (0.080) (0.055) (0.189) (0.138)
-0.200 -0.581 -2.616*** -3.306*** -0.902 -0.592 0.436
(0.422) (0.377) (0.973) (0.568) (0.610) (0.865) (0.400)
-0.345 0.730 -0.850 0.450 -0.004 -0.522 0.190
(0.409) (1.347) (0.559) (0.348) (0.432) (1.370) (0.665)
-0.800** -0.612 -1.381 -0.262 -0.450 -3.050 1.156***
(0.322) (0.554) (1.163) (0.935) (0.675) (2.431) (0.414)
-0.028 0.579 -0.322 1.838** 1.491** -0.753 2.321***
(0.376) (1.688) (0.563) (0.722) (0.615) (0.894) (0.497)
0.339 -0.930* -0.288 -1.164*** 1.560*** 1.394 -1.217**
(0.367) (0.544) (0.871) (0.326) (0.486) (0.891) (0.481)
0.442 -0.890 0.602 0.000 0.664 -1.325 0.062
(0.425) (0.912) (0.616) (0.000) (0.491) (1.213) (0.456)
2.248*** 9.897*** 4.453* 10.829*** 7.296*** 15.913*** 8.119***
(0.753) (3.263) (2.284) (1.666) (1.537) (5.722) (1.415)
N 441 318 277 356 533 186 407
adj. R-sq 0.085 0.057 0.251 0.254 0.273 0.231 0.153
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10,  ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01
Vil-mob
Vil-water bodies
Vil-wells
constant
Hh-experience
Hh-land owned
Hh-assets index 
Vil-schools
Vil-health
Vil-radio
Hh-size
SC3a_CogBon
SC3b_StrBond
SC3c_StrBrid
Hh-age head 
Hh-education head
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First, while structural-bonding social capital did not enter significantly in the pooled model, we 
now observe it is significantly correlated with innovation in no less than four countries. 
However, positive and negative correlations are equally prevalent, explaining why we did not 
detect a significant average effect. Positive associations eventuate for Mozambique and Nigeria, 
and negative ones for neighbouring Uganda and Rwanda. This is especially interesting in light 
of the observation that these countries have comparable levels of innovation and structural 
bonding social capital. Additional regression analysis (not shown) suggests there is no 
explanation based on the relative size of the innovation index, the interaction among social 
capital dimensions or other characteristics at the country level (i.e. average land/labour ratios, 
openness of economy or being a post conflict country) or household level (i.e. assets or 
education). When estimating model 2b we see that for Mozambique and Nigeria the 
association with cognitive bonding social capital is much stronger than that of structural 
bonding social capital, because the signs are negative and significant. This corresponds to the 
results for Rwanda. For Uganda the coefficient is not significant. This implies that when we 
don’t combine the two different categorization of social capital, results are consistent across 
the board.  
Second, DRC is an exception to the “rule” that cognitive-bonding social capital is 
negatively correlated with innovations. DRC had the lowest score in terms of innovation, and 
peace has not gained a firm foothold in the study region. On-going conflict, and the inability to 
develop formal institutions that foster development, might explain this atypical outcome. As 
discussed in section 3.2, we expect cognitive social capital to have an ambiguous effect on 
innovation –– shared norms may facilitate cooperation and self-insurance, but also promote 
conformity. Our regression results suggest a more precise hypothesis, namely that the former 
effect dominates in a situation of turmoil and conflict, and that the latter effect dominates 
under more predictable circumstances. This hypothesis is supported by the extremely low 
Worldwide Governance Indicators for DRC (the average index for DRC is 4.92, whereas the 
other countries in our sample score between 18.04 and 47.8). However care needs to be taken 
when interpreting these results because the coefficient is only significant at the 10% level. 
Future research should explore this issue in a more systematic fashion, and analyse when and 
how context matters. 
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3.4.3 Robustness 
We now explore the robustness of our results, and discuss four alternative models. Regression 
results are presented in Table 8.4  
Until now we used ordinary least square (OLS) to estimate our models. However, 
because our dependent variable consist of count data ranging between 0 and 20, a Poisson 
model may be more appropriate. Column 1 confirms that cognitive bonding social capital is 
negatively associated with the level of innovation. The size of the coefficient is comparable to 
that of model 3 (for mean values of the exogenous variables). Column 1 also reports that 
structural bridging social capital is positively associated with innovation, as before. The main 
difference with model 3 is that the coefficient for structural bonding social capital, which was 
insignificant, now enters significantly and with a negative sign. However, this coefficient was 
border-line significant in our OLS model as well, so overall the findings are fairly comparable. 
Until now we used ordinary least square (OLS) to estimate our models. However, 
because our dependent variable consist of count data ranging between 0 and 20, a Poisson 
model may be more appropriate. Column 1 confirms that cognitive bonding social capital is 
negatively associated with the level of innovation. The size of the coefficient is comparable to 
that of model 3 (for mean values of the exogenous variables). Column 1 also reports that 
structural bridging social capital is positively associated with innovation, as before. The main 
difference with model 3 is that the coefficient for structural bonding social capital, which was 
insignificant, now enters significantly and with a negative sign. However, this coefficient was 
border-line significant in our OLS model as well, so overall the findings are fairly comparable. 
In the next column of Table 8 we replace our broad innovation index by an index 
that captures a subset of more universal innovations – agricultural innovations that are relevant 
for farmers across different contexts (see Appendix 3.1). The positive association between 
structural bridging social capital and innovation is again confirmed. However, the coefficient 
for cognitive bonding social capital becomes smaller and turns insignificant.  
 
  
                                                          
4 Unless specified otherwise, country models (not provided here) illustrate qualitatively similar results for 
the robustness analysis. 
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Table 8: Robustness analysis (n=2518) 
Innovation index (1) poisson (2) essential inn. (3) village level (4) factors
-0.162** -0.234 -1.999***
(0.070) (0.295) (0.745)
-0.120* -0.089 0.957
(0.069) (0.300) (0.609)
0.845*** 2.109*** 4.431***
(0.084) (0.370) (0.819)
-0.177**
(0.081)
0.542***
(0.076)
-0.102
(0.090)
0.706***
(0.094)
Vil-controls yes yes yes yes
0.812*** 1.145*** 0.331 1.106***
(0.0568) (0.215) (0.601) (0.377)
adj. R-sq 0.196 0.251 0.498 0.443
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10,  ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01
yes yes yes
yesyesyes
Factor 2
Factor 3
Factor 4
yes
Hh-controls yes
constant
Country dummies
SC3a_CogBon
SC3b_StrBond
SC3c_StrBrid
Factor 1
 
 
To test the quality of our social capital indicators, which until now are based on a combination 
of village and household data, we have also constructed social capital variables based on the 
focus group (i.e. village level) data only (see section I and II, Panel B Table 1). While the 
magnitude of the coefficients varies, the concluding findings are unaffected.  
Finally, we use factor analysis to further probe the robustness of our findings (results 
of the factor analysis are given in Appendix 3.2). The first factor captures mainly indicators 
identified as cognitive social capital. The negative and significant coefficient in column 4 is 
therefore as expected. The second factor covers a mix of structural social capital indicators, 
resulting in a positive and significant coefficient. The third factor is a mix of different types of 
social capital, even though the loading on bonding indicators is higher than the loading on 
bridging indicators. The coefficient is negative, but not significant. Our final factor again enters 
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positively and significantly. It captures several indicators, scoring especially high on structural 
bridging social capital.  
The factor analysis provides some support for the way we have grouped indicators 
together (but recall that the analysis is based on proxies of true networks only). In particular, 
our theoretical grouping of variables into dimensions covering cognitive and structural 
bridging social capital is rather consistent with the factor analysis. Hence, these indicators are 
correlated and proxy for the same type of social capital. However, the results with respect to 
structural bonding social capital are less clear-cut, and various relevant indicators are spread 
across multiple factors. This suggests the empirical categorization in sub-classes of social 
capital is less clean than predicted by theory. However, with the data at our disposal it is 
impossible to examine whether this is due to the way we have measured (structural) social 
capital, or due to possible interdependence of structural and cognitive social capital.  
3.5 Discussion and conclusion 
The important role of social capital in processes of growth and development is widely 
acknowledged. A rapidly growing literature identifies various channels through which social 
capital “matters”. In this paper we investigate one such channel, and explore whether social 
capital is associated with the adoption of agricultural innovations. We unbundle social capital, 
and distinguish between three dimensions: cognitive social capital, and two forms of structural 
social capital (bonding and bridging). Using a novel data set covering multiple African 
countries we illustrate that these dimensions are associated with innovation in a variety of 
ways. We also illustrate that results are generally consistent across the different countries, even 
though there are some noteworthy exceptions. 
We obtain a large and significant association between an aggregate measure of social 
capital and the adoption of agricultural innovations by farmers. Further analysis reveals this 
association stems mainly from so-called structural bridging social capital––the participation in 
networks that extend beyond the local village. This form of social capital captures agricultural-
related links creating access to knowledge and resources; hence this result is not surprising.  
We find a negative association between cognitive social capital, capturing intra-
community norms of cooperation and trust, and our innovation index. This result emerges 
both in the pooled data and some of the country models. This finding could represent “a dark 
side” of social capital. High levels of cognitive social capital might result in inward-looking 
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modes of behaviour, or displace time and resources away from agricultural innovation. 
However, this result does not imply that cognitive social capital is unimportant – it could serve 
other functions for community members (including insurance to idiosyncratic shocks, etc.). It 
only suggests that communities may pay a price for such functions in the form of attenuated 
incentives for innovation. 
We speculate these results have implications for policy makers. First, since both 
structural and cognitive social capital matters for the adoption of innovations, it may provide a 
natural leverage point for policy makers to promote agricultural development. Work by, for 
example, Fearon et al. (2009) suggests that social capital levels in villages respond to outside 
interventions, such as specific aid projects. Targeted interventions and projects could perhaps 
be exploited to foster innovation and development. Second, and related, it appears as if 
cognitive bonding social capital is a factor that impedes adoption of innovations. Insofar as 
education and safety network programs contribute to relaxing the push for conformity, 
enhanced adoption of agricultural innovation may be a by-product. 
There is ample scope for follow-up research. First, our country models suggest 
considerable cross-country heterogeneity. The way social capital interacts with other variables 
could be context-specific, and deserves closer scrutiny. For example, we find that cognitive 
social capital is positively associated with innovation in the DRC. We speculate this may be due 
to turmoil created by on-going conflict – a context in which shared norms and trust are 
perhaps especially relevant. Second, it would be interesting to conduct a similar analysis using 
an alternative set of innovation indicators. The current analysis is based on innovations that 
have emerged from the “technology pipeline,” but arguably more significant effects materialise 
for a broader set of indicators encompassing innovations that are the product of local 
interactive and embedded innovation processes. Third, future research should attempt to 
unravel the chain of causation, and extend beyond establishing correlations. This arguably 
reflects constructing panel datasets. 
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3.6 Appendix 
Appendix 3.1: Innovation indicators (n=2518) 
Innovation Indicators Mean Sd Innovation Indicators Mean Sd
Soil and Water Management Innovation Post Harvest Innovation
Mulching* 0.362 0.481 Drying 0.598 0.490
Trenches and Terraces 0.261 0.439 Threshing/Shelling Equipment0.329 0.470
Water Harvesting 0.163 0.369 Improved Storage Facilities 0.251 0.434
Irrigation 0.303 0.459 Pest Control 0.421 0.494
Conservation Farming 0.215 0.411 Grading 0.374 0.484
Other 0.259 0.438 Other 0.011 0.105
Soil and Fertility Management Innovation Other Product Enhancing Innovation
Animal Manure* 0.647 0.478 Improved Varieties 0.375 0.484
Cover Crops 0.174 0.379 Livestock Breeds 0.021 0.142
Crop Rotation* 0.483 0.500 Livestock Drugs & Feed 0.185 0.389
Intercropping* 0.227 0.419 Other 0.053 0.225
Rhizobia Inoculation 0.008 0.089 Crop Management Innovation
Chemical Fertilizer 0.095 0.293 Row Planting* 0.583 0.493
Other 0.464 0.499 Plant Spacing* 0.476 0.500
Organic Pesticides 0.145 0.353
Inorganic Pesticides 0.089 0.285
Other 0.412 0.492
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Appendix 3.2: Factor analysis (n=2518) 
Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 Uniqueness
I1.3 Cognitive 0.376 0.785
I2.2 Cognitive 0.525 0.670
I2.3 Cognitive 0.560 0.624
I2.4 Cognitive 0.573 0.633
I2.5 Cognitive 0.647 0.533
I2.6 Cognitive 0.633 0.536
I2.7 Cognitive 0.485 0.359 0.601
I2.8 Cognitive 0.439 0.791
I2.9 Cognitive 0.416 0.747
I2.10 Cognitive 0.258 0.915
I2.11 Cognitive 0.470 0.747
I3.2 Cognitive 0.875 0.194
I3.3 Cognitive 0.754 0.265 0.352
I2.1 Stru-Bond 0.458 0.708
I1.1 Stru-Bond 0.415 0.722
I1.2 Stru-Bond 0.927
I1.4 Stru-Bond 0.441 0.750
I3.1 Stru-Bond 0.893 0.177
I3.4 Stru-Bond 0.507 0.555 0.427
I1.5 Stru-Brid 0.630 0.600
I1.6 Stru-Brid 0.812 0.335
I1.7 Stru-Brid 0.652 0.559
I1.8 Stru-Brid 0.624 0.556
I1.9 Stru-Brid 0.643 0.561
I3.5 Stru-Brid 0.433 0.670 0.352
I3.6 Stru-Brid 0.767 0.370
I3.7 Stru-Brid 0.766 0.358
Note: blanks represent loading<.25
Dimension
 
 
 
42  
43  
Chapter 4 The impact of agricultural 
extension services on social capital: an 
application to the Sub-Saharan African 
Challenge Program in Lake Kivu region 
 
 
Abstract: Many participatory projects in rural Africa aim to indirectly enhance development by 
promoting different dimensions of social capital: cooperation in networks (formal or informal), 
trust and norms of behaviour that encourage mutually beneficial action. However, it is unclear 
whether external interventions can actually influence these dimensions of social capital, 
especially in the short term. To address this question, we used semi-experimental data to 
investigate the effects of agricultural research and development (ARD) on various indicators of 
social capital in the border region of Rwanda, Uganda and the DRC. Specifically, we focused 
on the effects of the Integrated Agricultural Research for Development Approach (IAR4D) 
and compared it to conventional ARD efforts. We showed that IAR4D has influenced the 
level of social capital, although not in all dimensions and not consistently for all countries. In 
the DRC and Uganda, for example, IAR4D strengthened the networks that link villages to the 
outside world (bridging social capital), but not in other countries. We also found indications 
that IAR4D resulted in higher levels of intra-village networks (bonding social capital) in 
Rwanda and improved trust and norms of cooperation (cognitive social capital) in the DRC. 
Finally, we showed that traditional agricultural extension (ARD) has been less successful than 
IAR4D. 
 
 
 
 
Paper by Fédes van Rijn, Ephraim Nkonya and Adewale Adekunle. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Social capital – usually defined in terms of trust, adherence to norms and/or participation in 
networks – is known to play an important role in development. In recent decades, social capital 
has been used to explain more and more phenomena. For example, the seminal work by 
Knack and Keefer (1997) and Zak and Knack (2001) illustrated how social capital, in terms of 
trust and civic norms, is related to economic growth and investment. At the micro level, social 
capital is being increasingly used as an explanatory variable for aspects such as household 
income (Narayan and Pritchett 1999), advanced agricultural innovation (Isham 2002; Bandiera 
and Rasul 2006), access to credit (Besley et al. 1993) and reduced transaction costs (Fafchamps 
and Minten 2002).  
It is still unclear under which conditions these and other benefits of social capital 
accrue (e.g. Ahlerup et al. 2009) or whether they are in fact always positively related to 
development (e.g. Dasgupta 2005). Underlying this discussion is the wide variety of concepts 
and measures used to capture social capital. Some researchers question whether the concept 
has been conceptualised and measured appropriately (Sabatini 2005) and even whether it 
should be used at all (Bowles and Gintis 2001). Woolcock (2010) uses the term “essentially 
contested concepts” from Gallie (1956) to emphasize that the utility of the concept lies in 
facilitating constructive discussion on the importance of social relationships, rather than on 
forging consensus on how it is defined exactly. In any case much development aid increasingly 
pays attention to the importance of social relations, or building social capital. Many of these 
projects aim to enhance economic development indirectly by promoting cooperation in 
networks and by encouraging trust and norms of behaviour that involve mutual beneficial 
action. Mansuri and Rao (2004) estimated that the World Bank alone increased its lending to 
“community driven” and “participatory” projects from $325 million in 1996 to $2 billion in 
2003; if a broader definition is used, the lending increased from $3 billion to $7 billion.  
However, it is far from clear whether external interventions can actually influence 
social capital, especially in the short term. Many authors argue that social capital is a result of 
long-term historical processes (Putnam 2000; Bowles and Gintis 2001; Nunn and Wantchekon 
2011). On the other hand, some empirical evidence also indicates the potential to influence 
social capital (e.g. Bebbington and Carroll 2002; Krishna and Uphoff 2002), even in the short 
term (Fearon et al. 2009; Labonne and Chase 2011). On balance, however, the research on 
social capital has been more successful at documenting its potential role in development than 
identifying how, whether and to what extent external interventions can contribute to this 
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process (Grootaert and Bastelaer 2002). Without such knowledge, the policy implications of 
the documented effects of social capital remain unclear.  
One initiative where social capital has a clear role is in Integrated Agricultural 
Research for Development (IAR4D). Hawkins et al. define (2008) IAR4D broadly as “a set of 
individual and organisational behaviours that promote the integration of stakeholder concerns, 
knowledge, action and learning around a theme of mutual interest”. The development of 
IAR4D by a broad range of actors involved in agricultural research and development stems 
from the dissatisfaction with the fragmented and reductionist approach of traditional 
agricultural research and development. Hawkins et al. argue that if development is “ … about 
behaviour and capacity, then IAR4D needs to focus on improving behavioural processes and 
capacities as outcomes, rather than on (technology or policy) products as outputs”. Against this 
background, the Sub-Saharan African Challenge Programme (SSA CP) was initiated in 2005. 
The SSA CP has adopted IAR4D as its main philosophy. Innovation Platforms (IP), which can 
be described as an informal coalition and alliance of conventional agricultural research and 
development actors, are at the core of the approach. 
This programme clearly illustrates the important role social capital can have in 
development interventions with a participatory and multi-stakeholder character. The objective 
of our research was to analyse the effects that such a programme can have on various 
indicators of social capital. We did this by analysing data collected in the context of the SSA 
CP in the border region of Rwanda, Uganda and the DRC. We also compared the impact of 
IAR4D to the impact of conventional Agricultural Research and Development (ARD). We 
separated our indicators according to two dimensions: structural and cognitive, and bonding 
and bridging social capital. 
In Section 4.2 we discuss our theoretical framework, including a more detailed 
discussion on the concept of social capital, the role of social capital in development 
interventions, the IAR4D approach and the role of social capital in this approach. In Section 
4.3, we summarise our data and describe the model that we used to estimate the impact of 
IAR4D and ARD on social capital. In Section 4.4 we discuss the outcomes of these models, 
including several tests of robustness. We discuss our results in Section 4.5 and present our 
conclusions in Section 4.6.  
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4.2 Theoretical Framework 
4.2.1 Development aid and social capital 
Despite the conceptual vagueness of social capital (see section 2.1 and 2.2) and the uncertainty 
of its benefits (see section 2.4), development aid has invested significantly in efforts to increase 
it. Many of these efforts are community-driven or participatory projects based on the 
“community-driven development” approach, an umbrella term for projects and programmes 
that actively include their beneficiaries in processes such as design, management and 
evaluation. In a critical review, Mansuri and Rao (2004) showed that little evidence is available 
on the effectiveness of this approach. It is therefore unclear whether the benefits of social 
capital that the projects try to promote – reducing information problems, expanding resources 
available to the poor and strengthening the organisations that represent them – are actually 
achieved. Some even argue that the rapid expansion of such efforts has resulted in a severe 
waste of development resources (Yujiro 2009). 
More generally, it is still debatable whether external interventions can actually 
influence social capital, especially in the short term. A large body of literature suggests that 
social capital is historically derived (e.g. Putnam 2003 cited in Grootaert and Bastelaer 2002), is 
a result of long-run evolutionary processes (Bowles and Gintis 2001) or is shaped by critical 
junctures in history, such as the extraction of slaves from Africa (Nunn and Wantchekon 
2011). Pargal et al. (2002) argued that social capital, which they equate with community 
cohesion, might be something that is inherent to people’s ability to relate to one another. They 
showed that “homogeneity of interests and points of view” are paramount in explaining levels 
of social capital in their sample in Bangladesh. Even though social capital can be channelled to 
different uses, they suggested it might be hard for policy makers to influence actual levels of 
social capital (also see Alesina and Ferrara 2005 cited in Fearon et al. 2009). Others have 
empirically verified that development assistance programmes or projects, specifically those 
focusing on influencing social capital (or certain facets thereof), were unsuccessful (Gugerty 
and Kremer 2002). This coincides with the idea that programmes focussing on social capital 
may not be purposefully designed for economic benefit. Rather, when the need arises, pre-
existing social capital is used (Yujiro 2009).  
However, this does not mean that social capital cannot be created. An increasing 
number of studies have indicated that social capital can in fact be influenced by external 
interventions, even in the short term. For example, Krishna and Uphoff (2002) illustrated that 
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intra-district differences in social capital are much bigger than the inter-district differences that 
could be a result of history. More specifically, a number of studies have suggested that social 
capital can indeed be influenced by external interventions. Uphoff and Wijayaratna (2000) 
showed how efforts to induce social capital in Indonesia, in terms of collective irrigation 
management, resulted in long-term successful cooperation. Case study evidence from the rural 
Andes reported by Bebbington and Carroll (2002) showed that trust, reciprocity and 
cooperation can be stimulated by sensitive and persistent support. Pronyk et al. (2008) provide 
statistical evidence in relation to a microfinance program in South Africa that social capital can 
be generated intentionally. Recent work by Fearon et al. (2009), using a randomised field 
experiment to analyse the impact on community reconstruction groups in Liberia, supports 
this Also based on a solid statistical analysis, Labonne and Chase (2011) showed that 
community driven development projects in Philippines increased various indicators of social 
capital. Even more interesting, both studies show the impact was achieved within a time frame 
of about two years. 
4.2.2 Integrated Agricultural Research for Development and social capital 
To understand the role of social capital in IAR4D, we must take a closer look at how IAR4D is 
conceptualised in practice. The core of the approach relies on Innovation Platforms (IPs) 
which, although operating at various administrative levels, are positioned at the local 
governmental level and are active at the village level. They represent an institution that brings 
together stakeholders in the agricultural sector, including farm households, local government 
agencies, scientist, NGOs and traders. To abide with the IAR4D approach, the IPs have to 
fulfil five criteria (Hawkins et al. 2008). First, they should be characterised by representative, 
inclusive and diverse partnerships. A second criterion relates to the existence of nonlinear, 
collective and collaborative interaction among IP actors. Third, research should address key 
constraints and opportunities in the value chain as agreed upon in the IP. Fourth, the research 
process should be multidisciplinary and participatory. The fifth criterion states that institutional 
and human capacity building of IAR4D actors is part of the approach.  
This clearly shows that the main aim of IAR4D is not to directly influence certain 
development outcomes (e.g. agricultural innovation or income), but to create a setting to 
enable these outcomes. The formation of the IP is therefore the immediate output of the 
IAR4D approach. The activities that are initiated as a result of the interaction in these IPs are 
probably the largest source of IAR4Ds potential influence on the level of (structural) social 
capital. These can take place between households within the same village (i.e. bonding social 
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capital), but mostly between farm households and other actors involved in agricultural research 
and development, such as scientists, local government agents and traders (i.e. bridging social 
capital). Examples of such activities are the formation of farmer groups for the implementation 
of measures to control soil erosion in Bufundi, Uganda; the organisation of communal sales of 
cassava in Masisi, DRC; or the introduction of a loan scheme for dairy cattle in Burera, 
Rwanda. These activities might go hand in hand with changes in trust or norms of cooperation 
(i.e. cognitive social capital). The IP might also stimulate formal and informal networks, trust 
and norms of cooperation outside the IP. This increase in different dimensions of social capital 
can enable the adherence to key constraints and opportunities as agreed upon in the IP 
(Criterion 3) and allow the research process to be multidisciplinary and participatory (Criterion 
4). Together, these impacts on and through social capital are expected to result in improved 
development outcomes. The latter will be a topic for future research. 
Social capital is thus an important component of IAR4D, which aims to increase 
farmers’ participation in the identification and evaluation of innovations and the collective 
action in the production and marketing of agricultural products. We focus on the effect of the 
IAR4D approach in its entirety, with the IP as its immediate outcome, rather than on the effect 
of the exact activities resulting from the IPs which clearly vary by platform. Our study thus 
investigated whether social capital is indeed influenced by the IAR4D approach and how it 
relates to the influence of the conventional Agriculture Research and Development initiatives 
(ARD).  
4.3 Data and Methodology 
4.3.1 Data set and sampling 
To analyse the relationship between IAR4D and social capital, we used data collected in a 
large-scale experiment to test the impact of the Integrated Agricultural Research for 
Development (IAR4D) approach. The data collection corresponding to the experimental 
approach of the program was part of the Sub-Saharan African Challenge Programme (SSA 
CP). Measurement of social capital was considered important from the start of the project 
because it is considered one of the pathways through which IAR4D operates and generates 
impact. The data set consisted of a baseline survey conducted between mid-2008 and mid-2009 
and a second survey in mid-20105. The sample area consisted of the border region between 
                                                          
5 Previous results using this data were reported by e.g. chapter 3 and Nkonya, Oduol et al. (2010). 
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Rwanda, Uganda and the DRC – referred to as the Lake Kivu (LK) project learning site. Being 
set up as a large-scale experiment for evaluating the impact of IAR4D, in this section we 
discuss how we constructed a realistic counterfactual: what would have happened to the level 
of social capital if the programme had not been implemented?  
To obtain a representative sample, data collection was based on various stages 
(FARA 2009) 6. First the region was stratified according to the various countries. The LK 
region was initially chosen because the various countries emerged from conflict at different 
times in recent decades, resulting in differing national policies, institutions and physical 
infrastructures (Bekunda et al. 2005 from Farrow et al. 2011). These differences could 
influence the outcomes of IAR4D. The second stage was a characterisation of target zones in 
terms of market access; four sites were randomly selected in each country, two with good 
market access and two with poor market access. Following a structured village characterisation 
on aspects such as the level of agricultural research and development between 2003 and 2008, 
villages in each zone were classified into two types: villages with conventional agricultural 
research and development projects (ARD villages) and villages without ARD (clean villages). 
ARD projects included those initiatives identifying, promoting and disseminating technologies, 
mostly related to the production and marketing of farm products. In sites with mostly clean 
villages, 76 villages were randomly selected for IAR4D intervention. In sites with a mixture of 
clean and ARD villages, 82 villages were selected as clean counterfactual villages and 84 were 
selected as “ARD counterfactual” villages. The final stage was based on a random selection of 
10 households per village.  
                                                          
6 See Farrow, Opondo et al. and Thorton, Stroud et al. for a detailed discussion on site selection.  
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Table 1: Ex-ante comparison treatment and control groups (n=2237)
IAR4D
n=676
Mean Mean Mean
Panel A: household variables
gender of household head 0.815 0.793 -0.022 0.828 0.013
age of household head in years 44.803 45.909 1.106 45.592 0.789
education level of household head 3.294 3.354 0.059 3.402 0.107
highest level of education attained by hh 4.490 4.597 0.108 4.782 0.292 **
size of the household 6.396 6.510 0.114 6.768 0.372 **
number of males aged 16-58years 1.499 1.443 -0.056 1.574 0.076
number of females aged 16-58years 1.504 1.558 0.054 1.612 0.108 **
number of years of experience in farming 21.452 22.495 1.043 22.409 0.957
asset index (agricultral and non-agricultural assets) 1.960 1.848 -0.112 * 1.916 -0.044
visit to extension agent in past year 0.084 0.082 -0.003 0.084 -0.001
visit by extension agent in past year 0.044 0.041 -0.003 0.046 0.001
participation in research demonstration in past year 0.056 0.036 -0.020 * 0.047 -0.009
membership in farm association 0.241 0.271 0.030 0.243 0.002
number of rooms (excl.  kitchen and bathrooms) 3.692 3.573 -0.120 3.807 0.115
Panel B: village variables
schools 0.478 0.468 -0.010 0.435 -0.043 *
health centres 0.111 0.142 0.032 * 0.207 0.096 ***
boreholes/wells 0.163 0.168 0.006 0.240 0.077 ***
network coverage for radio 0.559 0.396 -0.163 *** 0.368 -0.192 ***
all weather roads 0.584 0.468 -0.117 *** 0.506 -0.079 ***
network coverage for mobile phones 0.790 0.702 -0.088 *** 0.728 -0.062 ***
 * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01 signifcantly different from IAR4D
Control 1: clean Control 2: ARD
n=772 n=789
diff diff
 
Compared to the evaluations of many existing development interventions (if any), this 
sampling strategy is a major improvement. Nevertheless, the data has two limitations 
considering the measurement of impact. First of all, whereas clean and IAR4D villages were 
selected from the same pool of villages (those without ARD during the last 2-5 years), the 
ARD villages were selected from a group of villages that already received ARD. It can be 
argued that receiving ARD is a result of specific characteristics such as accessibility or informal 
networks, and that those villages might have performed better or worse to start with. Second, 
social capital data was not well registered in the baseline survey and is missing for about 50% 
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of the villages (although it was correctly captured at household level). When analysing the 
missing data, we did not find a consistent pattern in terms of observable household or village 
characteristics; of the covariates that are significant in explaining whether social capital data is 
missing, some are expected to be correlated with higher levels of social capital, whereas others 
are expected to be correlated with lower levels of social capital7. However, the social capital 
data was missing for specific regions, resulting in a potential bias. Because data collection was 
part a stratified randomised intervention we therefore rely on the 2010 data for our main 
analysis. We controlled for the differences in observable baseline conditions listed in Table 1in 
all our estimations. We also estimate our results separately for IAR4D from that of ARD. 
Moreover, we used a fixed effect model and a propensity score model to test the robustness of 
our results (see section 4.3.4 for more details). 
4.3.2 Social capital indicators 
We used a mix of social capital indicators from the focus-group survey with farmers in the 
village (Panel A and B in Table 2) and the household survey (Panel C in Table 2). The first part 
captured the occurrence of certain gatherings at the village level by asking “How often in the 
last twelve months has the following happened in the village (0 to a maximum)?” The answers 
were rescaled to a 0 to 4 scale, where a score of 0 means “never happens” and a score of 4 
means “happens more than 5 times a month on average”. The second set of indicators 
describes aspects of social life in the village by asking “How would you assess this village on 
the following aspects?” These indicators were measured on a 0-4 scale, where a score of 0 
means “never happens” and a score of 4 means “happens very often”. Besides the village data, 
we also used a set of social capital indicators at the household level. This relates to the 
interactions among households in certain gatherings by asking “In the last 12 months, how 
often has a member of your household participated in the following? Answers were converted 
to a binary no/yes scale, where 0 indicates “never happens”.  
We captured and compared the impact of agricultural research and development on 
various dimensions of social capital. For purposes of comparison, we first created an average 
                                                          
7 Missing data is associated with households that have a higher educated household head (0.021***), more 
members (0.008*), more assets (.029***) and bigger houses (.023**). On the other hand, less missing data 
is also associated with lower membership in farmer associations (-.081**) and smaller houses (-.008***). 
At village level we find similar patterns where less missing data is associated with more access to schools, 
health centres and mobile phone networks but also with less access to radio and water. 
52 | Chapter 4 
social capital index, initially assuming that all indicators could be similarly affected by the 
IAR4D approach. In accordance with an earlier study by van Rijn et al. (see chapter 3), we 
distinguished between cognitive, structural bonding and structural bridging social capital (see 
Table 2). Structural social capital includes indicators related to formal and informal networks, 
whereas cognitive social capital relates to trust and norms of cooperation. The difference 
between bonding and bridging is akin to indicators capturing within- versus outside village 
social capital. The latter subdivision only applied to structural social capital, because we 
considered all our cognitive social capital indicators to be bonding. For this categorisation we 
normalised the village data to a 0-1 scale. Summary statistics are presented in Table 3.  
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Table 2: Social Capital Indicators8 (n=2237)
Min Max Mean Sd
Panel A: Happenings
social gathering 0 4 1.78 1.08 2nd S Bo
community project gathering 0 4 2.20 1.36 1st S Bo
financial contribution 0 4 1.05 1.07 2nd C Bo
village meeting 0 4 1.53 1.14 1st S Bo
agricultural visit to agent/organization 0 4 0.37 0.75 1st S Br
agricultural visit to other village 0 4 0.29 0.64 1st S Br
agricultural visit from other village 0 4 0.31 0.66 1st S Br
external agricultural training 0 4 0.60 0.80 1st S Br
agricultural visit from agent/organization 0 4 0.86 0.71 1st S Br
Panel B: Aspects
participation in community activities 0 4 2.42 0.87 1st S Bo
extent of trust among people 0 4 2.32 0.81 2nd C Bo
cooperation among people 0 4 2.47 0.86 1st C Bo
giving or exchanging gifts 0 4 2.10 0.99 2nd C Bo
financial contr. for comm. activities 0 4 2.03 1.14 2nd C Bo
financial contr. to group activities 0 4 1.35 1.21 2nd C Bo
spirit of helping others especially the poor 0 4 1.48 1.08 2nd C Bo
settling conflicts or disputes among people 0 4 2.78 0.76 2nd C Bo
abiding by the norms and byelaws 0 4 2.22 0.94 1st C Bo
women confidence to speak in public 0 4 2.36 0.94 2nd C Bo
men's respect and consideration of women 0 4 2.35 0.92 2nd C Bo
Panel C: Interactions
community participation 0 1 0.76 0.43 1st S Bo
community financial contribution 0 1 0.66 0.47 2nd C Bo
settling conflicts 0 1 0.60 0.49 2nd C Bo
agricultural learning in community 0 1 0.43 0.50 1st S Bo
agricultural between communities 0 1 0.32 0.46 1st S Br
visiting research institutes 0 1 0.13 0.34 1st S Br
visiting in extension office 0 1 0.15 0.36 1st S Br
Cognitive/ 
Structural
Bonding/ 
Br idging
1st order/ 
2nd order
 
                                                          
8 We are aware of the fact that certain indicators seem to measure comparable issues (e.g. community 
gatherings and village meetings). However we adopt the existing list since this was an outcome of 
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In practice, the IAR4Dness approach puts more emphasis on specific aspects of social capital, 
identified as the “first order” indicators in Table 2. These indicators were mostly related to the 
direct potential outcomes or impact of the IP and included village and community gatherings 
related to agricultural extension. At the same time, our social capital indicators were highly 
interdependent, and we expected (at least in the long term) that part of the impact will trickle 
down to the other social capital indicators. This was captured by the set of “second order” 
indicators. We noted that the first order indicators were spread across all dimensions, although 
relatively more in the area of structural bridging (8 out of 8 indicators), followed by structural 
bonding (3 out of 6) and lastly cognitive bonding (3 out of 14) social capital. We would like to 
stress that the IP is the immediate outcome of the IAR4Dness approach. First order indicators 
are therefore not necessarily project activities, but rather project outcomes or impacts. 
 
Table 3: Social capital dimensions (n=2237) 
Min Max Mean Sd
1. Total index of social capital 0.10 0.77 0.42 0.11
2. Cognitive bonding social capital 0.00 0.92 0.53 0.13
3. Structural bonding social capital 0.04 0.96 0.53 0.18
4. Structural bridging social capital 0.00 0.91 0.15 0.16  
 
4.3.3 Empirical model  
To empirically test for the potential of agricultural research and development interventions to 
influence social capital we estimate the nth dimension of social capital (SCn) as a function of 
participation in IAR4D or ARD, household control variables     and village control variables 
   , a set of country dummies     and a dummy variable that indicates whether it is a new site 
or not (        : 
                                                     (1) 
The nth dimension of SC is measured for household i in village j  in 2010 (see Table 3). DIAR4
captures the effect of integrated agricultural research for development, whereas ARD captures 
the effect of traditional agricultural research and development, for village j. To control for 
                                                                                                                                                   
intensive discussion and collaboration between a wide range of people and organisations experienced in 
collection of survey data across Africa. 
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potential bias of various household or village characteristics, we incorporated the set of 
household covariates ( X ) and village covariates (Y ) as listed in Table 1. Because a clear 
consensus on the determinants of social capital has not yet developed in the relevant literature, 
we included a very basic set of covariates relating to households’ demographics, education, 
assets, farm experience, access to extension and membership in farm organisations (also see 
Beard 2005). We included several covariates to capture village access to rural services. Because 
we expected the programme to influence some of these variables, we used baseline data 
measured in 2008. Finally, we included country dummies ( Z ) to indicate country-specific 
effects and a dummy newsite  for those villages where IAR4D was implemented in 2009. This 
is to control for the fact that the program was implemented with a one-year delay in 
approximately 25% of the villages. We estimate the model using Ordinary Least Squares and, 
because treatment was at village level, we cluster the household error term    at village level j. 
This should prevent unobservable factors at the village level that can influence social capital, 
for example recent or historical external shocks, from biasing our estimations. 
Besides estimating the overall potential of influencing social capital, we also 
hypothesised that this might depend on the socio, economic or institutional context within 
which an intervention is implemented. Therefore, we also estimated our model (1) separately 
for the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda.  
4.3.4 Robustness analysis 
To make our empirical results more robust we test for the effect of agricultural extension 
services on social capital using four alternative models. As a first robustness test we used an 
alternative sample, including only control households selected from the “clean” villages, i.e. the 
same pool from which the treatment villages were selected. We also excluded villages where 
the programme was implemented with a one-year delay. This reduced our overall sample from 
2019 to 936, and resulted in the following model: 
                                              (2) 
As a second test of robustness, we took advantage of the fact that social capital data were also 
collected in the baseline survey for almost 50% of our sample. Using a fixed effects model, we 
control for unobserved and time invariant household effects that might influence social capital, 
such as the general tendency or ability to socialise or network. To prevent a bias in our results, 
we only included data of IPs collected in both years and data on the treatment and 
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corresponding control villages. This reduced our data set to 968 households, covering 3 IPs in 
DRC, 1 in Rwanda and 2 in Uganda.  
                                                                (3) 
The interaction terms between the treatment and the year dummy (0 for baseline, 1 for 2010) 
give the average treatment effect. The time dummy (year) was also included separately to pick 
up any time effects.  
A third test of robustness relies on propensity score matching (PSM). PSM is an 
alternative method to control for observed pre-treatment differences between our treatment 
group and control groups (Rubin 1979). We use the propensity scores to estimate the 
probability of a village to participate in IAR4D village. The propensity score )(P  is estimated 
for household i as a function of pre-treatment household or village control variables (X and Y) 
                 (4) 
We calculate     for country z for two counterfactuals; one based on clean villages and one 
based on conventional ARD villages. We include those pre-treatment variables which jointly 
determine treatment propensity at p<20%9. Based on these probabilities a control group is 
selected using stratification matching. We eliminate households from our sample that fall 
outside the common support, i.e. households that do not have potentially comparable 
households with a different treatment status. This approach nets out the impact of additive and 
observable fixed factors on project outcomes (Ravallion 2005). After the matching, the mean 
social capital indicators in the IAR4D group are compared to those in the control group. To 
enhance robustness of the estimates, the error term was bootstrapped (see Caliendo and 
Kopeinig 2005 for more technical details on psm). We estimate the propensity score using a 
logit model to confine values between 0 and 1. 
In the final robustness test, we used an alternative method to aggregate our social 
capital dimensions. In our main analysis we assumed that the individual indicators have equal 
                                                          
9 We use a backward selection method with a 20% significance level (P > |t| = <.20) meaning that the 
first model includes all variables and variables are deleted one by one if not significant at 20%. The 
significance level was chosen to overestimate rather than underestimate the role of the covariates in 
determining the impact on social capital. Using this cut-off point we include almost all variables which 
demonstrate significant differences for the specific treatment and control group (results not reported in 
his paper but available upon request). 
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weights and are additive in nature. As another approach, in accordance with Sabatini (2005), 
we used the first factor obtained from a principal component analysis (PCA) performed on the 
group of indicators in each dimension. This factor analysis was done separately for the country 
models. This factor captures the correlation between the different indicators. This model is 
identical to model (1), except that we replaced the social capital dimensions with their first 
principal component.  
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Mean comparison social capital indicators 
As a first step in our analysis, we compared the mean values of the individual social capital 
indicators (see Table 2) of households in IAR4D villages with household in control villages in 
2010. Table 4 clearly shows that households from IAR4D villages have mostly higher levels of 
social capital.  
IAR4D villages scored higher in relation to frequency of agricultural visits to 
organisations, agricultural visits from and to other villages and external agricultural training and 
visits (H5-9). In addition, they scored higher than clean control villages in terms of frequency 
of social and community project gatherings (H1-2), and making financial contributions to 
community projects (H3). However, the differences in various aspects of village social life are 
not as clear. In relation to participation in community activities, there is a significant and 
positive difference compared to clean villages, although this difference is negative compared to 
ARD villages (A1). Moreover, IAR4D villages scored lower in terms of “giving and exchanging 
gifts” (A4). This is also the case for “financial contribution to community activities” (A5) and 
“spirit of helping others especially the poor” (A7) compared to clean villages and for 
“cooperation among people” (A3) compared to ARD villages. But there is a positive difference 
in terms of “abiding to norms and byelaws” (A9) and “men’s respect and consideration of 
women” (A11), the latter only being significant compared to ARD villages. This mixed result is 
perhaps not surprising, since most of these indicators are either not potential first order 
outcomes of the IP (see Table 2) or refer to a dimension of social capital that is likely to 
respond to change more slowly (i.e. trust and norms of cooperation).  
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Table 3: Mean values social capital indicators by treatment (n=2237)
IAR4D
N=676
Mean Mean Mean
Panel A: Happenings (H)
social gathering 1.905 1.519 0.386 *** 1.930 -0.025
community project gathering 2.284 2.019 0.265 *** 2.303 -0.019
financial contribution 1.087 0.951 0.137 ** 1.122 -0.034
village meeting 1.578 1.490 0.089 1.536 0.042
agricultural visit to agent/organization 0.479 0.310 0.170 *** 0.331 0.148 ***
agricultural visit to other village 0.359 0.222 0.138 *** 0.295 0.064 *
agricultural visit from other village 0.422 0.233 0.188 *** 0.293 0.129 ***
external agricultural training 0.688 0.521 0.167 *** 0.603 0.085 *
agricultural visit from agent/organization 0.954 0.749 0.205 *** 0.876 0.078 *
Panel B: Aspects (A)
participation in community activities 2.422 2.282 0.139 *** 2.548 -0.126 ***
extent of trust among people 2.349 2.289 0.060 2.317 0.032
cooperation among people 2.417 2.483 -0.066 2.503 -0.086 *
giving or exchanging gifts 1.957 2.070 -0.113 ** 2.241 -0.284 ***
financial contr. for comm. activities 1.979 2.101 -0.122 ** 1.997 -0.018
financial contr. to group activities 1.357 1.348 0.008 1.332 0.024
spirit of helping others especially the poor 1.425 1.522 -0.097 * 1.480 -0.056
settling conflicts or disputes among people 2.791 2.802 -0.010 2.750 0.041
abiding by the norms and byelaws 2.365 2.082 0.284 *** 2.228 0.137 ***
women confidence to speak in public 2.354 2.364 -0.010 2.349 0.005
men's respect and consideration of women 2.402 2.364 0.038 2.286 0.116 **
Panel C: Interactions (I)
community participation 0.768 0.763 0.005 0.736 0.031
community financial contribution 0.688 0.649 0.039 0.645 0.043 *
settling conflicts 0.646 0.598 0.048 * 0.574 0.072 ***
agricultural learning in community 0.429 0.443 -0.014 0.428 0.001
agricultural between communities 0.288 0.325 -0.037 0.330 -0.041 *
visiting research institutes 0.146 0.133 0.013 0.122 0.025
visiting in extension office 0.176 0.154 0.022 0.133 0.043 **
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01 (significantly different from the treatment group)
Control 1: clean Control 2: ARD
N=772 N=789
diff diff
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At the household level, the most significant and surprising difference related to settling conflict 
(I3). Interestingly, the impact was even higher compared to conventional ARD villages. It 
appears as if conventional ARD has not only “failed” to influence this, but might even have 
influenced it negatively. Finally, household data seems to indicate that households from 
IAR4D villages were involved in less agricultural exchange between communities, especially 
compared to ARD villages. This is not only counter to expectations, but also contradicts the 
results from the village indicators.  
To gain more insight into the overall impact of IAR4D and to evaluate how it relates 
to the impact of ARD, we grouped the dimensions as shown in Table 2. The results confirmed 
the significant differences in social capital compared to clean villages, reflected in both forms 
of structural social capital. Compared to ARD villages, there was only a significant difference 
in relation to structural bridging social capital. There was no significant difference in terms of 
cognitive social capital. These results adequately summarise the observations made on the 
individual indicators.  
 
Table 4: Mean values social capital dimensions by treatment (n=2237) 
IAR4D
n=676
Total index of social capital 0.427 0.407 0.020 *** 0.418 0.009
Cognitive bonding social capital 0.167 0.140 0.027 *** 0.148 0.019 **
Structural bonding social capital 0.541 0.506 0.035 *** 0.541 0.000
Structural bridging social capital 0.535 0.526 0.009 0.529 0.007
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01 (significantly different from the treatment group)
Control 1: clean Control 2: ARD
n=772 n=789
 
 
4.4.2 Regression results, social capital dimensions - pooled model 
We then explored the relationship between our social capital dimensions and both forms of 
agricultural extension services using regression analysis with Model (1). Besides adding several 
control variables (Table 1),  by clustering the error term at the village level we took into 
account the possibility that the level of social capital is partly explained by unknown and 
unobserved factors at the village level.  
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Table 5: Results pooled model (n=2236)
SC Struc-Brid Struc-Bond Cognitive
IAR4D 0.019 0.035 0.026 0.005
(0.013) (0.016)** (0.017) (0.017)
ARD 0.010 0.001 0.035 0.004
(0.012) (0.013) (0.015)** (0.018)
control var. yes yes yes yes
adj. R-sq 0.118 0.149 0.337 0.048
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10,  ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01
Note: coefficients of control variables (Table 1) are not reported but available upon request  
 
This clustering of errors at the village level changed the significance of the results considerably. 
Apparently, the positive difference referred to above is only partly explained by the 
implementation of IAR4D. At first, it seemed that IAR4D had no significant impact on social 
capital. However, when we disaggregated our social capital indicator as specified in the 
methodology we found a positive and significant impact on structural social capital, especially 
on facets capturing bridging networks linking the village to the outside. Initially the size seems 
small (0.0345**), but compared to the average level of this dimension (0.15) this means that 
IAR4D, all other variables held constant, resulted in an average increase in the structural 
bridging social capital index of 23%. It is interesting to note that conventional ARD did not 
have any impact in this area, except where the impact of IAR4D on bonding structural social 
capital was most limited. In that case, ARD appeared to have a significant influence (0.0347**). 
There was no overall impact on cognitive social capital.  
4.4.3 Regression results, social capital dimensions - country models 
We analysed Model (1) at the country level to determine the importance of the context in 
which IAR4D was implemented. The large size and significance of our country dummies in the 
pooled model appeared to suggest that it does. Because we found that the impact of 
agricultural research for development varies according to the dimensions of social capital used, 
we excluded our overall social capital index from further analysis.  
The effect of IAR4D on structural bridging social capital was confirmed and was 
strongest for the DRC. After controlling for control variables and unobserved village effects, 
IAR4D was associated with an increase of 41% (0.858*/0.21 average for the DRC) in 
structural bridging social capital. The same is true for ARD, although the size is much smaller 
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(20%). For Uganda, the impact of IAR4D was also significant, indicating an increase of 27% 
(0.0260**/ 0.0930 average for Uganda). For Rwanda, the impact was very small and not 
significant. The impact of ARD on structural bonding social capital in the pooled model was 
no longer visible. More generally, there was no impact on this area of social capital, even 
though coefficients are positive and nearly significant for IAR4D in Rwanda and for ARD in 
Uganda. This lack of impact was also true for cognitive social capital, where the signs of the 
coefficients were actually negative in the case of Rwanda. For the DRC, on the other hand, the 
coefficient seemed to point towards a positive impact (0.0568 on an average of 0.49 for the 
DRC) with a significance level of 22%. The results thus indicate significant country 
heterogeneity in the effect of agricultural research and development interventions on various 
dimensions of social capital. 
 
Table 6: Results country models 
Struc-Brid Struc-Bond Cognitive
DRC IAR4D 0.086 0.024 0.057
(n=767) (0.047)* (0.047) (0.046)
ARD 0.042 0.042 0.010
(0.025)* (0.031) (0.038)
control var. yes yes yes
adj. R-sq 0.087 0.013 0.042
Rwanda IAR4D 0.000 0.041 -0.012
(n=660) (0.023) -0,025 (0.023)
ARD -0.034 0.032 -0.022
(0.0258) (0.0231) (0.0189)
control var. yes yes yes
adj. R-sq 0.050 0.118 0.061
Uganda IAR4D 0.026 0.006 0.003
(n=809) (0.012)** (0.016) (0.020)
ARD -0.005 0.028 0.020
(0.012) -0,018 (0.029)
control var. yes yes yes
adj. R-sq 0.061 0.044 0.083
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01
Note: coefficients of control variables (Table 1) are not reported but available upon request  
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4.4.4 Robustness analysis 
Below we describe the robustness of our results according to the models specified in section 
4.3.4. Results are presented in Appendix 4.1. Due to the proven country heterogeneity, we 
continued this analysis at the country level.  
As a first robustness test we used an alternative sample excluding the new sites and 
traditional ARD villages (see results model 2 in Appendix 4.1). For the DRC, the size and 
significance of impact on structural bridging social capital increased to 0.102** (48%). In 
addition, the impact on cognitive social capital became significant at 10% (0.114**). For 
Rwanda the results were also more convincing, increasing in size and significance for structural 
bonding social capital (0.0466**). For Uganda, the results remained roughly the same, although 
slightly less significant. The impact of IAR4D on various dimensions of social capital as 
referred to in the previous section was thus confirmed and even strengthened. 
Second, we used a sub-sample of our villages (those for which social capital was 
correctly gathered in the baseline) to run a time series model in which we controlled for 
unobserved time invariant household and village characteristics (see results model 3 in 
Appendix 4.1). For the DRC, the impact increased in size for structural bridging social capital 
and became significant for bonding social capital. For Rwanda, the impact on bonding social 
capital became significant at 10%. The results for Uganda became slightly less significant, 
decreasing the significance of the impact on structural bridging social capital to slightly over 
10%. For ARD, no significant positive impact on social capital was confirmed. In fact, we 
observed a significant negative impact in Rwanda.  
As a third test of robustness we used a PSM (see results model 4 in Appendix 4.1)10. 
Overall we see that the results of model 1 are confirmed and increase in significance11. 
                                                          
10 In almost all cases we were able to calculate the propensity score and fulfil the balancing property by 
using the logit model as proposed in our method section. This means that all control variables included in 
the model have equal mean values across our treatment and control group. In two cases, the model for 
ARD in Rwanda and Uganda, we had to eliminate the availability of health centres as a village 
characteristic from our estimation to fulfil the balancing property. The models used for calculating the 
propensity score differ by country and by control group. Pre-treatment variables often included are the 
age of household head, household assets, number of rooms in the house, access to boreholes/wells, radio 
coverage and mobile phone coverage. The sign and significance of the variables do not point at an 
obvious selection effect. The only exception might be assets, which is consistently higher in IAR4D 
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Moreover, the model confirms some of the impacts found in our previous robustness models: 
the impact of IAR4D on cognitive bonding social capital in the DRC, the impact of ARD on 
structural bridging social capital and IAR4D on structural bonding social capital in Rwanda. 
In a final robustness test we used an alternative method to aggregate our social capital 
indicators: a principal component analysis (see results model 5 in Appendix 4.1). For the DRC 
the effect of IAR4D on structural bridging social capital was confirmed and strengthened. This 
was also true for structural bonding social capital in Uganda and Rwanda. Using the factors 
instead of the composite measures of social capital also resulted in a significant impact of ARD 
on structural bridging social capital in the DRC, though of a smaller size. Moreover, there 
appeared to be an impact of ARD on bonding social capital in all three countries, which was 
also seen in the initial pooled model referred to in Section 4.4.2.  
Although the robustness analysis appeared to indicate some inconsistency regarding 
the exact size or significance of our results, the main conclusions did not change. First, it 
confirmed that IAR4D indeed resulted in significant change, mainly in bridging social capital in 
the DRC and Uganda. Second, the robustness analysis confirmed the impact on bonding social 
capital in Rwanda. Finally, the analysis showed a stronger impact on cognitive bonding social 
in the DRC. For ARD, the impact on social capital was weak, and this was confirmed in our 
robustness analysis. In fact, there was as much proof for a negative impact (especially in 
Rwanda) as there was for a positive impact (especially in the area of bonding social capital). 
4.5 Discussion  
The results clearly show that IAR4D, compared to ARD, has successfully influenced social 
capital in the Lake Kivu area. We found no consistent impact for ARD, which supports the 
argument that many of the conventional agricultural extension services in Africa still assume 
that research, technology transfer and technology adoption are independent activities (e.g. 
Leeuwis and Van den Ban 2004; Röling 2009). If extension was indeed viewed as a process of 
                                                                                                                                                   
villages in DRC and Uganda. The potential selection effect is contradicted by the fact that in these same 
models either the number of rooms or access to certain village resources is consistently lower. 
11 These results are robust to different matching methods (kernel and nearest neighbour matching). The 
results of our main model (model 1) and the fixed effects model (model 3) are also robust to estimation 
on the common support. This means we exclude 1 household for DRC, 38 for Rwanda and 29 for 
Uganda. Results are available upon request. 
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interdependence among actors, joint learning and social interaction – as proposed by those 
authors – then at least some changes should have been visible in our indicators of social 
capital. The context within which these extension services are embedded is still largely 
overlooked. We did find these changes as a result of IAR4D, which could be promising for 
development outcomes such as agricultural innovation. Nevertheless, the impact of IAR4D 
depends greatly on the dimension of social capital that is used and the country in which the 
programme was implemented. In this section, we offer several potential explanations for these 
mixed results. 
First of all, the heterogeneity of results across social capital dimensions could be due 
to the nature of the IAR4D intervention. This approach brings together stakeholders in the 
agricultural sector – including farm households, local government agencies, scientist, NGOs 
and traders – essentially forming a platform for the creation of bridging social capital. The 
first/second order column in Table 2 shows that this is clearly reflected in the intervention 
approach. This does not mean social capital increases in the long-term after the project ends. 
But given that participation in IAR4D was voluntary and that external participants only 
facilitated the IP process, the results in Table 2 suggests that during the project 
implementation, social capital changed due to project implementation. Hence, we would like to 
stress again that the IP is the immediate outcome of the IAR4Dness approach and this might 
(or might not) results in an increase in social capital after project ends. In fact, not all countries 
show an increase in structural bridging social capital as a result of IAR4D. At the same time 
this result shows that a second order impact, which is plausible considering the interrelatedness 
of the different indicators, is not yet visible.  
An alternative explanation for this result is that structural social capital is simply 
easier to influence with short-term external interventions. Although some authors believe that 
social capital is historically derived, this argument is perhaps more applicable to cognitive social 
capital. At the same time, the results for the DRC should be considered; they tend to support 
the notion that trust and norms of cooperation might be less historically derived than is often 
assumed (also see Fearon et al. 2009; Labonne and Chase 2011). 
Besides heterogeneity across dimensions, we also found heterogeneity across 
countries. The success of IAR4D might depend on the socio, economic or institutional context 
in which it is implemented. Although we cannot test this hypothesis with our current data, we 
can suggest four possible explanations. First, we looked at the baseline differences at the 
household and village levels (Table 1). Any of these characteristics could interact with the 
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programme, making it more effective. Although we found several notable differences – for 
example, households in the DRC were less well connected and households in Uganda had 
more access to extension services in the past – we did not find any convincing statistical 
evidence that this aspect plays a role12. Only two variables were significant: the highest level of 
education within the household in the case of bridging social capital (0.0067*), and access to 
schools at the village level in the cases of cognitive social capital (-0.0708**) and structural 
bonding social capital (0.0678**). This suggests that education might play a role in the success 
of the IAR4D approach, though the direction would depend on the dimension of social 
capital. 
A second reason for the differential impact across countries might be because of 
differences in pre-existing levels of social capital (descriptive data available upon request). 
During both years, the DRC apparently had higher levels of bridging social capital than 
Rwanda or Uganda. IAR4D, in which building bridging social capital is vital, could thus be 
more successful in a region where people have already formed such linkages and are 
comfortable (perhaps more trustworthy) with such collaboration. Likewise it is possible that 
we identified an effect on structural bonding social capital in Rwanda simply because people 
there were already more inclined to cooperate at the village level. At the same time, the DRC 
has lower levels of cognitive social capital; we measured a noteworthy impact of this dimension 
only in the DRC (but the effect was not significant at less than 10%). Due to the lack of full 
baseline data, we cannot confirm these hypotheses at present, although it is a topic to on-going 
research. 
Another explanation concerns differences at the macro level, especially those related 
to higher-level institutions of governance. For example, on various governance indicators from 
the Worldwide Governance indicators project, the DRC scored much lower than Uganda and 
Rwanda (an average of 4.92 versus 42.24 and 38.12). This could indicate that the payoff of an 
IAR4D approach is higher in an environment with a lack of formal institutions, which 
                                                          
12 In our pooled model we include interaction terms of our control variables with the IAR4D treatment 
dummy. Results are not reported here but available on request.  
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increases the need for more informal types of institutions that regulate behaviour (Ahlerup et 
al. 2009)13. 
A final explanation for the heterogeneity in results might be that IAR4D was actually 
implemented differently in different IPs. On the one hand this is inherent to the approach – 
i.e. adapting to local circumstances – but on the other hand it could simply be that some IPs 
are managed more effectively than others. In accordance with Pamuk et al. (2012), we 
therefore replaced our IAR4D treatment dummy with 12 IP dummies, four in each of our 
country models (see Appendix 4.2). Part of the impact at the IP level was confirmed according 
to our expectations; for others it was surprisingly insignificant or even negative. Further 
research should show whether this result is robust, and – taking into account the alternative 
reasons for heterogeneity as discussed above – what the reasons for this mixed result could be 
(also see chapter 5) 
4.6 Conclusion 
The literature on social capital and the significant role it plays in development is constantly 
increasing. However, it is still unclear under which conditions the benefits of social capital 
accrue or whether they are in fact always positively related to economic development. 
Nevertheless, development aid has invested significantly in efforts to increase social capital. 
Many participatory projects in rural Africa are efforts to enhance development indirectly by 
promoting cooperation in formal or informal networks, and by encouraging trust and norms of 
behaviour towards mutually beneficial action. But it remains unclear whether external 
interventions can actually influence social capital, especially in the short term. 
One initiative where social capital has a role is in Integrated Agricultural Research for 
Development, as adopted by the Sub Saharan Africa Challenge Programme (SSA CP). This 
approach relies on Innovation Platforms (IPs) which is an informal coalition, partnership and 
alliance of conventional agricultural research and development actors. Using semi-experimental 
data collected in the context of the SSA CP, we showed that IAR4D has influenced social 
capital, although not in all its dimensions and not consistently for all countries. Furthermore, 
we showed that traditional forms of agricultural extension (ARD) have been less successful. 
                                                          
13 An alternative hypothesis that macro level institutions and (local) social capital are complements rather 
than supplements (Woolcock 2001), is also possible but not apparent in this context. 
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More specifically, we found that IAR4D has influenced networks that link the village 
to the outside (structural bridging social capital) in the DRC and Uganda. The networks inside 
the village (structural bonding social capital) and trust and norms of cooperation inside the 
village (cognitive bonding social capital) did not change significantly as a result of the 
programme. However, our robustness analysis indicated two possible exceptions. In Rwanda, 
the impact of IAR4D on structural bonding social capital was already significant at 15% in our 
main model and this effect is confirmed by all our robustness models. In DRC, we find a 
significant impact of IAR4D on cognitive bonding social capital in two out of four models. 
Both results could indicate a more durable impact of IAR4D on social capital and should be 
explored in future research. The end line survey which is has been recently approved for the 
LK PLS of the SSA CP in 2013 will provide ample opportunity to evaluate how social capital 
developed after end of the first phase of the project, especially considering the fact that most 
IPs now operate independently. 
We speculate that the heterogeneity across different dimensions of social capital 
might result from the nature of the intervention, which focuses primarily on the creation of 
structural bridging social capital. Alternatively, structural social capital might simply be easier to 
influence. We argue that heterogeneity across countries could result from the different socio, 
economic or institutional context in which IAR4D was implemented. We explored the effects 
of household and village baseline conditions, levels of social capital and macro level 
institutions, but we cannot offer any solid statistical proof for these hypotheses. Finally, we 
concluded that heterogeneity across the different IPs could partly explain the mixed results. 
These results at least imply that both context as well as implementation matter. In other words, 
it is impossible for “social capital” related projects to deliver predictable outcomes without 
very explicitly taking into account the differences in context, the diligence with which they 
were implemented14 and evaluation of performance of social capital after the project ends. 
These results have various policy implications. First of all, we showed that an 
intervention such as IAR4D can successfully influence the networks linking a village to 
partners outside the village; this is a dimension of social capital which is generally thought to 
                                                          
14 We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing forward this important conclusion. Also 
see the recent World Bank report “Localizing Development – Does participation work” by Mansuri and 
Rao (2013) who reach a similar conclusion based on the review of almost 500 studies on participation and 
decentralization.  
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be important, if not vital, to economic development. This result was found in two regions with 
divergent institutional contexts. At the same time, we also showed that this requires specific 
effort, because ARD, even though it was active for longer time, did not yield similar results. 
Another implication is that an intervention like IAR4D might not be successful in influencing 
trust and norms of cooperation in the short term. Both findings are important to the ever 
increasing number of projects and programmes for which networks, trust and norms of 
cooperation are either the basis for success or form an outcome as such. 
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4.7 Appendix 
Appendix 4.2: Results country models by IP
Struc-Brid Struc-Bond Cognitive
DRC Bweremana 0.172 0.118 0.102
(n=767) (0.106) (0.090) (0.057)*
Kituva 0.138 0.032 0.004
(0.113) (0.135) (0.055)
Rubare 0.085 0.022 0.155
(0.045)* (0.068) (0.059)**
Rumangabo -0.014 -0.057 -0.006
(0.056) (0.054) (0.080)
Rwanda Gataraga 0.025 0.060 -0.047
(n=660) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
Remera -0.075 -0.049 0.048
(0.036)** (0.039) (0.034)
Rwerere -0.003 0.015 -0.058
(0.025) (0.047) (0.053)
Mudende 0.033 0.120 0.034
(0.021) (0.039)*** (0.026)
Uganda Bufundi 0.016 0.002 0.022
(n=809) (0.019) (0.015) (0.035)
Bubare 0.041 -0.026 -0.059
(0.027) (0.033) (0.033)*
Chahi 0.035 0.013 -0.015
(0.015)** (0.027) (0.029)
Kayonza 0.016 0.033 0.058
(0.027) (0.047) (0.036)
 * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01
Note: coefficients of control variables (Table 1) and ARD coefficient are not reported 
but available upon request
model (1)
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Appendix 4.1: Robustness analysis 
 
pendix 4.2: Results country models by IP 
Struc-Brid Struc-Bond Cognitive
DRC Bweremana 0.172 0.118 0.102
(n=767) (0.106) (0.090) (0.057)*
Kituva 0.138 0.032 0.004
(0.113) (0.135) (0.055)
Rubare 0.085 0.022 0.155
(0.045)* (0.068) (0.059)**
Rumangabo -0.014 -0.057 -0.006
(0.056) (0.054) (0.080)
Rwanda Gataraga 0.025 0.060 -0.047
(n=660) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
Remera -0.075 -0.049 0.048
(0.036)** (0.039) (0.034)
Rwerere -0.003 0.015 -0.058
(0.025) (0.047) (0.053)
Mudende 0.033 0.120 0.034
(0.021) (0.039)*** (0.026)
Uganda Bufundi 0.016 0.002 0.022
(n=809) (0.019) (0.015) (0.035)
Bubare 0.041 -0.026 -0.059
(0.027) (0.033) (0.033)*
Chahi 0.035 0.013 -0.015
(0.015)** (0.027) (0.029)
Kayonza 0.016 0.033 0.058
(0.027) (0.047) (0.036)
 * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01
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Chapter 5 Implementation of the IAR4D 
approach matters: A research on the 
difference in impact of decentralized 
innovation systems in Africa  
 
 
Abstract: Agricultural growth is considered an important instrument for sustainable alleviation 
of poverty. A relatively new view to boost agricultural growth is the implementation of the 
innovation system perspective. The Sub Saharan African Challenge Program adopted this as its 
main philosophy through the Integrated Agricultural Research for Development Approach 
(IAR4D). Implementation was done through the development local decentralized Innovation 
Platforms (IPs) in eight countries. Previous research indicates considerable heterogeneity in 
impact of these IPs. In this paper we argue that this may be because there is heterogeneity in 
implementation: IPs may not have equally implemented the principles of the IAR4D approach. 
We test this by quantifying the five defining principles of IAR4D into an IAR4Dness index. 
Linking these data to the main survey data, we present three main results. First, the index is 
correlated positively and significantly to the Food Consumption Score (FSC), our proxy for 
poverty. Second, this effect mainly stems from the effect of two IAR4D sub principles: non-
linear, collective and collaborative interaction (principle 2) and institutional and human 
capacity building for IP actors (principle 5). Third, our analysis indicates that the effect of 
IAR4Dness on FSC does not operate through increased use of agricultural technologies or 
increased levels of household social capital.  
 
 
 
 
Paper by Haki Pamuk and Fédes van Rijn. 
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5.1 Introduction 
Agricultural growth is considered an important factor for sustainable alleviation of poverty 
(Haggblade et al. 2007; Ligon and Sadoulet 2007; World Bank 2007; Christiaensen et al. 2011). 
Policy makers have applied a wide variety of strategies to boost agricultural productivity and 
production in developing countries. A relatively new view in those strategies is the 
implementation of the innovation system perspective to support agricultural research and 
development for resource poor farmers. The innovation system approach is a multi-
stakeholder and participatory method integrating the knowledge of stakeholders from the value 
chain via so called “innovation platforms (IPs)”. At IPs, the stakeholders are expected to come 
together to find solutions to local bottlenecks and to design and implement policies at the local 
level (Leeuwis and Van den Ban 2004; Hall et al. 2006; Knickel et al. 2009). Many IPs have 
recently been introduced to enhance agricultural production and productivity of resource poor 
farmers through adoption of suitable and efficient agricultural techniques (Nederlof et al. 
2011).  
However, few evaluation studies have quantitatively explored the impact of these IPs. 
The exceptions are those studies that assessed the effect of Sub Saharan African Challenge 
Program (SSA CP). The SSA CP adopted the Integrated Agricultural Research for 
Development (IAR4D) approach as its main philosophy through the implementation of local 
decentralized IPs. These studies confirm that, on average, the program reduces poverty 
(Lynam et al. 2010; Pamuk et al. 2012). Nevertheless, they also show that the IPs have had 
mixed impacts on poverty, agricultural innovation (Pamuk et al. 2012) and household social 
capital (chapter 4). Impact analyses on these outcomes at IP level indicate large differences: 
ranging from significantly positive to non-significant to significantly negative. 
The policy evaluation literature suggests two answers to explain the differences in 
impact at IP level. First, the impact of any policy, in this case the IPs, may be a function of 
characteristics of the region where the project is implemented (Heckman et al. 1997; Deaton 
2010). Second, even if the policy is implemented among the same population, its outcomes 
may still vary if the policy is implemented by different organisations; the organisations may 
possess different organisational and managerial capacities and have different efficiency levels 
(Heckman et al. 1997; Deaton 2010; Allcott and Mullainathan 2012; Bold et al. 2013). The 
aforementioned studies evaluating the impact of IPs investigate the role of the first factor: 
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heterogeneity in target population. This paper investigates the role of the latter: heterogeneity 
in implementation. 
In this paper we explore the heterogeneity in implementation of the SSA CP, and the 
effects thereof on program impact. We argue that differences in program impact might be 
explained by the extent to which IPs adopted IAR4D. The objective of this paper was twofold. 
First, to capture heterogeneity in implementation, we quantify the IAR4D criteria and 
summarise them into an “IAR4Dness” index. Second, we analyse whether differences in 
impact result from difference in the level of IAR4Dness. We also explore whether certain 
baseline conditions explain why some IPs are more successful. 
Results indicate that implementation matters. IAR4Dness is positively related to the 
food consumption score, our main outcome variable and proxy for food security. We find that 
attendance of stakeholders to the activities – in particular to the information sharing activities 
and field visits – determine how successful IPs are in increasing household food consumption. 
Nevertheless, we do not find evidence that this relationship results from the adoption of 
agricultural technologies or increase in household social capital - two of the potential impact 
channels. In addition, we find tentative evidence that baseline village social capital is related to 
attendance in IP activities.  
This paper is organised as follows. In section 5.2, we give a brief conceptual 
framework including a description of the SSA CP. In section 5.3 we present our data set. In 
section 5.4, we describe the IAR4Dness indices and how they differ across IPs. In section 5.4, 
we analyse whether this index explains differences in impact of the IPs, including a detailed 
description of our identification strategy and a robustness analysis. In Section 5.6, we have a 
short discussion on the potential determinants of IAR4Dness. Finally, Section 5.7 concludes.  
5.2 Conceptual framework  
IAR4D was introduced as part of the SSA CP in 2004. The approach is based on the view of 
innovation systems. According to this view, innovation is seen as the result of the integration 
of knowledge from various actors and stakeholders (e.g. Leeuwis and Van den Ban 2004). With 
IAR4D this approach got form by the creation of decentralized IPs; coalitions of stakeholders 
to identify and address local bottlenecks to agricultural development. Representatives of 
farmers’ associations, traders, researchers, extension workers, NGOs, and government policy 
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makers regularly meet at these platforms, articulate their views, and negotiate joint strategies 
for action (FARA 2008).  
To promote external validity, IAR4D was implemented in three African project 
learning sites (PLSs): (i) “Lake Kivu (LK)” in Eastern and Central Africa, (ii) “Kano‐Katsina‐
Maradi (KKM)” in West Africa, and (iii) “Zimbabwe‐Malawi‐Mozambique (ZMM)” in 
Southern Africa. Each region was divided into three sub-regions and in each sub region 4 IPs 
were implemented covering various villages. In total, 32 IPs became operational15. The overall 
program has been coordinated by the Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa (FARA). 
However, different agencies have been responsible for the implementation and facilitation of 
the IPs (see Appendix 5.1 for an overview). 
IPs had to fulfil five criteria to abide with the IAR4D approach (FARA 2008; 
Hawkins et al. 2008): (1) existence of IPs that are representative, inclusive and with diverse 
partnerships, (2) existence of non-linear, collective and collaborative interaction among IP 
actors, (3) research addresses key constraints and opportunities agreed by the IP in the context 
of entire value chains, (4) the research process is multidisciplinary and participatory and (5) 
there is institutional and human capacity building for IAR4D actors to effectively participate. 
We define the extent to which IPs abide with these criteria as the level of “IAR4Dness”. 
Because of the decentralized nature of the IPs and the different implementing agencies, we 
expect to find variation in the level of IAR4Dness. 
As is elaborately explained by Haki et al. (2012) and van Rijn et al. (chapter 4) we 
expect the IAR4D approach to have an impact on poverty through increased agricultural 
innovation and social capital. Considering the focus of the policy on agricultural production, 
we chose to measure poverty impact through increased household food security. Increased 
agricultural innovation is the main channel through which IAR4D aims to enhance agricultural 
production and reduce poverty. Agricultural innovation can have a direct influence on poverty 
by increasing productivity, decreasing production cost, or reducing risk for those adopting (De 
Janvry and Sadoulet 2002). However, the five defining principles of IAR4D also illustrate that 
the immediate channel of impact on poverty of IAR4D is perhaps not to directly influence 
agricultural innovation, but to create a setting to enable these outcomes (see chapter 3 and 4 
for an overview of why social capital and agricultural innovation are naturally linked). 
                                                          
15 Although 36 IPs were to be established 4IPs in ZMM never became operational and data were not 
collected for those IPs. 
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Therefore, household social capital is considered an important intermediate outcome variable. 
The consideration of social capital as an immediate outcome indicator is in line with the 
innovation system perspective.  
5.3 Data description 
5.3.1 Sample 
The IAR4D program was implemented as a large experiment. This meant some communities 
“received” IPs (treatment communities) and others did not (control communities). To 
promote internal validity there was exogenous selection of villages into the IAR4D treatment. 
Even though details of the sampling frame were slightly different across the different regions it 
generally followed a randomized controlled trial approach (see FARA 2009; Pamuk et al. 2012 
for details on the sampling frame). Within each village, a random sub-sample of 10 
respondents (households) was drawn from treatment and control villages. Baseline and midline 
data were collected at village and household level in 2008 and 2010/2011. In this paper, we 
focus on treatment villages because we are interested in differences in impact within the 
treatment community. 
5.3.2 IAR4Dness 
To determine the level of IAR4Dness we used the data collected in a small survey among IP 
coordinators by email in mid-2012 (see Appendix 5.2 for the details of the survey). This survey 
included questions capturing the five IAR4D criteria. The first principle is captured by the 
number of different types of stakeholders involved16. The second principle was captured by the 
level of involvement of the stakeholders in different activities, and the variance in involvement 
of different types of stakeholders. The third principle was captured by the percentage of 
different stakeholders involved in problem identification and the percentage of problems 
prioritized and acted upon. The fourth principle was captured by stakeholders’ involvement 
and implementation of activities and the percentage of different stakeholders involved in the 
policy design. The fifth indicator was captured by stakeholders’ involvement in capacity 
building activities including information sharing, training and field visits. For all indicators we 
calculate the average of those stakeholders involved and/or those problems identified, and 
                                                          
16 Stakeholder include farmers, researchers, extension agents, marketing organisations, policy makers, 
NGOs, input suppliers, traders, private businesses and others. 
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normalise data from 0 to 1. Summary statistics are provided in Table 1, where higher values 
mean higher scores in terms of IAR4Dness.  
 
Table 1: IAR4Dness variables (n=32) 
Principle Definition Mean Sd Min Max
Principle 1 Number of stakeholders involved 0.75 0.15 0.55 1
Principle 2a Average involvement in listed activities 0.78 0.14 0.54 1
Principle 2b Difference to average participation* 0.77 0.17 0.27 1
Principle 3a % Of stakeholders involved in problem identification 0.33 0.2 0.08 1
Principle 3b % Of problems identified being prioritized and addressed 1.00 0.00 1.00 1
Principle 4a Average involvement joint planning and implementation 0.77 0.13 0.55 1
Principle 4b % Of stakeholders involved in policy formulation 0.45 0.27 0.08 1
Principle 5 Average involvement in information sharing and field visits 0.77 0.16 0.44 1
Note: all variables are normalised in the range [0,1]
*this indicator is rescaled so that smaller variances (more equality) is reflected by higher scores  
5.3.3 Outcome variables  
We use household level of household food security as the main outcome variable, and 
agricultural technology and household social capital as the two intermediary outcome variables 
(see Panel A of Table 2). For the measurement of household food security, we employ the 
Food Consumption Score (FCS) index measuring monthly food consumption of respondents 
of food items consumed in the last 30 days, weighted by the nutritional value added. To 
measure agricultural technology, we use count data indicating how many technologies 
households adopt with respect to soil and water management, soil fertility management, crop 
management, and post-harvest storage (see appendix 3.1 in chapter 3 for more details). Finally, 
for household social capital we construct an index measuring the level of interaction of a 
household with other villagers, farmers, researchers and extension agents17.  
                                                          
17 To construct the social capital index, we first create seven dummy variables (equal to 1 if household is 
involved in the following activity, 0 otherwise) regarding household’s participation in community 
development projects, financial contribution for community activities or collective problems, 
involvement in settling conflicts or disputes among people, visiting other farmers within your community 
to learn about agriculture, visiting other farmers outside your community to learn about agriculture, 
visiting a research station to learn about agriculture ,visiting an extension office to learn about agriculture. 
The index is the weighted average of these dummy variables. 
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Table 2: Outcome variables and household and village characteristics
Variable Obs* Mean Sd Min Max
Panel A: Outcome variables
Index of social capital 2658 0.5 0.3 0.00 1.00
Total number of innovations 3103 8.1 4.00 0.00 19.00
Monthly food consumption score 3322 205.6 91.9 0.00 465.00
Panel B: Household characteristics
Male household head 3456 0.7 0.4 0.00 1.00
Age of household head 3433 46.6 14.7 16.00 105.00
Education level of household head** 3242 3.3 2.3 1.00 10.00
Household size in logarithms 3436 1.9 0.6 0.00 4.8
Panel C: Village characteristics (dummies)
Village 332 0.66 0.47 0.00 1.00
Hospital 322 0.3 0.46 0.00 1.00
Worship place 339 0.81 0.39 0.00 1.00
Social hall 302 0.22 0.42 0.00 1.00
All wheather road(s) connected to the village 315 0.73 0.44 0.00 1.00
Mobile network connection 336 0.88 0.33 0.00 1.00
Panel D: Village social capital variables
Participation in community activities 129 2.8 1.00 0.00 4.00
Extent of trust among people 128 2.6 1.00 0.00 4.00
Cooperation among people 126 2.7 1.00 0.00 4.00
Giving or exchanging gifts 130 2.2 1.1 0.00 4.00
Financial contribution for community activities 130 2.4 1.2 0.00 4.00
Extent of financial contribution to group activities 128 2.3 1.2 0.00 4.00
Spirit of helping others especially the poor 129 2.00 1.4 0.00 4.00
Settling conflicts or disputes among people 128 2.9 1.00 0.00 4.00
Abiding by the norms and byelaws 131 2.6 1.1 0.00 4.00
Women confidence to speak in public 131 2.5 1.00 0.00 4.00
Men's respect and consideration of women 131 2.7 1.00 0.00 4.00
Panel E: Instruments
Equals to 1 if start IP activities > 1.5 years 32 0.34 0.48 0.00 1.00
Years after start of IP activities 32 1.55 0.70 0.50 2.50
*Number of observations are at households level (Panel A&B), village level (Panel C&D) 
and IP level (panel E) ** 0 - (no education)-10 (university or higher)
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5.3.4 Household and village characteristics 
To control for differences in IP context, and for their potential influence on project 
implementation, we use various household and village level variables (see Panel B and C of 
Table 2). Our household level variables include gender, age, formal education level of 
household head, and household size. Our village level variables include a list of village 
amenities. To explore whether the level of cohesion in the community affects IP performance 
we include a third set of variables, namely baseline village social capital (Panel D of Table 2). 
These are different indicators than our social capital outcome variable which was measured and 
defined at household level. The information regarding village level social capital was collected 
during community discussions by asking participants to evaluate social cohesion in their village 
from 0-4 according to several questions. They do not include information regarding interaction 
of the villagers with others. Instead they measure the quality and order in social life.  
5.4 Capturing the level of IAR4D into an “IAR4Dness” index 
We used three approaches to capture the level of IAR4Dness. The first is an aggregate index of 
the indicators which is the sum of five principles weighted according to the principle they 
represent. This reflects the idea that IAR4Dness is best captured by the different components 
rather than by its separate components. However, we also want to explore whether certain 
components matter more. Therefore, a second approach is the decomposition of the aggregate 
IAR4Dness index according to the five principles listed before. This means we create an 
average of principle 2a and 2b, 3a and 3b, and 4a and 4b. A third, and more data-driven 
approach, is to look at the actual correlation between the different IAR4Dness variables. To 
structure these correlations and create new components we use factors extracted from 
principal factor analysis. The number of factors, and thus components, is determined by the 
variance extracted within each factor, or eigenvalue. According to the Kaiser criterion, only 
factors with an eigenvalue above 1 are retained. We use a varimax rotation method to 
maximize the variance across factors. (see Kaplan 2008 for more technical details). 
We shortly present the IAR4Dness indices in Table 3. There is relatively little 
variance in aggregate IAR4Dness index with a mean of 0.74 and a standard deviation of only 
0.07. However, the variation of the individual principles is a bit higher indicating differences 
between the IPs. The factor analysis results in two factors (see Appendix 5.2). The first factor 
mainly captures higher participation in activities organised by the IP. The second factor 
captures higher number of stakeholders involved and a more equal involvement. Both factors 
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also capture a lower percentage of stakeholders involved in problem identification or policy 
formulation. This indicates that, perhaps not surprising, even though more stakeholders are 
involved in the IP, not all of these stakeholders are represented when it comes to problem 
identification or policy formulation.  
 
Table 3: IAR4Dness indices (n=32) 
Variable Definition Mean Sd Min Max
IAR4Dness Aggregate index 0.71 0.07 0.56 0.82
Principle 1 Representative, inclusive and diverse 0.75 0.15 0.50 1.00
Principle 2 Non linear, collective and collaborative 0.77 0.11 0.54 0.95
Principle 3 Key constraints and opportunities addressed 0.66 0.10 0.54 1.00
Principle 4 Multidisciplinary and participatory 0.61 0.16 0.41 0.97
Principle 5 Capacity building 0.77 0.16 0.44 1.00
Factor 1 ↑ Participation in activities +↓ % involved in problem iden. 0.00 1.00 -1.66 1.83
Factor 2 ↑ Nr of stakeholders +↓ % involved in policy formulation 0.00 0.99 -2.45 1.57
 
5.5 The relation of IAR4Dness to outcomes variables 
5.5.1 Identification strategy 
In this section we investigate whether IAR4Dness affects IP performance. To control for the 
potentially confounding effect of household, village and IP level characteristics on our 
outcome variable and IAR4Dness, we use data from the baseline survey conducted in 2008 
and the midline survey conducted in 2010/201118, and define our outcome variables at 
household level whereas our IAR4Dness variables are defined at IP level. For this reason, we 
cluster standard errors at IP level in the estimations.  
We estimate the nth outcome variable (Y) for household i in year t as a function of 
IAR4Dness (I) for IP p, household control variables (X) for household i, village control 
                                                          
18 Ideally, we would use baseline and midline data from village surveys to control for the potentially 
simultaneous impact on our outcome variables through increased village amenities and IAR4Dness. 
However, midline village data was only collected for LK PLS. To be able to use the available information 
for LK, we extrapolate the information concerning village resources for KKM and ZMM by using 
baseline surveys, and assume that they are same in baseline and midline periods. 
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variables (Y) for village j, a year dummy (Midline), a set of region dummies (Z) (usually 
corresponding to country level), and IP level fixed effects (IP): 
                                                                  (1) 
   represents our main variable of interest, the IAR4Dness index or set of indices (Table 3) 
and equals zero for the baseline period because IAR4D was introduced after the baseline 
period.   and   represent vectors of household and village level control variables identified in 
Panel B and C of Table 219.         is a dummy variable and controls for the general trend 
between two survey periods. We also control for sub-region level changes and shocks that 
might have happened between baseline and midline periods by using region specific time 
trends shown by            - equal to 1 in the midline period for corresponding region and 
0 otherwise. Finally, we control for the impact of unobserved fixed IP level characteristics on 
the impact of IAR4Dness and outcome variables, by including IP dummies. We estimate the 
models with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) methodology. 
We start our analysis by estimating (1) for the overall index. Then, to explore through 
which principles and factors the impact of the index is driven, we refine our results by 
estimating (1) for each principles and factor; we estimate a separate model for each principle 
and factor.20 Separate estimation of the models prevents the inflation of standard errors in the 
estimations as some of the IAR4Dness principles are highly correlated (see appendix 5.4 for 
details). These correlations between the principles result from the definition and the 
construction of the variables (see section 5.3). If there is any correlation due to an unobserved 
factor, this is controlled for through the control variables used and through the additional 
robustness analysis (see below).  
5.5.2 Results 
The estimation results of model (1) for our main outcome variable are summarized in Panel A 
of Table 4 and show that FCS levels are higher in the villages where the level of IAR4Dness is 
higher21. The columns refer to the outcome variables, and rows to different IAR4Dness 
                                                          
19 We do not control for the village characteristic in panel D of Table 2 in model (1) because they were 
only collected in 28 IPs in baseline surveys. However, our main results are robust to estimating our 
models for only 28 IPs and controlling for these village level social capital variables. 
20 Our results are robust to the inclusion of the two factor variables in one model. 
21 We test the hypothesis that control variables, time trends and IP level dummies are jointly equals to 
zero, and we reject the hypothesis for each set of variables and model estimated.  
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indicators. In Table 4 we only report the estimates for our coefficients of interest: average 
IAR4Dness, principles and factors. To explore which principles matter most, we repeat model 
(1) for each principle (see Panel B Table 4). It seems that the relation between IAR4Dness and 
FSC mainly stems from two IAR4Dness sub principles: non-linear, collective and collaborative 
interaction (principle 2) and institutional and human capacity building for IP actors (principle 
5). These results are in line with the results from Panel C. IPs with active participation in the 
activities, factor 1, have higher levels of FSC.  
Table 4: IAR4Dness and outcome variables 
FCS Innovation HH SC
Panel A: IAR4Dness Index
 IAR4Dness 278.4*** -11.78* -0.283
(96.35) (6.771) (0.268)
Panel B: IAR4Dness Principles
Principle1 35.6 -2.436 0.182
(46.47) (3.165) (0.207)
Principle2 120.1* -6.335 0.0471
(59.55) (4.469) (0.207)
Principle3 98.3 -0.521 0.326
(159.2) (2.991) (0.411)
Principle4 -8.243 -2.133 -0.465**
(61.74) (2.627) (0.226)
Principle5 142.0** -4.052 -0.151
(61.08) (3.008) (0.175)
Panel C: Factor indicators
Factor1 18.96*** -0.504 -0.021
(6.788) (0.525) (0.0254)
Factor2 1.181 -0.275 0.0258
(6.852) (0.38) (0.0266)
Note: coefficients of control variables are not included, but available upon request
* p<0.10,  ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01, Standard errors in parentheses, n= 2657, 3102 and 3321  
To explore the key factors behind our main result we explore the correlation between FSC and 
the sub indicators of principle 2 and 5. We predict that related sub-components of the indices 
might be the key factors behind the positive correlation between FSC and the principles. To 
test whether our conjecture is true, we estimate (1) for four additional specifications. We 
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replace outcome variable    with the average involvement to listed activities (Principle2a), 
difference to average participation (Principle2b), average involvement to planning and joint 
implementation (Principle4a) and average involvement to information sharing activities and 
field visits (Principle5) (see Table 5). 
 
Table 5: Involvement indicators and calorie intake 
FCS
Principle2a 148.9***
(50.83)
Principle2b 5.915
(38.26)
Principle4a 60.01
(70.8)
Principle5 142.0**
(61.08)
* p<0.10,  ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01
Standard errors in parentheses
Note: coefficients of control variables are not included, but available 
 
The results in Table 5 confirm our conjecture that average participation to the activities is 
positive and significantly correlated with FCS. Moreover, the type of the activity seems to be 
key in improving FSC. Participation in information sharing activities and field visits is more 
important than participation in activities concerning joint planning and implementation as the 
estimates are bigger and statistically more significant for the former. Finally, equal participation 
of stakeholders to these activities does not seem to be a critical factor for our results.  
5.5.3 Robustness Checks 
Our identification strategy rests on the assumption that the level of IAR4Dness is not 
correlated with IP level unobserved time varying effects that may also influence our outcome 
variables. In this section, we relax this assumption and test the consistency of our estimates. In 
Table 6, we report the estimates from alternative models specified to test the robustness of our 
main results. We focus on the impact of Principle2a and Principle5 on FSC because we found 
that our results are mainly driven by attendance to the IP activities.  
As a first robustness analysis we re-estimate model (1) at IP level. Although the 
standard errors of our main model is clustered at IP level, household level analysis still might 
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produce low standard errors, and overstate the significance of our estimates because 
IAR4Dness is measured at IP level (Wooldridge 2003). For this estimation, we use IP level 
unweighted average of FCS as the dependent variable, and drop household and village level 
controls. Column 1 and 2 of Table 6 show that both estimates are statistically significant and 
robust to our former estimates.  
 
Table 6: Robustness Checks 
Variables FCS FCS Principle2a Principle5 FCS FCS
Principle 2a 192.515** 642.470*
(81.484) (382.674)
Principle 5 173.282* 338.591**
(89.537) (137.942)
Dummy yearinfield 0.069* 0.130**
(0.038) (0.048)
R-squared 0.829 0.832 0.992 0.989 0.725 0.011
n=64
* p<0.10,  ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01
Standard errors in parentheses
IP level First stage 2SLS
Note: All regressions include IP level fixed effects and country level trend variables. We present 
estimates for the variables of interest to economize on space.
 
As a second robustness analysis, we estimate a 2SLS model to isolate the potential impact of 
unobserved time varying determinants. Unobserved factors such as economic and income 
shocks that happened after the baseline period may have directly affected both FSC and 
IAR4Dness. This might create an endogeneity problem for our estimates. To address this 
concern, we employ the exogenous variation in the duration of field activities of IPs as an 
instrument (see Panel E in Table 3 for variable descriptions). Some IPs started their field 
operations later than others due to organisational challenges. Hence, mature IPs had more 
opportunity to organize IAR4Dness activities. Besides, to our knowledge, the start-ups of IPs 
were not delayed by to sub-regional shocks. Therefore, our instrument is not directly correlated 
to food security and satisfies the exclusion restriction, given that we control for IP fixed effect 
and sub-region level trends.  
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 The specification of 2SLS model employed is as follows. We predict Principle2a      
and Principle5      as a function of years of field activity (D) of IP p, a year dummy (Midline) 
and a set of region dummies (Z): 
                                                              (2) 
where     refers to error term and    denotes our excluded instrument which equals to 0 in 
the baseline survey period as there is no field activity and 1 when years of field activities for the  
corresponding IP is more than 1.5 years (median level)22 in the midline survey period. Again, 
we also control for sub-region level changes and shocks that might have happened between 
baseline and midline periods by using region specific time trends shown by          - equal 
to 1 in the midline period for corresponding region and 0 otherwise. We justify the use of the 
same IV for both principles because they both relate to attendance, and years of field activities 
should explain both. As our instrument is at IP level, after inserting predicted values for     
from (2) into (1), we again estimate (1) at IP level for only Principle2a and Principle5 
Column 3 and 4 of Table 6 report the first stage estimates for Principle2a and 
Principle5 respectively. As we hypothesize, a longer period of field activities enhance the 
average involvement to listed activities and information sharing activities and field visits even 
though the relationship for the former is less is powerful. Finally, column 5 and 6 present the 
2SLS estimates for Principle2a and Principle5. The estimates are positive and statistically 
significant. Hence, they confirm our estimates are consistent with our main findings when we 
isolate the impact of unobserved time varying factors using years of field activities as an 
instrument. 
5.6 Discussion  
The findings above point out that IPs in which average involvement to the activities is higher 
are more successful in increasing food security. In this section we estimate a simple linear 
regression models to explore whether involvement related indicators are related to IP level23 
                                                          
22 We also test the robustness of our estimates by using years of field experiments as an instrument 
instead of dummy variable. The first stage estimates for Principle 2a as well as second stage estimates are 
not statistically significant while our results for Principle5 are still robust.  
23 The IP level characteristics are calculated by taking unweighted average of the characteristics at IP 
level. 
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baseline household characteristics, village amenities and village social capital measures listed in 
Table 2. As the numbers of observations at IP level are few, degrees of freedom in the 
estimations are not enough to reliably estimate coefficients for all characteristics at the same 
time. Therefore we separately estimate each coefficient and only control for baseline IP level 
FCS.  
Results in Table 7 provide some tentative evidence that the level of involvement in IP 
activities is related to baseline village characteristics of the regions where IPs are established. 
Controlling for baseline level of FSC, involvement of IP stakeholders is higher in communities 
with higher levels of education, higher percentage of female headed households, and higher 
levels of village social capital in terms of trust and gift exchange. Although not statistically 
significant (p-value=0.11), extent of settling conflicts in the village is also positively correlated 
with the level of participation to information sharing events. There is no statistically significant 
correlation between involvement indicators and village amenities – the proxies for the quality 
of infrastructure in the villages. This may imply that the initial development level of the villages 
do not play a role in the successful implementation of the project.24  
 
                                                          
24 Because our number of observations is limited, standard errors are generally high and imprecise, and 
we are vulnerable to type II errors: to falsely conclude that there is no effect, even if there actually is one.  
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Table 7: Involvement to IP activities and baseline characteristics, controlling for FSC
coef. se coef. se.
Gender -0.094 (0.065) -0.174** (0.074)
Headage -0.007 (0.005) -0.005 (0.006)
Headed 0.035* (0.019) 0.036 (0.024)
HHsize -0.096 (0.089) -0.076 (0.121)
School 0.007 (0.076) 0.044 (0.087)
Hospital 0.074 (0.082) 0.094 (0.098)
Worship 0.014 (0.075) 0.034 (0.079)
Socialhall -0.012 (0.052) -0.035 (0.059)
Roads -0.103 (0.081) -0.119 (0.092)
Mobilenetwork -0.145 (0.131) -0.081 (0.164)
Participation 0.009 (0.032) 0.032 (0.037)
Trust 0.050 (0.034) 0.071* (0.04)
Cooperation 0.043 (0.03) 0.047 (0.032)
Gift exchange 0.046 (0.031) 0.069* (0.035)
Contrcomm -0.003 (0.027) 0.018 (0.028)
Contributgr 0.000 (0.027) 0.026 (0.03)
Helping -0.001 (0.027) 0.015 (0.03)
Conflicts 0.030 (0.028) 0.057 (0.034)
Norms -0.031 (0.025) -0.026 (0.029)
Womenconfid 0.024 (0.04) 0.022 (0.048)
Consdwomen 0.021 (0.04) 0.059 (0.043)
n=32 and 28 for Panel C variables
* p<0.10,  ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01
Standard errors in parentheses
Principle2a Principle5
Panel A: Household characteristics
Panel b: Village characteristics
Panel C: Village social capital variables
 
5.7 Conclusion 
There is considerable heterogeneity in impact of the innovation system approach on resource 
poor farmers at IP level. In this paper we argued this may be because there is heterogeneity in 
implementation: IPs may not have equally implemented the principles of the IAR4D approach. 
We explore heterogeneity in implementation, and the effect thereof, by quantifying the five 
defining principles of IAR4D into an IAR4Dness index and linking these to the main survey 
data. We find that the IAR4Dness index is correlated positively and significantly to FCS, our 
proxy for calorie intake.  
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This relation between IAR4Dness and FSC mainly stems from two IAR4D sub 
principles: non-linear, collective and collaborative interaction (principle 2) and institutional and 
human capacity building for IP actors (principle 5). Looking at the sub-components of these 
principles, especially participation in information sharing activities and field visits is crucial. 
Success of IPs thus seems to depend on the attendance and contributions of stakeholders to 
the activities of the IPs. More specially, we believe this result may indicate that IPs only 
become beneficial for villagers when they (and other IP stakeholders) participate in capacity 
building events such as field visits and information sharing activities. Recent case study 
evidence from improved maize legume and production systems in Nigeria support our 
findings, and explain how capacity building activities help the platform perform. Dangbegnin 
et al. (2011) state that the platform organised capacity building activities on IAR4D and team 
building to enhance interdisciplinary, problem solving, team working and learning skills of 
platform members. They argue that these activities “enabled platform members to work as 
equal partners” (p. 92). 
It is also interesting to note that other IAR4Dness (sub) indicators of IAR4D do not 
seem to matter in terms of impact on FSC. For example, the different types of stakeholders 
involved or equal participation of these stakeholders to activities. Apparently average 
participation is more important than diversity per se. In fact it is easy to imagine some sort of 
trade-off between the number of stakeholders involved in an IP and the average participation 
of these stakeholders. This was supported by our factor analysis. It could well be that this 
means that IPs with less diverse partnerships, but overall higher average participation because 
of this, are more successful than IPs with many additional but low participating partners. 
Perhaps it becomes more difficult to manage the IP as it becomes bigger: i.e. it might be harder 
to align different goals and objectives and coordinate the IP. 
We also find that the effect of IAR4Dness on FSC does not operate through 
increased use of agricultural technologies or increased levels of household social capital. 
However, we only investigate two potential channels through which IPs can boost FCS. There 
are many other potential channels such as integration to markets or access to finance. There is 
need for future research to shed light on these channels.  
A follow up question would be to identify which factors promote active participation 
of IP stakeholders. Tentative results suggest that involvement of IP stakeholders is higher in 
communities with higher level of education, higher percentage of female headed households, 
and higher levels of village social capital in terms of trust and gift exchange. The potentially 
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important role of these types of social capital is also supported by Nederlof et al. (2011) who 
conclude that trust, commitment and ownership were critical success factor in the 12 case 
studies they investigated.  
Finally, we note two methodological issues regarding our results. First of all, we show 
that researchers can investigate the heterogeneity in the implementation of a project and the 
performance of the project partners by applying an objective survey to the partners after the 
treatment. However, we are aware of the fact that our IAR4Dness measures might be subject 
to measurement errors as we utilize a set of objective questions directed to platform members 
after two to three years implementation of the project. To minimize the error, a better 
approach might be collecting data from all stakeholders through a consistent monitoring and 
evaluation (M&E) survey during implementation. Secondly, we use data from baseline and 
midline surveys conducted merely two to three years after the platforms are established. This 
means that our results reflect only the short-term effects of IAR4Dness from early maturing 
platforms. An end-line survey is scheduled for late 2013/early 2014. By using the new data set 
from matured platforms, follow up research should probe the robustness and sustainability of 
the preliminary results presented here. 
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5.8 Appendix 
Appendix 5.1: Project learning sites, countries, implementing agents and IPs 
West Africa (KKM): Niger and Nigeria  
 INRAN: IPs related to livestock-feed, millet-cowpea, vegetables, and groundnut.  
 IFDC: IPs related to livestock-feed, maize-legume-livestock, vegetables, and rice 
 IITA: IP related to maize-cowpea-livestock, and 2 related to sorghum-cowpea-
livestock 
East Africa (LK): DRC, Rwanda and Uganda 
 CIAT: IPs related to banana, Irish potatoes, beans and cassava 
 ISAR: IPs related to NRM, livestock, milk, seed potato and maize 
 Makerere/ICRISAT: IPs related to potato, soil and water conservation, pineapple and 
sorghum 
Southern Africa (ZMM): Zimbabwe, Malawi, Mozambique  
 CIAT: IPs related to conservation agriculture 
 Bioversity International: IPs related to horticulture  
 
Appendix 5.2: Characterization of IAR4D as implemented by FARA 
Please note this is a modified version of the actual 2.5 page survey. All data collected is listed, 
but to economize space, the structure has been revised. The text in italic between brackets 
refers to pre-defined answer categories. 
Identification IP 
Name of the organisation; Name of the Innovation Platform (IP); Country of the IP; District 
of the IP; Sub country/other of the IP; When was the IP formed (month and year). 
Identification respondent 
Your Name; E-mail address; Your position in the organisation; Your role in the IP.  
IP formation and functioning 
How did the IP originate? (from scratch, builds on existing networks, already fully existed) 
How is the IP facilitated? (researchers, by local stakeholders, jointly) 
How are participants selected for the IP?       
IP participation of stakeholder 
Which of these stakeholders are represented in the IP? (yes, no - see footnote 16 for list of stakeholder) 
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How often (approximately) do the following partners in your IP conduct or attend a) joint 
planning of activities; b) joint implementation of activities; c) information sharing; d) field visits 
or workshops; e) seminars and training events? (daily, weekly, monthly, every six month, every year or 
less) 
Problems addressed 
Is the problem area addressed in IP? (yes, no) a) low agricultural technology use; b) access to 
inputs; c) market access and strategy problems; d) land related problems; e) other. 
Who identified the problem (list of stakeholders in footnote 16) 
Was the problem prioritized (yes, no) 
Was an action implemented (yes, no) 
Who designed the policy (list of stakeholders in footnote 16) 
What is the action?  
 
Appendix 5.3: Factor analysis IAR4Dness indices (n=32)  
Variable Factor1 Factor2
Principle 1 0.9428
Principle 2a 0.993
Principle 2b 0.968
Principle 3a -0.512
Principle 3b*
Principle 4a 0.831
Principle 4b -0.438
Principle 5 0.927
Note: blank spaces are loadings < .4 
*excluded because the same (1) for all IPs  
Appendix 5.4: Correlation coefficient estimates for IAR4Dness index and principles (n=32) 
Index P1 P2 P3 P4 P5
IAR4Dness 1
P1 0.65* 1
P2 0.85* 0.91* 1
P3 -0.40* -0.41* -0.55 1
P4 0.52* -0.17 0.07 -0.15 1
P5 0.80* 0.36* 0.66* -0.6 0.41* 1
* significant < 10 percent level   
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Chapter 6 Opening the black box of 
Social Capital: trust and group membership 
in the Lake Kivu Region 
 
 
Abstract: Central to this paper is the debate on how social capital is conceptualised and 
measured. Part of the critique relates to the ambiguous relationship between different 
indicators of two major components often used to represent social capital: trust and 
membership in formal or informal groups. It is unclear to which extent these components can 
be represented by a single indicator or how the two constructs are related to each other. In this 
paper, we analyse an extensive set of social capital indicators in the border region of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Uganda using factor analysis and path analysis. 
We present three main results. First, trust and membership in different groups cannot be 
captured by a latent factor called social capital. Second, different forms of trust are generally 
positively correlated to each other, but cannot be captured by one latent factor. Third, group 
membership - of any type - cannot be expected to automatically translate in or be associated 
with higher levels of trust. In the Lake Kivu region participation in only three out of thirteen 
groups is positively and significantly associated to trust in different societal groups.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Paper by Fédes van Rijn, Domenico Dentoni, Stefano Pascucci and Judith Oduol. 
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6.1 Introduction 
Social capital, generally described by the characteristics of social networks, is used to explain a 
wide range of phenomena from families and youth behaviour problems to democracy and 
governance (Woolcock 2010). The development and institutional economics literature reports 
that a high level of social capital has a positive impact on economic development (Knack and 
Keefer 1997; Narayan and Pritchett 1999; Zak and Knack 2001; Fafchamps and Minten 2002; 
Grootaert and Bastelaer 2002; Isham 2002; Karlan 2005; Ahlerup et al. 2009; Baliamoune-Lutz 
and Mavrotas 2009). Yet, how the different components of social capital are interlinked and 
how they impact socio-economic development is not sufficiently explored. The different 
conceptualizations and measures of social capital used in the literature make it challenging to 
address this. 
Woolcock (2010) argues that the use of different conceptualizations and measures of 
social capital might be inherent to the concept and we should not aim for a common 
definition. He refers to the term “essentially contested concepts” from Gallie (1956) to 
emphasize that the utility of social capital lies in facilitating constructive discussion on the 
importance of social relationships, rather than in forging consensus on how it is defined 
exactly. However, the use of different indicators by different studies make it difficult to 
compare results and implications. Therefore, it is not surprising that the discussion on 
measurement of social capital is still on-going (Rupasingha et al. 2006; Sabatini 2009; Guiso et 
al. 2010).  
Part of this debate relates to the measurement of two key components of social 
capital: trust and group membership (Poder 2011). Trust is often one of the intended (side) 
effects of increased group participation and at the same time might be a pre-condition for 
those groups to form. Group membership is often the more tangible part of social capital 
targeted by policy makers to foster cooperation between people. Examples are community 
driven development projects that aim to enhance a range of development outcomes or 
strengthen civil society in general (Mansuri and Rao 2004). It is unclear to what extent trust 
and group membership can be represented by specific indicators, to what extent these 
indicators actually represent the same social capital construct and how the two are related. 
Although this is conceptually well known, there is little empirical analysis highlighting this. It is 
also unclear to what extent these indicators of trust and group membership are related to each 
other (e.g. Claibourn and Martin 2000; Quibria 2003). Despite this, specific indicators of trust 
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and group membership are often used to generalize results and implications of social capital 
related research. 
The objective of this paper is twofold. First, we test the hypothesis that the indicators 
of trust and group membership can be summarised in one latent factor called “social capital”. 
We also formulate a more specific hypothesis that our trust indicators can be summarised in 
one latent factor. The second objective is exploratory, namely to investigate the relationship 
between the individual indicators of trust and group membership. We distinguish trust in 
people inside the village, outside the village, strangers, local and central government officials, 
research institutes, traders and NGOs. We also distinguish between membership in 
community, agricultural, cultural, welfare, financial and political groups. All variables were 
measured at the individual level.  
To meet these objectives, we used data collected the Lake Kivu (LK) of the Sub 
Saharan African Challenge Program. LK covers the border region between the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC), Rwanda and Uganda. To understand the interrelations between 
different components and indicators of social capital is particularly relevant in a context of 
“weak institutions” where legal systems are unable to protect private property rights and major 
socio-economic shocks, such as civil war and violence, affected local communities intensively 
(Hyden 2001; Voors et al. 2012).  
We present two main results. First, trust and membership in different groups cannot 
be empirically reflected by one underlying social capital factor. Likewise, different forms of 
trust, even though generally positively correlated to each other, cannot be captured by one 
latent trust factor. Second, group membership - of any type - cannot be expected to 
automatically translate in or be associated with higher levels of trust. Participation in only three 
out of thirteen groups is positively and significantly associated with trust in different societal 
groups. These results confirm concerns raised by various authors including Sabatini (2005), 
Poder (2011) and Quibria (2003) related to the inclusion and interpretation of social capital 
indicators in empirical models. Moreover, these results have implications for programmes 
aiming to enhance development by promoting cooperation in groups, trust and norms of 
behaviour towards mutual beneficial action. These programmes should consider which 
component of social capital they try to influence, what type of effects this may have on other 
components of social capital, and to which extent other components of social capital are 
essential for success.  
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In Section 6.2, we discuss the conceptual framework, including a discussion on trust, 
group membership and the relationship between the two. In Section 6.3, we summarise and 
describe the data. In Section 6.4, we describe the method we used to estimate the correlation 
within and between the two social capital components. In Section 6.5, we discuss the outcomes 
of these models, including several tests of robustness. Section 6.6 concludes. 
6.2 Conceptual framework 
6.2.1 Social capital 
In this study we focus on two important and well-known components of social capital namely 
trust and group membership (see chapter 2.2 and 2.5). These two components fit well within 
the conceptual separation between cognitive and structural social capital (Uphoff and 
Wijayaratna 2000). Trust is one of the major representations of cognitive social capital and 
group membership is one of the major representations of structural social capital. Trust can be 
classified according to personalised trust, generalised trust and institutional trust (Groenewald 
and Bulte 2012). Personalised trust refers to trust in existing networks; generalised trust refers 
to trust in strangers; and institutional trust refers to trust in more formal governance networks. 
Group membership, or networks more generally, can be further separated based on whether 
they are bonding (ties to similar people), bridging (ties to other groups of people) or linking 
(ties to more formal institutions). Usually networks are classified according to this distinction 
although in reality a network can be bonding, bridging and linking at the same time depending 
on its members and activities (Bhandari and Yasunobu 2009).  
6.2.2 The relationship between trust and group membership 
In the literature the relationship between trust and group membership depends on at least four 
factors. The first factor is the level of involvement in groups (Wollebæk and Selle 2003); the 
intensity of participation may strengthen any effect between membership and trust. The 
second factor is the scope of involvement (Wollebæk and Selle 2003); multiple affiliations 
mean more and broader interaction which could result in spill over effects to other groups. 
The third factor is the institutional environment in which people are embedded. The 
institutional environment is the set of formal and informal political, social and legal rules of 
cooperation (Ahlerup et al. 2009). It also includes the potential influence of various specific 
micro factors such as the trustworthiness of local leaders. Finally, the relationship between 
trust and group membership may depend on the type of trust and group membership 
(Wollebæk and Selle 2003). For example, strong bonding networks (such as religious groups) 
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may be correlated with higher levels of trust within that group, but lower levels outside the 
group (generalized or institutional trust). The reverse could be true for participation in 
agricultural groups that are oriented more to the outside of the village.  
Many authors implicitly or explicitly assume group membership results in more trust 
(e.g. Putnam 2000). Although the mechanism through which this effect is assumed to take 
place differs, it generally follows the argumentation that participation in networks, and this can 
be any kind of network, allows trust to spread outside your existing network (Wollebæk and 
Selle 2003). Examples of such effects are abundant; a producer who joins a cooperative that 
purchases farm inputs collectively will get to know more people inside his village, and possibly 
outside the village, with whom he can build a relationship of trust.  
However, the relationship between trust and group membership is not clear-cut. 
Negative experiences with groups may actually decrease existing levels of trust (Claibourn and 
Martin 2000). A classic example is the embezzlement of funds by cooperative officials before 
the introduction of the structural adjustment programs in SSA. Moreover, membership in 
certain groups may enhance trust inside the group but just as easily create mistrust outside this 
group (Kumlin and Rothstein 2005). It is therefore not necessarily true that group membership 
results in higher levels of trust. Moreover, some argue that trust is actually a necessary 
foundation for the formation of groups or networks (e.g. Dasgupta 2005). Those who have 
more trust towards others are more likely to become active in networks (Sabatini 2009). If the 
farmer in the example has a lot of trust in his fellow-farmers, he may be more inclined to 
cooperate with them in the first place. This is probably because the costs of cooperation are 
lower. But again, we can argue the other way around as well; distrust and lack of trust can 
motivate people to cooperate (Cook et al. 2007). If a farmer has low levels of trust towards his 
fellow farmers, there is a larger need to create a more formalised group if he wants to purchase 
inputs collectively. The benefits of cooperation are higher.  
6.2.3 Research hypothesis 
Based on the discussion in section 6.2.1, we formulate the hypothesis that we expect different 
components of social capital to be empirically reflected in one social capital factor. However, 
group membership in one group might exclude group membership in another because of time 
constraints or conflicting interests. For trust this is not apparent. Therefore, we formulate a 
second, more accurate, hypothesis that our trust indicators can be summarised in one trust 
factor.  
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In the second part of this conceptual framework we highlighted that it is unclear 
whether trust and group membership are necessarily related, how they are related (positive or 
negative) and what the causality of the relationship is. Considering the data at hand, we focus 
on the first two questions and leave the causality question for future research. Because this part 
of the research is exploratory in nature, we do not formulate any specific hypothesis at this 
stage. However, we do anticipate finding some coherence in the relationship between the 
specific types of trust and specific types of groups. For example, it is quite intuitive that trust in 
people within the village is related to membership in community-oriented groups (i.e. village 
community and civic group) and social/cultural groups (i.e. burial, religious and sport clubs). 
Another example would be that trust in local and national government and NGOs is related to 
membership in political and social/cultural groups.  
6.3 Data 
6.3.1 Sample 
To empirically explore the relationship between trust and group membership we used the data 
collected by the Sub-Saharan African Challenge Program. The program was implemented by 
the Forum of Agricultural Research in Africa (FARA) and adopted the Integrated Agricultural 
Research for Development approach (IAR4D) as its main approach in eight African countries. 
Innovation Platforms, which can be described as an informal coalition and alliance of 
conventional agricultural research and development actors, are at the core of this approach. 
This study focuses on the border area between the DRC, Rwanda, and Uganda, referred to as 
the Lake Kivu region in the remainder of this paper.  
Our data is drawn from a household survey conducted in 2010 among 2239 
household heads or another adult representing the household. The main purpose of this data 
collection was to evaluate the IAR4D approach and compare its outcomes to that of 
conventional agricultural research and development. Therefore, the programme 
implementation and data collection was part of a large scale pilot experiment (FARA 2009). A 
baseline survey was also conducted between mid-2008 and mid-2009. We used data from the 
second round of surveys collected in mid-2010 because it included a more extensive 
measurement of trust and group membership. After a careful selection of villages 
corresponding to the objective to evaluate the programs impact (see chapter 4), ten households 
were randomly selected from a total of 242 villages. 
Opening the blackbox of social capital | 97 
 
6.3.2 Trust 
Trust, the first component of social capital, was measured based on two types of survey 
questions. First, we used the well-known World Value Survey question: “Generally speaking, 
would you say most people can be trusted?” This question was answered by yes or no. 
However, there has been critique on this question because it is unclear what is understood by 
“most people” (e.g. Glaeser et al. 2000). Moreover, one of the interests of this paper was to 
explore to which extent the relationship between group membership and trust depends on the 
type of trust or group. Therefore, we also measured more specific types of trust in the form of 
“In general, how would you describe your trust in the following people?” from the World 
Bank Social Capital Group Survey (Grootaert et al. 2004). The types of trust identified in the 
survey were based on a discussion with the implementing partners and essentially refer to 
different societal- or reference groups. These indicators reflect the respondents’ levels of trust 
and were measured on a 1 to 5 scale, where a score of 1 means “very poor” and a score of 5 
means “very good”. Table 1 shows descriptive data and the categorization according to the 
types of trust as discussed in section 6.2.1.  
 
Table 1: Descriptive data on trust (n=2239) 
Trust Type
very poor poor
poor / 
good good very good
Within the village Personalised 12% 11% 36% 34% 7%
Outside the village Generalised 18% 17% 45% 19% 1%
Strangers Generalised 35% 29% 29% 6% 0%
Local government Institutional 15% 14% 33% 30% 7%
Central government Institutional 18% 18% 33% 23% 8%
Agricultural traders Institutional 21% 31% 35% 13% 1%
Research institutes Institutional 26% 18% 34% 17% 4%
NGOs Institutional 21% 16% 41% 18% 4%
Level of trust
 
As expected, the evaluation of trust depends on the type of trust. The evaluation of the specific 
indicators of trust does not show an optimistic picture because more respondents indicate that 
trust is very poor or poor rather than very good or good. This is true for all types of trust, 
except for trust within the village and trust in local government officials. Trust inside the 
village is usually evaluated as the highest or single highest, whereas trust in strangers is 
evaluated very poorly. Contrary to this, 64% of the respondents indicate they, generally 
speaking, think other people can be trusted. 
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6.3.3 Group membership 
Group membership, the second component of social capital, was defined based on the 
participation of the respondent in an almost inclusive list of formal and informal groups25. In 
Table 2 we present the descriptive data, including a column identifying the focus of the group; 
agriculture, community development, politics, finance, welfare or social/cultural issues.  
 
Table 2: Descriptive data group membership (n=2239) 
Group membership Type Membership
Marketing Agriculture 3%
Production Agriculture 18%
Processing Agriculture 1%
Village committee Community 33%
Village civic Community 10%
Political Political 33%
Water and waste  Community 7%
Finance or saving Financial 34%
Health Welfare 18%
Education Welfare 8%
Burial or festival Social/cultural 36%
Religious Social/cultural 62%
Cultural Social/cultural 9%
Sports Social/cultural 7%  
Table 2 shows quite some variation in membership across the different groups. Most 
respondents participate in religious groups followed by burial and festival societies, credit 
groups, political groups and village committees. Very few households participate in processing 
groups, marketing groups, water and waste management groups, sports groups, education 
groups and cultural groups. It is interesting to note that the two most common groups are 
socially oriented, whereas the least common are agriculturally oriented.  
                                                          
25 In the survey groups were defined as “groups, organisations, networks or association can be formally 
organised groups or just groups of people who get together regularly to do an activity or talk about 
things” 
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6.4 Empirical strategy 
6.4.1 Main estimation strategy 
Data were analysed with Structural Equation Modelling (SEM). SEM allows us to examine the 
series of interrelated relationships between the social capital indicators and latent constructs 
and, if applicable, among the latent constructs (Hair et al. 2010). In this study, these latent 
constructs are social capital and trust. We pool the data of the three countries together in one 
data set. Interpreting results in light of the (different) institutional settings is left for future 
research. SEM combines a set of measurement and multiple regression models in a system of 
equations. The method involves a two-step procedure (for details see Kaplan 2009; Hair et al. 
2010).  
The first step is identifying the latent constructs through Factor Analysis (FA). This 
step corresponds to the confirmatory objective of this paper, namely testing the two 
hypotheses as outlined in section 6.2.3. We used exploratory FA to identify which indicators 
can be reflected by which latent factors. The factors are based on the interrelations between 
the indicators and the number of factors on the variance extracted within each factor26. We 
used confirmatory FA to test these factors based on two common goodness-of-fit indices: the 
Root Mean Square error of Approximation (RMSEA) and the Comparative Fit Index (CFI)27.  
As a second step, we identify and test the entire set of direct and indirect relationships 
among our indicators and/or constructs using a trial-and-error procedure based on the overall 
goodness-of-fit with the data. This step corresponds to the exploratory objective of the paper 
as outlined in section 6.2.3. Similar to the confirmatory FA, goodness-of-fit was evaluated 
based on CFI and RMSEA.  
                                                          
26 According to the Kaiser criterion, only factors with an eigenvalue > 1 are retained. Through the 
varimax method, the variance of factors across variables is maximized (Kaplan 2008). 
27 The RMSEA is an absolute fit index and takes into account sample size and model complexity in its 
computation. Lower values of the RMSEA indicate better model fit with values below 0.10 being 
acceptable; below 0.05 being good; and below 0.01 being very good (Kaplan 2008). The CFI is an 
incremental fit index comparing the estimated model to a model in which no correlation is assumed. The 
range of the CFI lies between 0 and 1, with higher values indicating better model fit. Usually levels above 
0.9 are considered acceptable (Hair 2012). Empirical evidence indicates that RMSEA is more appropriate 
in case of large sample sizes (Rigdon 1996; Hair, et al 2010) 
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Given the current gap in the literature on the relationship between trust and group 
membership, we took an exploratory approach of model building (Hair et al. 2010). Therefore, 
analysis was data-driven rather than theory-driven (see for example Cudeck and Henly 1991, 
Maccullum, Tucker and Briggs 2001 cited in Bentler 2006). At the start of the analysis, the 
relationships among variables were identified based on Pearson’s correlation coefficients, 
which are widely used to measure of the strength of correlation between pairs of variables. On 
the basis of the Pearson’s correlation matrices among variables we identified these paths in 
three steps: 1) within the set of trust indicators, 2) within the set of group membership 
indicators and 3) across trust and group membership. Paths were included if statistically 
significant at less than 5% and higher than 0.50, 0.30 or 0.15, depending on the strength of 
correlations in the data. The Lagrange Multiplier (LM) and the Wald Test (W) were used to 
find a model with higher goodness-of-fit28. Both measures can be interpreted as goodness-of-
fit tests of the revised model compared to the starting model (Bentler 2006). It is important to 
note that our model does not test cause-and-effect relationships, but merely explores 
relationship between the variables. The assumptions made on which variables are dependent or 
independent variables in the model should be interpreted as proposed interpretation of cause-
effect relationship that future research could address.  
6.4.2 Country, village, and household variation 
We re-estimate the final model at country level using a so-called multi-group SEM to test 
whether the final path model varied across the three countries. As was noted before social 
capital is recognized as a highly contextual construct (e.g. Mansuri and Rao 2004). The Lake 
Kivu region was initially chosen because the countries emerged from conflict at different 
times, resulting in different national policies, institutions and physical infrastructures (Bekunda 
et al. 2005 from Farrow et al. 2011) . This may influence the level of trust and group 
membership and the relationships between them. We compared the model fit statistics and the 
size, sign and significance of each country path with the results of the pooled sample.  
Besides country differences, differences at a lower level of administration might also 
influence the relationship between our indicators of social capital. Therefore, we investigate 
                                                          
28 In deciding on the number of parameters to add we used Hancock’s finite intersection multiple 
comparison rationale (Bentler 2006). This allows a conservative testing strategy by taking into account the 
degrees of freedom of the current model instead of the usual one degree of freedom. 
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whether our results are robust to different village and household characteristics (see appendix 
6.1).  
We estimate each of the 23 social capital indicators (Y), being a specific level of trust 
or group membership for household i, as a function of the other indicators of trust (T), the 
other indicators of group membership (G), the set of household control variables (X) and 
village control variables for village j (Z):  
23...3,2,1),,,,(,1,  nZXGTfY jiiinin  (1) 
To prevent potential impact of the IAR4D approach from influencing these household 
characteristics we use the 2008 baseline data for X and Z. We use simple Ordinary Least 
Squares methodology because, even though this method does not estimate the equations as a 
system, it more easily accommodates the amount of control variables we want to include. 
6.5 Results 
6.5.1 Social capital factor 
Before we test the hypothesis that trust and group membership can be empirically reflected in 
one latent factor, we explore the relationship between our indicators using a simple correlation 
matrix (see appendix 6.2). Membership in all types of groups is significantly correlated to 
membership in various other groups. However, the size of the correlation coefficients is not 
very high and some correlation coefficients are negative. Only about half of the correlation 
coefficient between group membership and trust are significant at p>0.05. The majority of the 
significant correlation coefficients are positive; higher levels of trust are associated with higher 
levels of group membership. The other indicators of trust and group membership are not 
significantly correlated. Contrary to this, we find that the correlation matrix shows large 
positive and significant correlations among all trust variables, except for general trust (appendix 
6.2b). The relationship between different indicators of social capital is therefore not at all clear. 
The results from the exploratory FA in Table 3 confirm our preliminary observations 
that social capital cannot be empirically reflected by one latent factor. The FA results in a set of 
seven very scattered factors. As expected, the confirmatory FA thus rejects the hypothesis that 
different indicators of trust and group membership are reflected by the common underlying 
factor of social capital (CFI: 0.55<0.90 RMSEA; 0.11>0.10).  
Nevertheless, the trust indicators in Table 3 are clearly concentrated in the first two 
factors. Loadings for factor 1 are high for all trust indicators, except for general trust. Loadings 
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are particularly high (>0.70) for trust in government officials, research institutes and NGOs. 
All these loadings are higher than their loadings for factor 2. This is also true for trust in 
traders. These results are in line with the theoretical construct of institutional trust as often 
used in the existing literature on social capital and trust discussed in section 6.2.1. General 
trust, trust inside and outside the village and strangers all score high for factor 2 (>0.52) and 
higher than on factor 1. Therefore this factor captures a combination of personalized and 
generalized trust. Some indicators load almost the same for both factors (trust in stranger and 
trust in traders) and some indicators loading high on one factor still load relatively high on the 
other (trust inside the village, trust in local and central government officials).  
 
Table 3: Exploratory factor analysis social capital (n=2239) 
Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 Factor5 Factor6 Factor7
Marketing 0.77
Production 0.81
Processing 0.39
Village committee 0.49
Village civic 0.37 0.57
Political 0.70
Water and waste  0.65
Credit 0.65
Health 0.67
Education 0.68
Burial or festival 0.82
Religious 0.37 -0.49 0.41
Cultural 0.67
Sports 0.72
General trust 0.52 0.38
Within the village 0.66
Outside the village 0.39 0.73
Strangers 0.35 0.60
Local government 0.70 0.40
Central government 0.78
Agricultural traders 0.45 0.36 -0.39
Research institutes 0.84
NGOs 0.79
Note: only factor loading above 0.3 or below -0.3 are shown
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Corresponding to our second hypothesis we perform a confirmatory FA to test if trust in 
different groups of people is correlated highly and consistently enough to be captured by one 
latent factor. Based on the discussion of the factor analysis, it is not surprising this hypothesis 
is rejected (CFI: 0.79<0.90 RMSEA; 0.17>0.10) . Therefore, we also performed a confirmatory 
FA to test the hypothesis that the set of trust indicators represent two underlying constructs, 
namely institutional trust and generalised/personalised trust. Both goodness-of-fit-statistics 
reject the hypothesis (CFI: 0.86<0.90 RMSEA; 0.14>0.10). This means that even though the 
trust indicators are closely related, the closeness is not strong enough to argue they can be 
captured by the two underlying factors. Therefore, we reject both hypotheses and conclude 
that our social capital indicators are more effectively represented as individual indicators. 
6.5.2 Relationships among trust and membership in groups 
The first step in our path analysis explores relationships among the indicators of trust in 
different groups. The initial path model included all significant Pearson’s correlations above 0.5 
in appendix 6.2. We built the model with trust at lower levels of institutions as independent 
variables and trust at higher levels of institutions as dependent variables, although this does not 
imply causality but only relationship (Kaplan 2009; Hair et al. 2010). After testing a set of 
models according to the described trial-and-error procedure, the final model, for which all 
parameters are significant at less than 5%, is presented in Figure 1. To arrive at this model we 
added three relations to the starting model: between trust inside the village and trust in local 
government officials, agricultural traders and general trust (see dashed lines). The model fit is 
acceptable with an RMSEA of 0.09 and a CFI of 0.95. This means that our model of 
interrelations as depicted in figure 1 adequately captures the interrelatedness in our data. 
 
 
Figure 1: Path Model Trust  
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Figure 1 confirms that different types of are significantly related with coefficients ranging from 
0.173 between trust inside the village and trust in agricultural traders till 0.801 between trust in 
local government officials and central government officials. Therefore, observing high levels 
for one type of trust would therefore generally be associated with high levels in other types of 
trust. More specifically, general trust is related to trust inside the village. Apparently evaluation 
of general trust most closely corresponds to evaluation of trust in those people nearby. Trust 
inside the village is closely related to trust outside the village, and to trust in local government 
officials and trust in agricultural traders. This could be because part of the local government 
officials and agricultural traders may in fact be from the same village, or are very familiar with 
people inside the village. Trust outside the village is also related to trust in local government 
officials and is the only parameter in explaining trust in strangers. Trust in local government 
officials is the only explanatory parameter in trust in central government officials, but with a 
very high coefficient. Trust in central government officials appears to be central for trust at 
higher levels, being related to trust in NGOs, trust in agricultural traders and trust in research 
institutes. Finally, trust in NGO’s is related to trust in research institutes.  
The second step of the path analysis process involved testing relationships among 
membership in the different groups. Because none of the correlations in our data is above 0.5 
(see appendix 6.2), the initial path model was built with variables having correlations above 0.3. 
We tested two initial models. In the first model the paths generally run from membership in 
community and welfare oriented groups to membership in socio-cultural groups (see Table 2 
for classification). The reverse is true for the second model. Based on the described trial-and-
error procedure, the final model is given in Figure 2. To arrive at this model we added several 
relations between village committees and village civic groups and other groups. The model fit 
is the highest for the first model, with an RMSEA of 0.053 and a CFI of 0.950 (see Table A6). 
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Figure 2: Path Model Group Membership 
 
Contrary to the path model for trust we found that membership in different groups is not 
necessarily related to membership in other groups, not in positive nor negative terms. 
Membership in five out of thirteen groups is not related to membership in any other group; 
groups related to agriculture (marketing, production, processing), politics, or health. Please 
note that these groups are not depicted in the figure. This is surprising because membership in 
one group may make it too time consuming, unnecessary or even impossible for someone to 
join another group. In this case one would expect a significant negative relation.  
 Those indicators of group membership that are related are always positively related; 
membership in one group is usually associated with more participation in other groups. 
Coefficients range from 0.108 between membership in village committees and education 
groups till 0.310 between membership in finance groups and burial or festival societies.  
There appear to be two clusters in the figure that link the different types of groups as 
identified in Table 2. The first cluster links membership in the three community groups to one 
welfare and two socio-cultural groups. Apparently, membership in village committees plays a 
central role because this is associated to membership in three other groups. Moreover, it is the 
only variable associated to membership in village civic groups, which in its turn is related to 
those same groups as well as membership in cultural groups. The fact that membership in 
village committees is quite high relative to the other groups in this cluster could be an 
explanation for this central role (see Table 2). Another reason could be that, considering the 
community purpose of village committees, people with different backgrounds and interests in 
joining group are represented. The second cluster associates membership in finance groups to 
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membership in burial and festival societies. These two groups may co-exist for the purpose of 
providing safety nets and performing important functions such as substituting the formal 
insurance systems that are often out of reach for the rural population. Burial and festive 
groups, just like finance groups, often save money to rely on in case a group member is for 
example bereaved or gets married.  
The final step of the path analysis procedure was to test the overall model analysing 
relationships among different types of trust and group membership. We start our model by 
joining the final trust and group membership model in one estimation. Because many 
correlation coefficients are either not significant or very low, we also tested relationships 
among variables that were significantly correlated with an absolute value above >0.15 with the 
described trial-and-error procedure. The final model has an acceptable fit (RMSEA: 0.056, 
CFI: 0.911) and has various trust measures related to membership in political groups, burial 
and festival societies and finance groups. 
 
 
Figure 3: Path model group membership and trust 
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Based on the results of the path analysis (Figure 3), it is evident that the correlation between 
membership in various groups and different types of trust according to the final model is 
limited. Trust is only related to membership in political groups and the second cluster of 
groups identified in Figure 2, being membership in finance groups and burial and festival 
societies. This means that trust is not correlated to membership in village committees, village 
NGOs or civic groups, water and waste management groups, education groups, cultural groups 
or sports groups. The same is true for those groups which were not included in the model: 
membership in the three agricultural related groups, in health groups and in religious groups.  
Another observation is that the relationship among group membership and trust, as 
hypothesized, depends on the type of trust, but overall is always positive. Trust inside the 
village is quite central being related to membership in finance groups, political groups and 
burial and festival societies. Trust in strangers is related to membership in finance groups and 
in political groups. Trust in local government officials and in agricultural traders is also related 
to membership in finance groups. Finally, trust in people outside the village and in central 
government officials is also related to membership in political groups. 
6.5.3 Country, village, and household variation 
To explore the role of country specific effects we repeated the final path model at the country 
level (see appendix 6.5a-c.). The relations among trust indicators and among group 
membership indicators as presented in figure 1 and 2 seem largely robust to country specific 
effects. However, many of the relations between trust and group membership as presented in 
figure 3 disappear. For DRC only one relationship remains significant, for Rwanda two, and 
for Uganda four of which one is negative. This lack of relation between trust and group 
membership is reflected by the fact that overall goodness-of-fit is acceptable in terms of 
RMSEA, but not in terms of CFI (see appendix 6.3). Whether this is caused by the differences 
in country institutions, trust, group memberships or by smaller sample size is left for future 
research. 
Using the regression model specified in section 6.4.2, we also explored whether 
village and household characteristics influence the correlations we observe in the structural 
models (see appendix 6.4 for a summary of results29). Although various household and village 
                                                          
29 We only present the coefficients for the variables which were included in our final structural model. 
Because we do not estimate our regression model as a set of equations it might well be the case that other 
paths are identified which were not identified in our final structural model, or only identified as indirect 
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characteristics are related to the level of trust or group membership, they do not influence 
results: the only path from the final structural model not significant in the regression model is 
the relationship between trust in people inside the village and membership in financial groups. 
All other paths are robust to the inclusion of the set of household and village control variables 
specified in appendix 6.1. 
6.6 Conclusion  
Social capital is known to play an important role in development. Yet, it is not sufficiently 
explored in the literature how the different components of social capital are interlinked. In this 
paper we use factor and path analysis to investigate the relation between different indicators of 
trust and group membership, two well-known indicators of social capital dimensions. We use 
the data collected from 2239 households in the framework of the Sub Saharan African 
Challenge Program in the border region of the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda. We found four 
important results. 
First, social capital is not effectively reflected by one latent factor. This is because 
trust in different societal groups and group membership are often not correlated. We thus 
confirm the concerns raised by various authors including Sabatini (2009), Poder (2011) and 
Quibria (2003). However, few tested these concerns empirically, and none used a confirmatory 
FA.  
Second, all types of trust are positively related although not strong enough to be 
reflected by one underlying latent factor. Moreover, the indicator of general trust is only weakly 
correlated with the indicators of trust in specific societal groups. This confirms concerns on 
whether the well-known “general trust” question from the World Value Survey can be used to 
infer trust in specific societal groups (e.g. Glaeser et al. 2000).  
Third, the relationship across indicators of membership in different groups is weak. 
This is perhaps not surprising because membership in one group may make it too time 
consuming, unnecessary or even impossible for someone to join another group. However, 
although participation in one group is indeed not necessarily related to participation in other 
groups, we also do not find any significant negative relation. Moreover, we find that 
participation in some groups is in fact positively related to participation in other groups. In the 
                                                                                                                                                   
paths (i.e. through other indicators of trust or networks). Complete regression results are available upon 
request.  
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final path model there are two clusters of relationships among group memberships. One 
cluster links membership in community groups, agricultural groups, two welfare groups and 
two socio-cultural groups. The other cluster links membership in financial groups to burial and 
festival groups. This means that some individuals are likely to participate in multiple groups. 
This is in line with Wolleback and Selle (2003) who find that multiple affiliations mean more 
and broader interaction. This implies that participation in one group might results in spill over 
effects to other groups.  
Fourth, indicators of trust and membership in different societal groups are weakly 
related to each other. Only membership in three out of thirteen groups is significantly and 
positively related to trust indicators, namely finance and saving groups, burial and festival 
societies and political groups. The common factor of these groups is probably the role of 
finance in terms of a social security or entrusted funds (Dercon et al. 2006). Indeed, 
Fafchamps (2004) contends that where there is information asymmetry and weak legal 
enforcement mechanisms, as in most sub-Saharan Africa countries, personal trust is an 
effective substitute for the security provided by the costless legal enforcement. Trust in a 
number of groups seems to be essential in the formation of groups where finance plays a role. 
Alternatively, assuming reverse causality, participation in these groups is essential to develop 
trust in certain societal groups.  
Combined these four results should invite researchers and policy-makers to be 
cautious in interpreting social capital indicators in empirical models. On the one hand, trust or 
group membership in a specific group cannot be used as an effective indicator of general social 
capital. On the other hand, trust and group membership can be used to create a social capital 
index, if this is useful for policy analysis. This would be similar to variables such as “life 
expectancy” and “literacy” which are not necessarily correlated, but constitute weights for the 
Human Development Index. Moreover, organisations that try to enhance development by 
building social capital should carefully consider which component of social capital they try to 
influence, what kind of effects this may have on other components of social capital, or to 
which extent other components of social capital are essential for success  
This research is clearly exploratory in nature and there are many prospects for future 
research. First of all, results are only based on data from the Lake Kivu region. Because social 
capital is known to be a highly context-specific concept, it should be investigated whether data 
from other regions confirm or contradict our results. Related to this, is to understand the 
potential effect of institutions on the measurement and relationships between social capital, 
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group membership and trust. Finally, all relationships found in this paper reflect associations 
rather than cause and effect. It is of great interest to investigate the causality of these relations 
more thoroughly in the future.  
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6.7 Appendix 
Appendix 6.1: Summary statistics household and village characteristics (n=2239)
Mean Sd Min Max
Panel A: Household characteristics
gender of hh head 0.81 0.39 0 1
age of hh head 45.45 15.09 17 104
education level hh head 3.35 2.21 1 10
highest level of education in hh 4.63 2.51 1 10
size of the hh 6.56 3.24 1 38
males aged 16-58 1.51 1.28 0 12
females aged 16-58 1.56 1.13 0 11
years farming 22.14 14.49 0 80
asset index 2.06 1.34 0 10
visit to extension agent in 2010 0.08 0.28 0 1
visit by extension agent in 2010 0.04 0.20 0 1
research demonstration in 2010 0.05 0.21 0 1
number of rooms 3.69 1.42 0 20
Panel B: Village characteristics
schools 0.46 0.50 0 1
health centres 0.16 0.36 0 1
boreholes/wells 0.19 0.39 0 1
network coverage for radio 0.43 0.50 0 1
all weather roads 0.52 0.50 0 1
network coverage for mobile phones 0.74 0.44 0 1
no ARD for the past 2-5 years 0.35 0.48 0 1
conventional ARD 0.35 0.48 0 1
IAR4D 0.30 0.46 0 1  
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Appendix 6.2a: Correlation matrix trust and group membership (n=2239) 
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 Appendix 6.2b: Correlation matrix trust and group membership (n=2239) 
gener in. vil out. vi stran .l gov c. gov agr. tr res. in ngo
General trust 1.00
Within the village 0.29 1.00
Outside the village 0.25 0.56 1.00
Strangers 0.13 0.29 0.58 1.00
Local government 0.18 0.54 0.54 0.43 1.00
Central government 0.11 0.42 0.47 0.41 0.80 1.00
Agricultural traders 0.15 0.29 0.35 0.33 0.34 0.35 1.00
Research institutes 0.12 0.26 0.36 0.29 0.50 0.56 0.33 1.00
NGOs 0.14 0.23 0.35 0.29 0.44 0.50 0.34 0.64 1.00
trust
T
ru
st
 
Appendix 6.3: Model fit statistics 
Model number* DF N
CFI RMSEA
EFA Social Capital 2239 0.55 0.11
EFA Trust 2239 0.79 0.17
EFA 2 types of trust 2239 0.86 0.14
Trust 25 2239 0.95 0.09
Group membership 16 2239 0.95 0.05
Trust & Group membership 139 2239 0.91 0.06
DRC 128 770 0.82 0.08
Rwanda 129 661 0.89 0.06
Uganda 143 808 0.86 0.07
*We only included the model with the highest fit; the model statistics of the 
other models are available upon request
Model Fit Statistics
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Appendix 6.4a: Robustness analysis of household and village characteristics (n=2235) 
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Appendix 6.4b: Robustness analysis of household and village characteristics 
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Appendix 5a: Trust and group membership in the DRC 
 
Appendix 5b: Trust and group membership in Rwanda 
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Appendix 5c: Trust and group membership in Uganda 
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Chapter 7 Trust and sustainable coffee 
projects: the relation between producers’ 
trust and the uptake of training practices in 
sustainable coffee projects in Vietnam 
 
 
Abstract: In the last decades multinational companies became increasingly involved in 
certification initiatives to enhance the social and environmental conditions under which coffee 
is produced. However, it is often unclear whether, for whom and under which conditions these 
projects result in more sustainable coffee production. If we see uptake of training practices, an 
important component of these projects, as a result of an exchange of ideas and expectations 
between different people and institutions it becomes clear that the impact might depend quite 
extensively on the level of trust. We empirically confirm that higher levels of trust are 
associated with the higher uptake of training practices as promoted by four sustainable coffee 
projects in Vietnam. This significant positive relation stems mostly from the effect of 
institutional trust, especially in combination with high levels of trust inside the village. The 
association between trust in strangers and uptake of training practices is not significant. We 
also find tentative evidence that participation in the sustainable coffee projects positively 
influenced personalized trust in one project whereas it negatively influenced institutional trust 
in another project. Therefore, implementing agencies should carefully reflect whether and how 
the impact of their intervention relies on trust, how they could enhance it or at least avoid 
actions that deteriorate it. 
 
 
 
 
Paper by Fédes van Rijn, Michiel Kuit and Marrit van den Berg. 
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7.1 Introduction 
In the last two decades multinational coffee companies became increasingly involved in 
initiatives to enhance the social and environmental conditions under which coffee is produced, 
including certification of coffee (Kolk 2011). However, there is still much uncertainty related 
to the impact of certification, and of sustainable coffee projects in general (Kolk 2011; van Rijn 
et al. 2012). Moreover, most impact assessments have focused on the evaluation of average  
impacts on producers (Bacon 2005; Utting-Chamorro 2005; Pirotte et al. 2006; Ruben et al. 
2009; van Rijn et al. 2012). Little attention is generally paid to the distribution of program 
benefits (Raina 2003). Without this understanding, it is uncertain whether these sustainable 
coffee projects will yield similar benefits to other households or in other contexts (Deaton 
2009). It thus remains unclear whether, for whom and under which conditions these projects 
result in more sustainable coffee production. 
One aspect that could explain heterogeneity in impact of sustainable coffee projects is 
the level of trust. More specifically, we argue that trust plays an important role in one of the 
key impact pathways in the coffee supply chain at producer level - namely in the uptake of 
training practices. We conceptualise uptake of training practices as an outcome of an 
“innovation system” in which producers, trainers and institutions exchange knowledge and 
form agreements. This view agrees with the insight that agricultural innovation results from the 
integration of knowledge from various actors and stakeholders, implying a focus on 
interdependence, networks and social learning (Leeuwis and Ban 2004; Röling 2009). Whether 
or not, and for whom, interventions in the coffee supply chain have the intended results might 
thus depend on the level of trust. We contribute to closing this knowledge gap. 
Trust is one of the main components of social capital which is generally defined as 
the norms of cooperation, the social networks and the level of trust characterizing a household 
or community. Various scholars identify the importance of social capital for the evaluation of 
development interventions (Isham and Kähkönen 2002; Mansuri and Rao 2004; Deaton 2009). 
In relation to agricultural innovation most empirical studies focus on the role of the second 
component – the networks. Monge et al. (2008) for example show that households who are 
better embedded in social networks in rural Bolivia are more likely to adopt the agricultural 
innovations brought to them by various interventions. However, far less attention has been 
paid to the role of trust. One example is the study by de Hoop and van Kempen (2011) who 
find that households with higher levels of trust in healthcare providers adopt more bed nets as 
Trust and sustainable coffee projects | 121 
 
 
provided by healthcare providers. The influence of trust on uptake of agricultural training by 
farmers or agricultural innovation in general is unclear (De Hoop 2012; Landry et al. 2002).  
We empirically tested the hypothesis that a higher level of trust is associated with 
higher uptake of the training practices as promoted by four sustainable coffee projects among 
240 randomly selected project participants. Uptake of training is defined as the average 
application of practices related to pruning, soil management, irrigation, pesticide application, 
harvesting and processing of coffee. Additionally, we hypothesize that trust is more important 
for high risk practices than it is for low risk practices. Trust was measured using self-reported 
levels of trust in strangers (generalized trust), in several institutions (institutional trust) and 
inside the village (personalized trust). If trust indeed matters, it is relevant to know whether 
trust was influenced by the sustainable coffee projects. This is explored in the second part of 
our analysis where we compared the self-reported change in trust of project participants to that 
of 150 carefully selected comparable producers who did not participate in a sustainable coffee 
project. We used a regression analyses to control for a large number of household, farm and 
unobserved community level characteristics that might influence uptake of training or the level 
of trust. 
In Section 7.2 we discuss the rise of sustainable coffee projects in general, and the 
sustainable coffee projects in Vietnam in particular. In Section 7.3 we discuss our theoretical 
framework defining trust, specifying how it relates to social capital, and formulating hypotheses 
on the relationship between trust and uptake of agricultural training practices. In Section 7.4, 
we summarize our data and describe the model that we used to estimate the relationship 
between trust and uptake of training practices. We discuss and conclude our results in Section 
7.5.  
7.2 Sustainable coffee projects  
7.2.1 Sustainable coffee projects, certification and impact 
Several voluntary standards for sustainable coffee have been developed in the coffee sector in 
the last two decades (Kolk 2011). With the lifting of export quotas in the early nineties, 
production expanded significantly in Brazil and new entrants such as Vietnam. As a result of 
over-supply, the price for coffee fell by more than 50% between 1997 and 2001 contributing to 
the poor living conditions of small-scale coffee producers worldwide (Linton 2005). 
Conventional aid activities, in which no partnership was sought with the private sector, did not 
seem to improve these conditions significantly or prevent potentially hazardous effects of 
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coffee production on the environment from occurring. NGOs started a strong lobby towards 
multinational companies to take their responsibility in the supply chain (Kolk 2011). The top-5 
multinational companies, who control almost 50% of the processing and commercialization of 
coffee, became increasingly involved in initiatives to enhance sustainable coffee production 
(Ponte 2002). In fact, certification of commodities is an increasingly common way to ensure 
that producers and other value chain partners such as traders and exporters adhere to pre-
defined social, environmental and in some cases technical standards. Global supply of certified 
sustainable coffee has risen from about 1% in 2001 to 9% in 2010. Supply growth of 
conventional coffee averaged around 2% over the same period (author’s calculation, based on 
ICO data).  
Certification schemes are often implemented as part of a sustainable coffee project 
involving the organisation of small scale producers. Seventy per cent of coffee is produced by 
an estimated 20 million small-scale producers (Kolk 2011). Some of these producers are 
member of cooperatives, but the majority operate as individuals. Aside from a lack of 
management and administrative skills, individual smallholder coffee producers cannot 
profitably access the market for certified coffee because they lack sufficient volumes over 
which to spread implementation costs. Given the large and fragmented supply base, addressing 
demand for certified sustainable coffee requires trading and exporting companies to organize 
producer groups and use these as a basis for implementation of certification.  
Besides the organisation of small scale farmers, certification requires a certain amount 
of training to comply with the certification standards and address other modifications to 
further professionalize crop and farm management (Don Jansen in Kuit et al. 2013). This 
combination of compliance and professionalization should result in value for producers, aside 
from the premium, by facilitating long-term improvements in productivity, quality and cost 
efficiency. Uptake of training practices is the focus of this paper. 
There is still much uncertainty related to the impact of certification, and of 
sustainable coffee projects in general (Kolk 2011; van Rijn et al. 2012). The evidence to 
support claims of various certification agencies on improvement in productivity, quality and 
cost efficiency is very modest (Steering Committee of the State-of-Knowledge Assessment of 
Standards and Certification 2012). A meta-study commissioned by the Scientific and Technical 
Advisory Panel of the Global Environment Facility (2010) reviewed 134 studies that claim to 
assess the impact of certification in different sectors, including coffee. Out of these only 14 
were deemed sufficiently rigorous in their research design to appear credible and only six of 
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these identified some positive socioeconomic or environmental impact at farm level. The 
authors conclude that the evidence for positive impact of certification is, at best, very weak. 
Moreover, it remains unclear why some sustainable coffee projects are more successful than 
others. As was argued in the introduction, one of the aspects that could explain heterogeneity 
in impact is social capital. 
7.2.2 Project description sustainable coffee projects in Vietnam 
This paper was written in the framework of a study commissioned to investigate the 
effectiveness and efficiency of different projects that seek to promote sustainable coffee 
production in Vietnam. Vietnam is the second-largest exporter of coffee, the largest exporter 
of Robusta coffee and one of the dominant suppliers of certified coffee. Coffee production in 
Vietnam is characterised by a high degree of labour and input intensification. Furthermore, its 
literacy rate is higher than that of other Robusta coffee producing countries such as Cote 
d’Ivoire, Cameroon and Uganda (World Bank 2012). Within Vietnam, the provinces of Dak 
Lak and Gia Lai were selected for research. The two provinces produce about half of 
Vietnam’s coffee (Nguyen and Tuan 2012). Dak Lak represents the relatively more mature 
coffee areas, characterized by older tree stocks, some with declining productivity. Gia Lai is a 
more recently established coffee area with a younger tree population and tends to be more 
productive. 
In the study, we distinguished three implementation modalities that were used to 
achieve certification: high intensity, medium intensity and low intensity (see Kuit et al. 2013 for 
results). These levels of intensity refer to the quantity and quality of training. There is a 
growing realisation that what leads to impact at farm level is not so much sustainable 
certification as such, but more the way in which it is achieved. The high intensity training 
project was implemented by a multinational exporter. It has certified about 800 coffee 
producers since 2008 and uses a farmer field school (FFS) approach which is a group-based, 
experimental learning approach. The medium intensity training project was implemented in 
2011 by an NGO and is a relatively small project with 46 participants. The low intensity 
project was implemented by a national exporting company and certified almost 1800 producers 
since 2007. A fourth project was also included in the study which was implemented in 2005 by 
a multinational exporting company using only FFS training without certification. 
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7.3 Theoretical framework 
7.3.1 Trust, innovation and training uptake 
The idea that trust matters for agricultural innovation stems from the “innovation system” 
approach. It is increasingly recognized that agricultural innovation results from the integration 
of knowledge from various actors and stakeholders, implying a focus on interdependence, 
networks, learning, and social interaction (e.g. Leeuwis and Ban 2004; Röling 2009). This view 
suggests that agricultural innovation should be linked to social capital (see section 2.4 and 
chapter 4). The overall influence of social capital is often described as forming an “innovative 
milieu” (Dakhli and De Clercq 2004) or a “factor” of innovation) (Kaasa 2009).  
Although the exact mechanisms through which social capital operates vary, it is 
usually linked to the notion of cooperation. Cooperation can be seen as driven by preferences 
for cooperation and beliefs in the cooperative behaviour of others (Thöni et al. 2012). Below 
we argue that beliefs and preferences for cooperation will be more optimistic with a higher 
level of trust.  
Trust can generally be understood as an optimistic expectation or belief regarding 
someone’s behaviour (Fafchamps 2004). The more optimistic this expectation, the more likely 
it is people will cooperate. In fact, trust in people one is interacting with is a key ingredient in 
many economic and non-economic transactions (Guiso et al. 2010).  
Trust can be classified into to generalised, institutionalised and personalised trust 
(Groenewald and Bulte 2012). Personalised trust refers to trust in existing networks and most 
closely corresponds to bonding social capital. Generalised trust refers to trust in strangers and 
most closely corresponds to bridging trust. Institutional trust refers to trust in more formal 
governance networks and most closely corresponds to linking social capital.  
7.3.2 Sustainable coffee projects and trust 
Following Röling (2009), we define an innovation as “the process of technical and institutional 
change at farm and higher levels .”. In this paper we consider the act of applying sustainable 
coffee training practices as an innovation. We hypothesize that the impact of training given 
within sustainable coffee projects depends on the beliefs in and preferences for cooperation. 
We first focus on a commonly used measure of trust, namely that of generalized trust, defined 
as trust in strangers. In theory, generalized trust is considered the dimension of trust that 
makes institutions and markets function properly (Guiso et al. 2010). Our first hypothesis is as 
follows: 
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(H1): a higher level of generalized trust of producers participating in sustainable coffee projects is associated with 
a higher uptake of agricultural training practices by these producers.  
 
Quotes from in-depth interviews, conducted as part of the overall research project, confirm 
that trust indeed matters in the context of the sustainable coffee projects investigated in this 
paper. One respondent for example mentioned that “Even if I trust the project, I don’t know 
if the people who will keep our money are credible [referring to the cooperative]”. The impact 
of training clearly depends on producers’ beliefs on the likelihood that the trainer and institute 
they represent keep their word as to the results of implementing the training practices. 
Furthermore, our survey evidence indicates that 45% of the coffee producers do not apply any 
of the training received on organisational development because of a lack of trust among 
producers. These examples illustrate how trust might promote or hinder cooperation, 
cooperative development and consequently project impact through uptake of training 
practices. At the same time this quote illustrates that the effect of trust might depend on 
specific types of trust, rather than generalized trust. Therefore we formulate more specific 
hypothesis with respect to institutional and personalised trust. 
We expect that trust in the institutions that provide the training, and the people that 
represent them, matter for the uptake of training practices. Following Fafchamp’s (2004) 
understanding of trust, this means the producers have more optimistic beliefs about the value 
of the practices communicated and the action that should results from implementing these 
practices. For example in terms of an increased price level for certified coffee. Obviously it 
matters whether producers trust the institutions and individuals representing them to comply 
with this.  
 
(H2): a higher level of institutionalised trust of producers participating in sustainable coffee projects is associated 
with a higher uptake of agricultural training practices by these producers. 
 
In line with the theory of social learning we expect personalised trust, defined as trust inside 
the village in this study, to enhance the application of the training practices. The main reason 
why trust in fellow producers matters for uptake of training practices is that faster social 
learning can occur within networks characterized by a high level of trust (De Hoop and Van 
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Kempen 2012). This enhanced social learning is linked to the idea that famers share and use 
more information with and from producers they trust (e.g. Bandiera and Rasul 2006; De Hoop 
and Van Kempen 2012). In the literature, personalised trust is probably most often connected 
to agricultural innovation. In fact, the few papers that address the role of trust in agricultural 
innovation are usually related to trust in social networks within the village.  
At the same time some authors have also argued that strong bonding social capital 
might hinder agricultural innovation by promoting promote conservatism and inward looking 
behaviour (Dakhli and De Clercq 2004, chapter 3). This is especially true when bridging and 
linking social capital is low (Knack and Keefer 1997). Therefore, the net effect of personalised 
trust is ambiguous. However, combined with high levels of bridging social capital, we expect 
that personalised trust can act as a catalyst in reinforcing the positive effect of social capital on 
agricultural innovation. This results in our third hypothesis: 
 
(H3): a high level of personalised trust of producers participating in sustainable coffee projects is only associated 
with a higher uptake of agricultural training practices by these producers when combined with a high level of 
generalized or institutionalized trust. 
 
We expect the role of trust to depend on the level of risk and uncertainty involved in applying 
a new practice. In the hypotheses given before, we assume that the effect of trust is identical 
for all agricultural training practices. However, a risk averse farmer will only decide to adopt 
the practice when the expected, but unsure, outcome is significantly larger than that of the 
current practice (e.g. Conley and Udry 2001). The training provided by the projects, and 
interaction with fellow villagers in these projects, provide a platform to learn about the 
potential benefits of the new practice and overcome the uncertainty involved. We hypothesize 
that the trust between the interacting parties increases the value of shared information about 
the prospects of a new practices, hence reducing uncertainty and risk. If a practice does not 
involve risk or uncertainty, trust may be (less) important. This is also argued by De Hoop and 
van Kempen who find that trust inside the village only matters for the uptake of tomatoes, 
which is considered a risky crop in terms of demand, and not for the adoption of French 
beans. This results in our fourth and last hypothesis: 
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 (H4): a high level of trust of producers participating in sustainable coffee projects is associated more strongly 
with the uptake of high risk training practices than with the uptake of low risk training practices.  
 
If our hypotheses are confirmed, and trust indeed matters, we have an important follow-up 
question: can trust be influenced by the participation in sustainable coffee projects? 
Considering the important role of trust identified in the previous section, we explore whether 
sustainable coffee projects can potentially enhance uptake of training by increasing the level of 
trust, in particular by increasing institutional trust. Many authors argue that social capital, 
especially trust, is the result of long-term historic processes (see Fearon et al. 2009 for an 
overview). However, empirical evidence also indicates that social capital can be influenced by 
external development interventions (Bebbington and Carroll 2002; Krishna and Uphoff 2002), 
even in the short term (Fearon et al. 2009; Labonne and Chase 2011).  
7.4 Data and empirical strategy 
7.4.1 Sample 
Structured interviews were conducted among 264 participating coffee producers. For three of 
the four projects we randomly selected about 75 producers using a complete list of 
participants. For the other project we interviewed almost all participants because of its small 
population of 46 producers. In total, 15 communities were involved. To construct a 
counterfactual for the impact assessment, i.e., what would have happened if the projects would 
not have been implemented, we also conducted structured interviews among 150 purposefully 
selected coffee producers that were not involved in any sustainable coffee project. First we 
selected communities comparable to those in which the projects were implemented30. In the 
six selected communities, we designed a half-day training session. The opportunity to 
participate was announced a few days in advance assuming we would attract farmers similar to 
the project farmers in terms of motivation. In Table 1 we provide an overview of the sample 
groups in our study. 
 
                                                          
30 Communities were first short listed based on the importance of coffee as a livelihood. Next, a matrix 
with 14 key agro-ecological and socio-economic variables was constructed and filled out with the 
assistance of the respective Departments of Agriculture and Rural Development of each of the provinces. 
Based on this matrix we rated and selected six comparable communities.  
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Table 1: Sample 
Implementation modality Training intensity Certification Province n
P1: FFS + certification high yes Gia Lai 76
P2: low + certification low yes Dak Lak 75
P3: medium + certification medium yes Gia Lai 44
P4: FFS only high no Dak Lak 79
Control group farmers n.a. n.a. Gia Lai & Dak Lak 150  
 
7.4.2 Estimation strategy 
We estimate the amount of practices applied (Y) for household i as a function of a vector of 
trust variables (T), the project a famer participates in (P), a set of controls (X) and a set of 
dummies of the community a farmer lives in (C) : 
                    (1) 
We estimate the model using Ordinary Least Squares and control for characteristics that 
simultaneously influence trust and uptake of training practices in three ways. First, we control 
for a large number of observed household characteristics (see section 7.4.3). Second, we 
control for the impact of unobserved project or community level characteristics by estimating 
project and community level fixed effects. This essentially means we include dummy variables 
for each project and each community. Third, we estimate model (1) only for the treatment 
group. This prevents omitted variables that simultaneously determine project participation and 
uptake of training practices from influencing our results. Given the data at hand, there might 
still be unobserved factors that we cannot control for. Therefore, we interpret results as 
associations rather than causal relationships31.  
According to H1 and H2, we unbundle trust, T, into general, institutional and 
personalised trust. To test H3 we add interaction effects between personalised and generalised 
trust and between personalised and institutionalised trust. The interaction effect represents the 
                                                          
31 Another way to address the potential bias resulting from unobserved factors or reverse causality is to 
estimate a 2SLS using an instrumental variables (IV) approach. In this case, the IV should directly explain 
trust, but not uptake of training practices. The literature has identified some useful IVs for social capital 
variables, such as religion, ethnicity, land rights or community aggregate trust (e.g. Grootaert and 
Narayan, Guiso et al. 2006, Nunn and Wantchekon 2011, Groenewald and Bulte 2012, Kondelys 2008). 
However, at this stage no valid instruments were identified. Finding a plausible IV will be subject to 
future research. 
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residual part of the product of the two variables after the original variables have been partialed 
out (see Ross and Creyer 1993)32. To test H4 we estimate model (1) separately for high-risk and 
low risk training practices.  
To explore the influence of the sustainable coffee projects on trust we estimate the 
self-reported change in the nth dimension of trust since 2008 (C) for household i as a function 
of the project a farmer participates in (P), and the set of controls relating to human, social, 
physical, financial and natural capital (X): 
                         (2) 
We repeat model (2) for the nth indicator of trust. Self-reported change in trust (C) is 1 when 
increased, 0 when the same, and -1 when decreased. We compare these changes to the changes of 
producers from the control group by estimating an ordinary least square model for our entire 
sample. Again we include community dummies to control for unobserved community level 
fixed effects. 
7.4.3 Uptake of training practices 
Uptake of training practices was based on the following survey question: “How much of what 
you have learned do you apply in your farm for the following topic”. The topics included 
pruning, soil management, pesticide application, irrigation, harvesting and processing.  These 
indicators were measured on a 0 to 4 scale, where a score of 0 means “none”, 1 means “some 
practices”, 2 means “half of the practices”, 3 means “more than half of the practices” and a 
score of 4 means “all”.  
To test our hypotheses, we created an “average application” index of the six 
agronomy-related training areas. Especially pruning, irrigation and soil management are seen as 
important drivers for productivity and profitability (Marsh 2007). Pruning requires large 
amounts of labour, while irrigation and soil management, in particular application of fertilisers, 
entail major capital expenditures. To test our fourth hypothesis, we differentiate between high 
risk and low risk topics. We define irrigation and soil management practices as high risk. The 
use of irrigation and fertilizers, an important component of soil management, are considered a 
hedging strategy against potential yield loss (Cheesman et al. 2007). In the context of Vietnam, 
                                                          
32 This means we run a regression with the product of two types of trust, Tj and Tk:               
       , where   represents the interaction. This makes it possible to maintain a correct interpretation 
of the original variables and prevent multicollinearity. 
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implementing training practices would mean a reduction of irrigation and nutrients, with 
uncertain implications for yield. In Table 2 we present a summary of our outcome indicators. 
On average producers apply slightly more than half of the practices and there is not much 
difference between high risk and low risk practices. 
 
Table 2: Application of training  
n mean sd min max
Average application of training 242 2.53 0.98 0.33 4.00
High risk training practices 240 2.51 1.21 0.00 4.00
Low risk training practices 242 2.55 1.01 0.25 4.00  
 
7.4.4 Trust  
The level of trust was measured using the following survey question: “In general, how would 
you describe your trust in the following people?” based on the World Bank Social Capital 
Group Survey. These indicators were measured on a 1 to 5 scale, where a score of 1 means 
“very poor” and a score of 5 means “very good”. In total eight different groups of people were 
identified based on their relevance in the coffee supply chain. The most important critique on 
these types of survey questions is that it is not clear whether we measure someone’s preference 
for cooperation or someone’s beliefs about others’ cooperative behaviour, called 
trustworthiness, or a combination of the two (Fehr 2009). For example, Thöni et al. (2012) 
indicate that the general trust survey question captures the preference-based component, 
whereas the analysis by Sapienza et al. (2013) suggest it is the belief-based component. 
However, in both papers as well as others there is a clear correlation between the answers to 
the survey question of trust and actual cooperative behaviour in behavioural experiments (see 
Guiso et al. 2010 for an overview).  
Considering the hypotheses at hand we use three indicators to represent the 
dimensions of trust at household level. Generalized trust is represented by trust in strangers. 
Institutional trust is represented by an index of trust in local government officials, central 
government officials, agricultural traders, research institutes and NGOs. Personalized trust is 
represented by trust inside the village. The appropriateness of the index is supported by the 
fact that the underlying variables are positively and significantly correlated and reflected by one 
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factor in our factor analysis33. The three dimensions of trust are not significantly correlated 
illustrating that they indeed represent different dimensions of trust as hypothesized in section 
7.3. In Table 3, we present a summary of our trust indicators. On average trust in strangers is 
somewhere between very poor and poor, trust in institutions is not poor, nor good and trust 
inside the village is good. 
 
Table 3: Evaluation of trust in 2012  
n mean sd min max
Trust in strangers 274 1.58 0.78 1.00 4.00
Trust in institutions (index) 268 3.33 0.65 1.60 5.00
Trust inside the village 274 4.08 0.73 1.00 5.00  
 
7.4.5 Household and farm characteristics 
To appropriately measure the relationship between trust and uptake of training practices, we 
need to control for the wide range of other characteristic acknowledged in the literature that 
might influence the uptake of training. If producers with higher levels of trust also show more 
or less of these characteristics, we might get biased results; that is we might capture the 
relationship between these characteristics and uptake, rather than between trust and uptake. 
We control for a range of personal, physical, institutional and socio economic characteristics of 
the farm households (see Edwards-Jones 2006; Feola and Binder 2010 for an overview of 
variables that influence training uptake). In Table 4 we present summary statistics for the 
project participants. 
In the design of the impact study these characteristics were classified according to the 
five capital assets as identified in the sustainable livelihood framework (DFID 2007). In this 
paper we classify them accordingly. Under human capital we include gender of the respondent, 
the highest obtained education level in the household, a dummy for ethnic minority household, 
household size, household dependency ratio (the ratio of people outside versus inside the 
                                                          
33 Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) is used to explore whether our institutional trust indicators are 
sufficiently and consistently correlated so that they can be measured by one underlying latent variable or 
factor. In EFA the number of factors is determined by the variance extracted within each factor, or 
eigenvalue. According to the Kaiser criterion, only factors with an eigenvalue > 1 are retained (Kaplan 
2008). In our analysis this indeed results in one factor.  
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workforce) and experience in coffee. We also add the number of training sessions inside and 
outside the project since 2008. Looking at the role of trust, it is essential to control for another 
essential component of social capital namely membership of coffee and non-coffee related 
groups. We use size of coffee field, productivity and average age of coffee trees as proxies for 
natural capital. Physical capital comprises the basic infrastructure and producer goods needed 
to support livelihoods, represented by an index of equipment. Financial capital denotes the 
financial resources that people use to achieve their livelihood objectives and is captured by 
ownership of land (rather than rent), dependency on coffee income and an asset index to 
proxy for wealth. All variables are either fixed, not influenced by the sustainable coffee 
projects, or based on recall data of 2008.  
 
Table 4: Descriptives control variables (n=274) 
mean sd min max
Panel A: Human capital
Gender respondent 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00
Education level household 4.56 1.37 0.00 7.00
Ethnic minority household 0.90 0.30 0.00 1.00
Household size 5.05 1.43 2.00 12.00
Household dependency ratio 45.41 52.39 0.00 300.00
Experience coffee 18.27 5.13 4.00 34.00
Training outside the project since 2008 8.52 10.37 0.00 78.00
Training in the project since 2008 10.78 11.28 0.00 80.00
Panel B: Social capital
Membership coffee related groups 2008 1.66 1.30 0.00 5.00
Membership other groups 2008 0.70 0.90 0.00 5.00
Panel C: Natural capital
Size coffee field 2008 1.36 1.00 0.20 7.50
Productivity 2008 3.35 1.27 0.00 10.00
Average age coffee trees 16.13 5.15 3.00 32.00
Panel D: Physical capital
Equipment index 2008* 4.03 1.29 0.00 6.00
Panel E: Financial capital
Ownership farm 2008 1.63 0.73 0.00 2.00
Dependency on coffee income 2008 3.52 0.73 1.00 4.00
Asset index 2008** 4.80 1.77 0.00 10.00
*sum of water pump, irrigation pipes, tractor, electricity, hulling equipment, drying yard
**sum of washing machine, fridge, gas cooker, electric rice cooker, mobile phone,  
computer, internet, bicycle, motorbike, car  
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We include the same set of control variables in model (2) to explore the effect of the 
sustainable coffee projects on trust. These are often identified to influence the level of trust or 
social capital in general (e.g. Elder et al. 2012). We also add a dummy for Dak Lak province34 
and a household level dummy indicating whether or not one of the household heads was born 
in the district they currently live in. 
7.5 Results 
7.5.1 Trust and uptake of training practices  
We first look at the average level of training uptake for each level of trust. In Table 5 we see 
that the relation between trust and uptake of training depends on the type of trust. There is no 
consistent relationship between trust in strangers and uptake op training practices. However, 
trust in institutions is clearly higher for those with a higher level of training uptake. The same is 
true for personalized trust, measured as trust inside the village, although there is a slightly 
lower level of uptake among those respondents with a very high level of trust. 
 
Table 5: Level of training uptake by level of trust 
Level of trust
trust in 
strangers
trust in 
institutions*
trust inside 
village
very poor 2.48 - 1.75
poor 2.47 2.04 2.08
not poor, nor good 2.68 2.39 2.12
good 2.31 2.77 2.62
very good - 3.51 2.50
*this variable is re-categorized to 1 (1-1.4), 2 (1.5-2.4), 3 (2.5-3.4), 4 (3.5-4)
Uptake of practices by
 
 
The results of model (1) in the first column of Table 6 clearly show that the role of trust 
indeed depends on whether we measure generalized, institutional or personalised trust. We 
reject our first hypothesis that application of training practices can be explained by generalized 
trust. On the other hand, the results strongly support our second hypothesis that uptake of 
training practices is related to institutional trust. A one point increase of institutional trust is 
                                                          
34 Please note that we did not include this as a control variable in model (1) because each project is 
implemented in only one province. Because of high multicollinearity between the project dummies and 
the province dummy it is impossible to estimate a model including both. 
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associated with an increase of the training index of 0.397 on a scale of 0.33 to 4. The 
coefficient of trust inside the village is also significantly positive, although much lower at 0.160. 
Other characteristics that are related to increased levels of training uptake are the amount of 
training sessions received inside the sustainable coffee projects and the level of productivity in 
2008. Interestingly, the effect of training is slightly lower than that of institutional trust35. 
 
Table 6: Empirical result model 1  
Uptake 
practices
Uptake 
practices
Uptake 
High risk 
practices
Uptake 
Low risk 
practices 
Trust in strangers -0.116 -0.115 -0.135 -0.107
(-1.59) (-1.57) (-1.39) (-1.40)
Trust in institutions 0.397*** 0.411*** 0.356*** 0.423***
(4.31) (4.46) (2.87) (4.38)
Trust inside the village 0.160** 0.164** 0.118 0.164**
(2.11) (2.17) (1.17) (2.07)
Trust strangers * inside the village -0.035 -0.058 -0.021
(-0.39) (-0.49) (-0.23)
Trust institutions * inside the village 0.183* 0.130 0.181*
(1.87) (1.01) (1.78)
P1: FFS + certification 0.179 0.205 0.021 0.327
(0.91) (1.03) (0.08) (1.57)
P2: Low training + certification -0.327* -0.331* -0.605*** -0.207
(-1.91) (-1.92) (-2.66) (-1.15)
P3: Medium training + certification 0.091 0.120 0.076 0.232
(0.39) (0.51) (0.24) (0.95)
Gender respondent -0.052 -0.086 -0.217 0.010
(-0.32) (-0.52) (-1.00) (0.06)
Education level hh 0.031 0.028 -0.030 0.050
(0.71) (0.63) (-0.49) (1.08)
Training outside project since 2008 0.001 0.000 0.002 -0.002
(0.20) (0.04) (0.20) (-0.26)  
                                                          
35 Standardized coefficients are 0.261 for institutional trust, 0.246 for amount of training sessions and 
0.112 for productivity. 
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Training in the project since 2008 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.020** 0.024***
(3.28) (3.45) (2.32) (3.56)
Ethnic minority household -0.098 -0.146 -0.061 -0.184
(-0.47) (-0.69) (-0.21) (-0.84)
Household size -0.061 -0.055 -0.087 -0.043
(-1.45) (-1.31) (-1.56) (-0.99)
Household dependency ratio -0.002* -0.002* -0.002 -0.002
(-1.96) (-1.76) (-1.30) (-1.63)
Experience coffee -0.010 -0.011 0.008 -0.015
(-0.69) (-0.78) (0.40) (-1.01)
Membership coffee related groups 2008 0.042 0.044 0.048 0.043
(0.76) (0.81) (0.65) (0.74)
Membership other groups 2008 0.016 0.009 0.050 0.004
(0.22) (0.12) (0.51) (0.06)
Size coffee field 2008 -0.077 -0.078 -0.082 -0.082
(-1.25) (-1.27) (-1.00) (-1.27)
Productivity 2008 0.088* 0.073 0.096 0.070
(1.72) (1.41) (1.38) (1.30)
Average age coffee trees -0.008 -0.000 -0.016 0.005
(-0.55) (-0.01) (-0.82) (0.32)
Equipment index 0.032 0.027 0.113* 0.004
(0.68) (0.58) (1.78) (0.08)
Ownership farm 2008 -0.179** -0.175** -0.095 -0.208**
(-2.12) (-2.07) (-0.85) (-2.36)
Dependency on coffee income -0.052 -0.045 -0.047 -0.056
(-0.62) (-0.54) (-0.41) (-0.63)
Asset index -0.016 -0.014 -0.031 -0.004
(-0.45) (-0.39) (-0.65) (-0.11)
Constant 1.329* 1.211 1.516 1.109
(1.80) (1.63) (1.54) (1.43)
n 256 256 247 256
Note: all estimations include a constant, community, dummies
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01, Standard errors in parentheses  
 
In the second column we find some evidence for the hypothesis that personalised trust is 
particularly important when generalised or institutional trust is high. The relationship between 
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uptake of training practices and personalised trust increases when institutional trust is also 
high: amongst producers that have a high level of trust inside the village and in institutions the 
uptake of training is even higher. This is not true for the interaction between trust inside the 
village and trust in strangers.  
We do not find any evidence to support our fourth hypothesis that the role of trust is 
larger for the uptake of high risk training practices (see column 3 and 4 in Table 5). In fact, if 
anything, we find the opposite. The role of trust inside the village is not significant for high 
risk training practices whereas it is for low risk training practices. Moreover, the coefficient for 
trust in institutions is lower for high risk training practices than it is for low risk training 
practices.  
A major concern of any work related to social capital is that social capital is not 
exogenous to the model because it is correlated with unobserved factors, it is reverse-caused by 
current economic factors or it reflects the working of institutions (Guiso et al. 2010). This 
could bias results of an OLS regression. We already control for a large number of observed 
and unobserved factors that might influence trust or uptake of training thereby limiting the 
chance for omitted variables bias. It is also unlikely that current trust is influenced by the 
uptake of training. However, it might be that those who consider the project more successful, 
and have applied more training, indicate higher levels of trust because they are more optimistic. 
This especially applies to institutional trust. If this is the case we should find that producers 
with a higher uptake of training are also those producers who indicate more increase in 
institutional trust since the start of the project. We test this by replacing our institutional trust 
indicator by the change in institutional trust since 2008. We do not find any positive significant 
correlation that indicates that our results are driven by perceived successfulness of the projects 
(see appendix 7.1). Interestingly, the negative coefficient of generalised trust now becomes 
significant, indicating that those who have less generalised trust implement more training 
practices. Whether this results is robust and what explains this, is topic to future research. 
 
7.5.2 Exploring the impact of sustainable coffee projects on trust 
23% of the respondent in our sample indicate a change in trust in strangers, 65% indicate a 
change in trust inside the village, and 70% indicate a change in trust in at least one of the 
institutions. This supports the view that trust is very dynamic. In Table 7 we present the 
average change in trust for each sustainable coffee project and compare it to the change in the 
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control group within the same province. We see an overall increase in trust inside the village 
and trust in institutions across all groups, although there is significantly more increase in the 
low training + certification group (see Panel A). We find a decrease in trust in strangers for all 
groups.  
 
Table 7: Change in trust since 2008 
Change in 
trust in 
strangers
Change in 
trust in 
institutions
Change in 
trust inside 
village
Panel A: Dak Lak
Control group -0.11 0.26 0.47
Project 2: Low + cert. -0.11 0.37* 0.69**
Project 4: FFS only -0.16 0.23 0.48
Panel B: Gia Lai
Control group -0.08 0.33 0.51
Project 1: FFS + cert. -0.09 0.24 0.51
Project 3: Med + cert. -0.05 0.26 0.45
Note: decrease (-1), same (0), increase (1)
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01 (significantly different from the control group in the same province)
 
 
Results of model (2) in Table 8 indicate that project participation can have a significant 
influence on trust, although not for all trust indicators and projects, and not necessarily 
positively.  
First, when we control for other characteristics, participants of the FFS + 
certification project indicated significantly less increase in trust in institutions than the control 
group. Based on the in-depth interviews we speculate this might be because of unmet 
expectations and lack of communication. One producer from this project for example said: 
“They were explaining and convincing us to join the cooperative, but after one or two 
trainings, they just disappeared. We didn’t see any project staff over the past year. I don’t even 
know where the project office is”. Another producers said “However, for an unknown reason, 
the company didn’t buy the certified coffee with a premium this year” At the same time, this 
type of comments was not limited to this project. Therefore, miscommunication and unmet 
expectations were either more prevalent in this project or had more severe consequences. 
Alternatively, the reason why especially this project has experienced less increase in trust lies 
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elsewhere. Characteristics that have a positive impact on trust are origin from the same district, 
training sessions outside the project, and membership in coffee related groups in 2008.  
Second, results confirm that the higher increase in trust among participants in the low 
training + certification project resulted from project participation. Besides participation in this 
project, only the number of training sessions outside the project seems to have a positive 
influence, whereas the asset index has a negative influence. We are unable to determine for 
certain why it is especially this project that resulted in increased trust inside the village. 
However, we speculate it might be because this project, which is probably the most 
commercially-led of all, probably selected as many farmers from the same villages as possible 
to minimize costs of operation. Furthermore, even though participation was voluntary, this 
project seemed to have selected especially those producers that show promising yields. The 
selection by the organisation, versus self-selection, might have increased the likelihood that 
producers were not yet familiar with each other yet, thus providing more room for trust  
building.  
 
Table 8: Empirical result model 2 
Change in 
trust in 
strangers
Change in 
trust in 
institutions
Change in 
trust inside 
village
P1: FFS + certification -0.013 -0.187*** -0.006
(-0.14) (-2.74) (-0.05)
P2: Low training + certification -0.100 0.087 0.244**
(-1.17) (1.38) (2.19)
P3: Medium training + certification 0.040 -0.047 -0.032
(0.41) (-0.65) (-0.25)
T4: FFS only -0.115 -0.091 0.013
(-1.40) (-1.47) (0.12)
Gender respondent -0.047 -0.046 -0.067
(-0.67) (-0.86) (-0.73)
Education level hh 0.027 0.008 -0.024
(1.47) (0.58) (-1.00)
Origin same district 0.182** 0.133** -0.110
(2.27) (2.14) (-1.05)  
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Training outside project since 2008 -0.003 0.005* 0.008*
(-0.82) (1.84) (1.85)
Training in the project since 2008 0.006* -0.001 -0.006
(1.79) (-0.35) (-1.37)
Ethnic minority household 0.054 0.025 0.076
(0.66) (0.40) (0.71)
Household size -0.003 0.001 -0.010
(-0.19) (0.10) (-0.46)
Household dependency ratio -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(-0.40) (-0.39) (-0.37)
Experience coffee 0.008 -0.000 -0.013
(1.33) (-0.02) (-1.62)
Membership coffee related groups 2008 0.010 0.064*** 0.022
(0.38) (3.27) (0.64)
Membership other groups 2008 0.037 -0.015 -0.015
(1.12) (-0.59) (-0.35)
Size coffee field 2008 0.015 0.013 0.001
(0.61) (0.70) (0.03)
Productivity 2008 0.026 0.019 -0.014
(1.28) (1.24) (-0.53)
Average age coffee trees -0.017*** -0.005 0.002
(-2.88) (-1.21) (0.30)
Equipment index -0.015 -0.014 0.008
(-0.77) (-0.98) (0.33)
Ownership farm 2008 -0.019 0.029 0.004
(-0.52) (1.10) (0.09)
Dependency on coffee income 0.035 -0.003 -0.046
(1.12) (-0.14) (-1.11)
Asset index -0.025 -0.016 -0.039*
(-1.61) (-1.39) (-1.96)
Daklak 0.060 -0.030 0.030
(0.69) (-0.45) (0.26)
Constant -0.224 0.266* 1.111***
(-1.17) (1.83) (4.42)
n 422 408 422
Note: all estimations include a constant, community, dummies
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01, Standard errors in parentheses  
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To test the robustness of these results we use two alternative model specifications and look at 
the current level of trust in the different sustainable coffee projects. As a first robustness test, 
we use a model that takes into account the fact that the original data is categorical rather than 
continuous. An OLS estimation could bias results. Also, we combine the change in the 
different institutional trust indicators which might hide effects on the individual indicators. We 
already saw that participation in the sustainable coffee projects might result in more increase in 
trust but also in more decrease. We therefore use a multinomial logit model and essentially 
estimate equation (2) twice: one comparing a decrease versus the same, and one comparing an 
increase versus the same (see appendix 7.2). As a second robustness test, we estimate model (2) 
using the current level of trust as an outcome variable rather than self-reported change in trust 
since 2008. If the projects resulted in an increase or decrease in trust this should also be 
reflected in current levels of trust if we have a good control group (see appendix 7.3). Both 
robustness analyses confirm the negative impact of participation in the FFS + certification on 
trust in institutions. The multinomial logit results confirm the positive impact of participation 
in the low training + certification on an increase in trust inside the village. However, the 
current level of trust inside the village does not seem to be higher than in the control group. 
This could mean that trust was not influenced, but it could also mean that trust was different 
to start with and our control variables do not pick up the cause of these differences.  
7.6 Discussion and conclusion 
In the last two decades multinational coffee companies became increasingly involved in 
initiatives to enhance the social and environmental conditions under which coffee is produced, 
including certification of coffee. However, it is unclear whether, for whom and under which 
conditions these projects result in more sustainable coffee production. Training of producers 
has an important, if not decisive role. When we see uptake of training practices as a result of an 
exchange of ideas and expectations between different people and institutions it becomes clear 
that the impact of training might depend quite extensively on the level of trust. In this paper, 
we empirically test and confirm the hypothesis that a higher level of trust is associated with a 
higher uptake of training practices as promoted by four sustainable coffee projects in Vietnam. 
In fact, of all household and farm characteristics we included in our analysis, the level of trust 
seems to have the highest correlation to uptake of training practices. 
We find that the relation between trust and uptake of training practices depends on 
whether we measure generalized, institutional or personalised trust. The significant positive 
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relation between trust and uptake of training practices stems mostly from trust in institutions. 
Trust inside the village, our measure of personalised trust, is also positively associated to 
uptake, although the coefficient is much lower. Trust in strangers, our measure of generalized 
trust, is not significantly correlated to uptake of training practices. This result is interesting 
because a large part of the literature on social capital and trust claim that it is especially this 
type of trust that matters for economic development (e.g. Guiso et al. 2010). Although this 
might be true for other areas of development, our results show that this is not necessarily the 
case for agricultural innovation. Interestingly, this is supported by evidence from various other 
countries as well. For example, de Hoop et al. (2010) find that trust in health providers is more 
important than generalized trust for the adoption of bed nets in Ghana. Furthermore, Cassar et 
al. (2007) find that trust between group members is more important than generalized trust in 
predicting loan repayment in Armenia and South Africa.   
We also find some evidence that the role of personalised trust is higher with high 
levels of institutional trust. The relation between uptake and our measure of bonding social 
capital, personalized trust, is even higher in combination with higher levels of our measure of 
bridging social capital, institutional trust. This confirms the idea that bonding and bridging 
social capital are complementary (Knack and Keefer 1997). However, it is also important to 
note that we do not find any evidence for a detrimental effect of bonding social capital, for 
example by promoting inward-looking modes of behaviour that defer agricultural innovation 
(e.g. Dakhli and De Clerq 2004, chapter 3). Contrary to the results by De Hoop and van 
Kempen (2012) we find no difference between the role of trust in uptake of low risk or high 
risk training practices.  
In the second part of our analysis we find tentative evidence that participation in the 
sustainable coffee projects has had an influence on trust. A large body of literature suggests 
that social capital is historically derived  (e.g. Putnam 2000), is a result of long-run evolutionary 
processes (Bowles and Gintis 2001) or is shaped by critical junctures in history (Nunn and 
Wantchekon 2011). Our results indicate that participation in at least one of the projects 
resulted in significantly higher increase in trust inside the village. This supports an increasing 
number of studies that show that social capital can indeed be influenced by external 
interventions, even in the short term (Uphoff and Wijayaratna 2000; Fearon et al. 2009; 
Labonne and Chase 2011). On the other hand, participation in another group resulted in 
significantly less increase in trust in institutions. The idea that development interventions might 
have negative side-effects on existing levels of social capital is not new. Elder et al. (2012) for 
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example show that Fair Trade resulted in a decrease in trust in leaders in Rwanda. Vollan 
(2012) shows that a high level of externally initiated committees resulted in lower levels of trust 
in South Africa. He argues that the negative impact on trust is likely driven by unfulfilled 
expectations, a lack of downward accountability and transparency or poor coordination. In-
depth interviews conducted for this survey pointed in similar directions. A caveat to these 
results is that they are based on the level of self-reported trust in a non-randomly selected 
treatment and control group. 
Nonetheless, we think these results have essential implications for the 
implementation and design of sustainable coffee projects, and development interventions in 
general. Implementing agencies should realize that trust, especially institutional trust, is very 
important for the uptake of training practices. They should carefully reflect whether and how 
the impact of their intervention relies on trust, how they could enhance it or at least avoid 
actions that deteriorate it. This is not only important for the success of the specific 
intervention, but also for preventing potentially long lasting negative side-effects from 
occurring. Because it is not yet entirely clear under which conditions development 
interventions can or do influence trust, programs could also target those households who have 
higher levels of trust to start with, as for example suggested by de Hoop et al. (2011). 
However, they rightly argue that trust is not easy to observe and thus difficult to use as a 
selection criteria. Moreover, it might not be realistic or ethical to exclude producers who are a 
potential target. An alternative is to work with already existing groups or stimulate producers 
to form their own groups, rather than defining those groups top-down. 
Considering the limited amount of research investigating the link between trust and 
the success of sustainable coffee projects, in this case the uptake of training practices, there is 
plenty of room for follow-up research. Future research should identify the differences in the 
relationship between trust and training uptake in the different sustainable coffee projects. For 
example, we might expect that the role of trust inside the village is more important for those 
initiatives that require a lot of interaction between producers, such as the FFS approach. 
Second, this paper addressed the role of trust in uptake of training practices, a direct outcome 
indicator. It would be interesting to see whether trust also has role further down the impact 
chain, for example in relation to yield or costs of production. Third, it would be particularly 
interesting to see whether our results can be generalized to other development initiatives or 
other countries. Finally, even though we control for various factor that might bias our results 
because trust is not exogenous, we would like to see our results confirmed if we a find a 
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plausible instrument or could replicate this study as truly semi-experimental or at least using 
baseline data. 
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7.7 Appendix 
Appendix 7.1 Robustness analysis for the relation between trust and training uptake (n=255) 
Uptake of practices
Trust in strangers -0.131*
(-1.68)
Change in trust in institutions 0.246
(1.46)
Trust inside the village 0.150*
(1.91)
Note: all estimations include a constant, community .
dummies, and the set of control variables
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01, Standard errors in parentheses  
 
Appendix 7.2: Multinomial logit robustness analysis for the impact of projects on trust 
Strangers
Local
Govern.
Central
Govern.
Agricult. 
Traders
Resear.
Institut. NGOs
Inside 
village
decrease
P1: FFS + cert. 0.022 18.501*** 16.300*** 0.686 -22.723 -1.085 0.815
P2: Low + cert. 1.939*** -0.373 -2.598* 0.703 -41.781 0.370 -0.650
P3: Medium + cert. -1.256 18.318*** -12.689 -0.556 21.195*** -0.709 1.320
T4: FFS only 0.919* 0.286 -0.524 1.015 0.539 1.179 0.809
increase
P1: FFS + cert. -0.816 -0.742* -1.177*** -0.223 -1.244*** -1.365** 0.130
P2: Low + cert. 1.856** 0.204 -0.050 0.994** 0.278 0.058 0.770*
P3: Medium + cert. -36.908 -0.246 -0.700 -0.438 -0.185 0.069 0.158
T4: FFS only 0.358 -0.766** -0.584 0.534 0.023 -0.510 0.361
N 422 424 421 423 419 414 422
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01
Note: the control variables are all included but left out to save sapce; results are avalaible upon request
Trust in:
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Table7.3: Robustness analysis for the impact of projects on current level trust 
Trust in 
strangers
Trust in 
institutions
Trust inside 
village
P1: FFS + certification 0.071 -0.295*** -0.016
(0.48) (-2.72) (-0.12)
P2: Low training + certification -0.004 0.319*** 0.015
(-0.03) (3.17) (0.12)
P3: Medium training + certification0.206 -0.048 -0.025
(1.32) (-0.42) (-0.18)
T4: FFS only -0.126 0.081 -0.143
(-0.95) (0.83) (-1.18)
n 424 411 424
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01, Standard errors in parentheses
Note: all estimations include a constant, community dummies, and the set of control variable
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Chapter 8 Conclusion 
8.1 Main findings 
In this thesis I show that social capital should have an important role in the evaluation of 
development initiatives targeting agricultural innovation. This is specifically true for the 
increasing number of policies, programs and projects that include beneficiaries in the design, 
management and decision making process. I broadly define social capital as the participation in 
formal and informal networks, the norms that define behaviour in these networks and the trust 
within and outside these networks. Even though social capital is something which exists 
between people, it has a clear individual attribute. Therefore, I consider network participation 
and trust as individual attributes of social capital, which may or may not be aggregated at 
village level. I distinguish four dimensions of social capital; structural bonding, structural 
bridging, cognitive bonding and cognitive bridging. Participation in networks is used as a proxy 
for structural social capital, whereas norms and trust within and between these networks is 
used as a proxy for cognitive social capital.  In this thesis, bonding and bridging social capital is 
akin to social capital inside and outside the village.  
I empirically investigate the relationships between social capital, agricultural 
innovation and two types of development initiatives. The first is the implementation of 
agricultural research through the Integrated Agricultural Research for Development (IAR4D). 
IAR4D was adopted by the Sub Saharan African Challenge Program (SSA CP) and 
implemented in eight different countries (FARA 2009).  The core of this approach is the 
development of Innovation Platforms (IPs), which can be described as an informal coalition 
and alliance of conventional agricultural research and development actors. Using the semi 
experimental data collected in this context, I could investigate the important role of social 
capital in different contexts. The second type of initiative is implementation of sustainable 
certification schemes through group-based experimental learning approaches. I investigate four 
sustainable coffee projects in Vietnam, of which two adopted the interactive Farmer Field 
School training approach. The data of these four projects allow me to verify some of the 
conclusions from a different context and a different development initiative. 
I find that social capital is important for development initiatives targeting agricultural 
innovation in the three ways proposed in chapter 1 (also see figure 1). First, social capital is 
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associated with agricultural innovation (arrow i). Second, development initiatives can influence 
social capital (arrow ii). Third, the existing level of social capital is associated with the success 
of development interventions (arrow iii). However, the effect of social capital or the impact of 
a development initiative on social capital was not necessarily positive and depends greatly on 
the aforementioned dimension of social capital. The latter is also supported by the fact that 
different dimensions of social capital are not necessarily related. Below I discuss these findings 
in more detail. 
8.1.1 The role of social capital in agricultural innovation 
The important role of social capital in processes of agricultural development and innovation is 
increasingly recognized (e.g. Narayan and Pritchett 1999; Isham 2002; Bandiera and Rasul 
2006). Yet, the existing literature about the different dimensions of social capital and how they 
contribute to agricultural innovation is limited. In the theoretical discussion in chapter 2 it 
became clear that not all dimensions of social capital are conducive to agricultural innovation.  
In chapter 3, I empirically test whether and how different dimensions of social capital 
are associated with the adoption of agricultural innovation. I use the baseline data collected by 
the SSA CP for a large sample of African smallholders in eight Sub Saharan African countries. 
Agricultural innovation is measured as an aggregate index of a variety of innovations in the 
domains of land management, post-harvest management and production enhancing 
innovations. In Chapter 2, I unbundle social capital into structural bonding, structural bridging 
and cognitive bonding social capital. I find that social capital is associated with agricultural 
innovation in different ways.  
Structural bridging social capital is significantly and positively related to the level of 
agricultural innovation. This result is true for the pooled model as well as for four of the 
country models. This form of social capital captures agriculture-related links creating access to 
knowledge and resources and is considered an important dimension of economic development 
(e.g. Fafchamps 2004; Granovetter 2005). The effect of structural bonding social capital 
remains ambiguous. 
I find a negative association between cognitive bonding social capital and the 
innovation index. This result emerges both in the pooled data and some of the country models. 
This finding could represent a potentially harmful side of social capital in terms of agricultural 
innovation. High levels of cognitive social capital might result in inward-looking modes of 
behaviour, displace time and resources away from agricultural innovation, or promote create 
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conflict between groups (e.g. Knack and Keefer 1997; Bowles and Gintis 2001; Dakhli and De 
Clercq 2004; Kaasa 2009) .  
8.1.2 The effect of development initiatives on social capital 
Considering the important role of social capital for development, economic and otherwise 
(Woolcock 2010), development aid has invested significantly in efforts to increase social 
capital. Under the banner of community-driven development programs, there has been an 
enormous increase in projects that include beneficiaries in the design and management of the 
project, and that stress the importance of information sharing, capacity building, and 
strengthening the organisations that represent them (Mansuri and Rao 2004). A good example 
is the IAR4D approach. However, whether external initiatives can actually influence social 
capital is still topic of debate (Gugerty and Kremer 2002; Pronyk et al. 2008; Fearon et al. 2009; 
Casey et al. 2012).  
In chapter 4, I use semi-experimental data collected in the context of the SSA CP to 
investigate the impact of the IAR4D approach on social capital in one of the pilot sub regions 
–the border region between Rwanda, Uganda and the DRC. Social capital is defined similar to 
chapter 3, and grouped into structural bridging, structural bonding and cognitive bonding 
social capital. I compare the impact of IAR4D on these dimension of social capital to that of 
traditional Agriculture Research and Development (ARD). I find that IAR4D has influenced 
social capital, although not in all its dimensions and not consistently for all countries. 
Furthermore, I show that traditional ARD has been less successful. 
More specifically, I find that IAR4D has increased structural bridging social capital in 
the DRC and Uganda, but not in Rwanda. Whether the IAR4D approach has had a positive 
impact on structural and cognitive bonding social capital remains ambiguous. I find some 
tentative evidence that IAR4D has had a positive impact on bonding social capital, but this 
effect is not confirmed by the main estimation model.  
However, in chapter 7, I provide tentative evidence that cognitive social capital can 
be influenced by development initiatives. Using data collected among participants of four 
sustainable coffee projects and carefully collected control groups in Vietnam, I find suggestive 
evidence for the fact that participation in the sustainable coffee projects has affected trust. Our 
results indicate that participation in at least one of the projects resulted in a significant increase 
in trust inside the village. This supports the growing amount of evidence that social capital can 
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be influenced in the short term (e.g. Pronyk et al. 2008; Fearon et al. 2009; Labonne and Chase 
2011). 
However, the impact of development interventions on social capital is not necessarily 
positive. In chapter 7, I also find tentative evidence that participation in one of the sustainable 
coffee projects in Vietnam actually had a negative influence on trust in institutions. The idea 
that development interventions might have negative side-effects on existing levels of social 
capital is not new. Elder et al. (2012) for example show that Fair Trade resulted in a decrease in 
trust in leaders in Rwanda. Vollan (2012) shows that a high level of externally initiated 
committees resulted in lower levels of trust in South Africa. He argues that the negative impact 
on trust is likely driven by unfulfilled expectations, a lack of downward accountability and 
transparency, or poor coordination. In-depth interviews conducted for the evaluation of the 
sustainable coffee projects in Vietnam pointed in similar directions.  
8.1.3 Social capital as a catalyst for the success of development initiatives  
Various scholars identify the importance of social capital as a catalyst for the success of   
development initiatives (Isham 2002; Mansuri and Rao 2004; Dasgupta 2005; Baliamoune-Lutz 
and Mavrotas 2009; Deaton 2009). The evaluation literature suggests two ways in which initial 
levels of social capital matters. First, outcomes of a policy may vary if the policy is 
implemented by different organisations; the organisations may possess different organisational 
and managerial capacities and have different efficiency levels (Heckman, 1991; Deaton, 2010; 
Allcott & Mullainathan, 2012; Bold et al., 2013). Second, the impact of any development 
initiative may be a function of population characteristics of the region where the project is 
implemented (Heckman, 1991; Deaton, 2010). Social capital is a potentially important source 
of differences in implementation and impact.  
In chapter 5, I find tentative evidence that the initial level of village social capital 
influences the successful implementation of the IAR4D approach. The successful 
implementation of IAR4D is measured by quantifying the five defining principles of IAR4D 
into an IAR4Dness index. I argue that IPs may not have implemented the principles of the 
IAR4D approach in the same way across IPs. This might explain the heterogeneity in impact 
of IPs identified in chapter 3  (also see Pamuk et al. 2012). Indeed, I find that the index is 
positively and significantly correlated with the household Food Consumption Score (FCS). 
Looking at the sub-components of each principle it seems especially participation in 
information sharing activities and field visits was crucial for project success. Involvement in 
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these activities is higher in communities with a higher level of education, a higher percentage 
of female headed households, and a higher level of village social capital in terms of trust and 
gift exchange. Whether this effect is causal, still needs to be confirmed. However, the analysis 
also indicates that the effect of IAR4Dness on FSC does not operate through the increased 
levels of social capital observed in chapter 3. 
In chapter 7, I investigate whether cognitive social capital explains differences in the 
uptake of training practices, a key component of sustainable coffee projects (Kuit 2013). It 
remains unclear whether, for whom and under which conditions these projects result in more 
sustainable coffee production (Kolk 2011; van Rijn et al. 2012) Using survey data collected 
among 240 randomly selected coffee project participants, I empirically test the hypothesis that 
higher levels of trust increase the uptake of the training practices as promoted by four 
sustainable coffee projects in Vietnam. I distinguish between trust in strangers, institutions, and 
inside the village. I also distinguish between the uptake of high and low risk training practices. 
The relation between trust levels of respondents and the uptake of training practices is 
particularly relevant.  
The significant positive relation between trust and the uptake of training practices 
stems mostly from the impact of trust in institutions, which is a measure of bridging social 
capital. The role of trust inside the village, which is bonding social capital, is also positive 
although the coefficient is much lower. I also find some evidence that the role of bonding trust 
is higher with high levels of bridging trust. This confirms the idea that bonding and bridging 
social capital are complementary (Knack and Keefer 1997). Contrary to the results in chapter 3, 
I do not find indications of a detrimental effect of high levels of cognitive bonding social 
capital on innovation; the relation between trust inside the village and uptake of training. 
The relation of trust in strangers to uptake of training practices among project 
participants is not significant. This result is interesting because a large part of the literature on 
social capital and trust claims that it is especially this type of trust that matters for the impact of 
social capital on economic development (Guiso et al. 2010). Although this might be true for 
other areas of development, the result in chapter 7 shows that this is not necessarily the case 
for agricultural innovation. This is supported by evidence from various other countries as well 
(Cassar et al. 2007; De Hoop and Van Kempen 2010).  
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8.1.4 Relationship between the different dimensions of social capital 
In answering the main research questions, I found that the role of social capital depends greatly 
on the dimension of social capital measured; that is structural bonding, structural bridging, 
cognitive bonding or cognitive bridging. However, the existing literature does not provide an 
unambiguous answer to how these dimensions are related. In chapter 6, I find that the 
different dimensions of social capital are in fact not necessarily related, as is often implicitly 
assumed. 
Using factor and path analysis I investigate how group membership, an important 
component of structural social capital, is related to trust, and important component of 
cognitive social capital. I use data from one of the pilot learning sites of the SSA CP: the 
border region of the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda. I distinguished between trust in people inside 
the village, outside the village, strangers, local and central government officials, research 
institutes, traders and NGOs. I also distinguished between membership in community, 
agricultural, cultural, welfare, financial and political groups. All variables were measured at the 
individual level. 
I find that different types of trust and group membership are often not correlated. 
This confirms the concerns raised by various authors including Sabatini (2009), Poder (2011) 
and Quibria (2003). Only membership in three out of thirteen groups is significantly and 
positively related to the trust indicators, namely finance and saving groups, burial and festival 
societies and political groups. The common factor of these groups is probably the role of 
finance in terms of social security or entrusted funds (Fafchamps 2004; Dercon et al. 2006). 
Indeed, Fafchamps (2004) contends that where there is information asymmetry and weak legal 
enforcement, as in most sub-Saharan Africa countries, personal trust is an effective substitute 
for the security provided by the legal enforcement.  
However, the relationship among different indicators of trust is strong and positive, 
although not strong enough to be reflected by one underlying latent factor. This significant 
relation is not true for the indicator of general trust, which is only weakly correlated with the 
other indicators of trust. This confirms concerns regarding the use of a specific question from 
the World Value Survey related to “general trust”, to infer trust in specific societal groups (e.g. 
Glaeser et al. 2000).    
The relationship across indicators of membership in different groups is weak; 
membership in one group may make it too time consuming, unnecessary or even impossible 
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for someone to join another group. However, rather than a negative correlation we find that 
participation in some groups is in fact positively related to participation in other groups. This 
means that some individuals are likely to participate in multiple groups. Multiple affiliations 
could mean that participation in one group results in spill over effects to other groups 
(Wollebæk and Selle 2003). 
8.2 Policy and research implications 
Agricultural innovation, and agricultural development more generally, is a vital condition for 
alleviating poverty in many developing countries (e.g. Duflo and Kremer 2005; World Bank 
2007; De Janvry 2010; Diao et al. 2010; Christiaensen et al. 2011). This thesis has several 
implications related to the role of social capital in the design, implementation and evaluation of 
development initiatives that target agricultural innovation. These implications are important to 
the ever increasing number of policies, programmes or projects for which networks, trust and 
norms of cooperation are either the basis for success or form an outcome as such. This 
specifically applies to those initiatives that include the beneficiaries in the design and 
management of the project and stress the importance of information sharing, capacity building, 
and strengthening civic societies that represent them (Mansuri and Rao 2004).  
The first implication is that stimulating social capital, especially bridging social capital, 
may be a natural leverage point for policy makers to promote agricultural development. This is 
a dimension of social capital which is generally thought to be important, if not vital, to 
economic development. Insofar as education or other policies contribute to relaxing the push 
for conformity, enhanced adoption of agricultural innovation may be a by-product. However, 
it appears as if cognitive bonding social capital can also be a factor that impedes adoption of 
agricultural innovations. Therefore, it might be appropriate to do a careful evaluation of the 
context in terms of the existing level of different dimensions of social capital; especially 
focussing on the balance between bonding and bridging social capital. This can be done before 
implementation of a program based on existing social capital data- such as the World Value 
Survey –baseline data, or more qualitative research methods such as focus group discussions.  
The second implication is that increased levels of social capital can indeed be an 
outcome of development initiatives, either intentionally or not. I have shown that an 
intervention such as IAR4D can successfully influence the networks linking a village to 
partners outside the village. This result was found in two regions with divergent institutional 
contexts. I also showed that creating an impact on structural social capital requires specific 
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efforts, because traditional ARD did not yield similar results. However, IAR4D did yet not yet 
have a strong significant impact on cognitive bonding social capital. It thus remains 
questionable whether development initiatives can influence cognitive social capital if this is 
required. At the same time, I find tentative results that the impact on cognitive bridging social 
capital might have been negative in a sustainable coffee project in Vietnam. Because these are 
not stand-alone results (e.g. Elder et al. 2012; Ruben and Heras 2012; Vollan 2012) 
implementing agents should carefully reflect whether their initiatives might have a negative 
effect on social capital. This could for example be done by monitoring the changes in social 
capital using standardized monitoring tools or through frequent interaction with target group 
beneficiaries. Issues that could be addressed are the identification of unmet expectations, lack 
of downward accountability and transparency or poor coordination (e.g. Vollan 2012). 
The third implication is that social capital might matter for the success of certain 
development initiatives, either as a source of heterogeneous implementation or impact.  More 
specifically, I show that institutional trust is important for the uptake of training practices. 
Therefore, the existing level of trust should be taken into account when training is used as a 
tool to improve agricultural training practices. For example, by incorporating trust-building 
modules to create awareness of potential mistrust, the barriers this mistrust could create and 
ways to improve upon this. 
A fourth implication is that it is vital to take into account the multi-dimensional 
nature of social capital and the fact that these dimensions might have different relations to 
agricultural innovation and development initiatives. Moreover, the different dimensions are not 
necessarily related to each other. These results should invite researchers and policy-makers to 
be cautious in interpreting social capital indicators in empirical models. On the one hand, 
different dimensions and indicators of social capital cannot be used as an effective indicator of 
general social capital. On the other hand, they can be used to create a social capital index, if 
this is useful for comparative country analysis in line with Doing Business or World Wide 
Governance Indices. This would be similar to variables such as “life expectancy” and “literacy” 
which are not necessarily correlated, but constitute weights for the Human Development 
Index. Moreover, organisations that try to enhance development by building social capital 
should carefully consider which dimension or indicator of social capital they try to influence, 
what kind of effects this may have on other dimensions of social capital, or to which extent 
other dimensions of social capital are essential for success.  
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Combined these implications mean that indicators of social capital should be included 
in the design and analysis of evaluation tools of agriculture-related development initiatives. 
There has been an increased interest in measuring the impact of agriculture-related 
development initiatives, and of development aid more generally (Duflo and Kremer 2005; 
Deaton 2009; De Janvry 2010). Including social capital indicators in these impact evaluations 
might be used to enhance capturing the characteristics of the agents involved, the informal 
institutional context in which they operate, and the mechanisms through which these program 
results in impact. In doing so, impact assessment better captures the fact that impact results 
from a combination of the mechanisms, the institutional context and the agents involved (also 
see Ekboir 2003; Mackay and Horton 2003; Deaton 2009).   
Some of the implications might also apply to initiatives in other sectors of 
development. The role of social capital is much broader than its role agricultural development 
alone. For example, Woolcock (2010) identified at least nine fields of studies where social 
capital has played an important role: families and youth behaviour problems, crime and 
violence; schooling and education, community life, work and organisations, democracy and 
governance, collective action problems, and economic development. The implications related 
to agricultural development initiatives, might also apply to the design and evaluation of 
policies, programs and projects in some of these other fields of development. 
8.3 Limitations and future research 
Considering the limited amount of research investigating the link between social capital, 
agricultural innovation and development initiatives, there is plenty of room for follow-up 
research. Suggestions for follow-up research are related to the identification of causality, the 
definition and measurement of social capital and agricultural innovation processes, 
heterogeneity in results across countries and development initiatives, and longer term effects. 
Many of these suggestions are related to the limitations of this thesis. 
A first area of future research is to further unravel the chains of causation between 
different dimensions of social capital, agricultural innovation, and development initiatives. 
Given the cross-sectional and semi-experimental data which underlie this thesis there are still 
concerns of endogeneity that need to be addressed, particularly that of reverse causality and 
omitted variables bias. An increasing number of studies addresses the causality between 
development initiatives and social capital using experimental data (Pronyk et al. 2008; Fearon et 
al. 2009; Casey et al. 2012). The causal link between specific dimensions of social capital and 
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agricultural innovation is also increasingly investigated, for example by using extensive network 
data (e.g. social learning by Conley and Udry 2010). However, the multidimensional nature and 
effects of social capital are often not addressed. Moreover, there is a need to empirically 
confirm that social capital is a catalyst for the success of development initiatives, especially at 
micro level (De Hoop and Van Kempen 2010 is perhaps one of the few examples).  
Second, future research should validate the indicators and indices of social capital 
using experimental games or more advanced survey questions, and/or better embedding them 
in existing theories. One option is to follow up on the work by authors such as Sapienza et al. 
(2013) and Thöni et al. (2012). These authors compare outcomes from various experimental 
games that measure generalised trust to survey measures of trust. It would be useful to 
replicate this work in a developing country context and for other dimensions of trust. Another 
option is to test the usefulness of survey questions that explicitly frame the question in a 
probability framework. An example is "Suppose that a random person you do not know 
personally receives by mistake a sum of 1000 Euros that belong to you. He or she is aware that 
the money belongs to you and knows your name and address. He or she can keep the money 
without incurring in any punishment. According to you what is the probability (a number 
between zero and 100) that he or she returns the money?" (see Guiso et al. 2009). Moreover, 
future research should further investigate how and to which extent the different dimensions 
and indicators underlying social capital can be aggregated to become useful for policy or 
evaluation purposes. Finally, in line with chapter 6, future research should address the 
empirical, but also conceptual and theoretical, overlap between the different indicators and 
dimensions of social capital. For example with respect to concepts such as culture or informal 
institutions, or theories such as social psychology or game theory (Durlauf 2002). 
Third, future research could advance in the measurement of innovation as a truly 
“interactive, participatory and embedded process”. I do not study the innovation process in 
detail. Instead, I study the role of social capital in the adoption of specific types of knowledge 
embodied in agricultural practices, varieties or inputs used. Moreover, I study the effect of 
social capital at farm level and not at higher levels in the impact or value chain. In doing so, I 
may underestimate the full effect of social capital on agricultural innovation.  
Fourth, future research could address whether the importance of social capital, as a 
catalyst for success or as an outcome variable, depends on the nature of the development 
initiatives. In this thesis, I compare different agricultural development initiatives to 
“community driven development” projects. I do this based on the notion that these projects 
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often include beneficiaries in the design and management of the project and stress the 
importance of information sharing, capacity building, and strengthening civic societies that 
represent them. However, there is a difference between the exact nature of these initiatives. 
For example, in chapter 4 I show that the more interactive approach IAR4D was successful in 
influencing social capital, whereas traditional ARD was not. This might also be the case for the 
sustainable coffee projects I discuss in chapter 7. The role of cognitive bonding social might be 
more important for projects that use group-based Farmer Field School approaches than for 
projects that do not. 
A fifth important area for future research is to explore the differences in results 
across countries. For example, I find that cognitive social capital is positively associated with 
innovation in the DRC, whereas the association is negative in some other countries. I also find 
that the impact of the IAR4D approach on social capital is strongest in DRC. These 
differences across countries also emerged when analysing the relationships between different 
dimensions of social capital. Therefore, it is of interest to see how social capital interacts with 
other country characteristics, but also to further explore differences across regions or even 
communities. Various authors address the link between social capital and institutions (Tabellini 
2005; Ahlerup et al. 2009; Baliamoune-Lutz and Mavrotas 2009; Baliamoune-Lutz 2011). 
However, the existing literature mostly focuses on macro level institutions. It would be of 
particular interest to investigate the interaction between social capital and micro level formal 
institutions such as rule of law or property rights. An interesting line of research might be to 
combine microeconomic statistical analysis with historical accounts on how current institutions 
came into being and have been interacting with social capital (see Woolcock et al. 2011 for an 
account of why history matters, and why historian should be involved). 
Finally, research yet has to address the long-run effect of development initiatives on 
social capital. I find that IAR4D has significantly influenced structural social capital. I also 
provide tentative evidence that both initiatives investigated in this thesis might have had an 
impact on cognitive social capital. Whether or not the impact on structural social capital is 
durable and the impact on cognitive social capital becomes significant on in the long run, is not 
clear. This area of research is particularly important considering the increasing number of 
studies that find a potentially negative side effect of development initiatives on social capital. 
The end line survey , which is has been approved for one of the pilot learning sites of the SSA 
CP, will provide opportunity to evaluate how social capital developed after the end of the first 
phase of the project, especially considering the fact that most IPs now operate independently. 
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When combined, these data, collected between 2008 and 2014, can also be used to address 
some of the other limitations related to causality and a more elaborate definition of innovation. 
 
159  
References 
Ahlerup, P., O. Olsson and D. Yanagizawa (2009). "Social capital vs institutions in the growth 
process." European Journal of Political Economy 25(1): 1-14. 
Allcott, H. and S. Mullainathan (2012). External validity and partner selection bias, National 
Bureau of Economic Research. 
Anderson, L. R., J. M. Mellor and J. Milyo (2004). "Social capital and contributions in a public-
goods experiment." The American economic review 94(2): 373-376. 
Bacon, C. (2005). "Confronting the coffee crisis: Can Fair Trade, organic, and specialty coffees 
reduce small-scale farmer vulnerability in Northern Nicaragua?" World 
Development 33(3): 497-511. 
Baliamoune-Lutz, M. (2011). "Trust-based social capital, institutions, and development." 
Journal of Socio-Economics 40(4): 335-346. 
Baliamoune-Lutz, M. and G. Mavrotas (2009). "Aid Effectiveness: Looking at the Aid–Social 
Capital–Growth Nexus." Review of Development Economics 13(3): 
510-525. 
Bandiera, O. and I. Rasul (2002). Social Networks and Technology Adoption in Northern 
Mozambique, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics 
and Related Disciplines, LSE. 
Bandiera, O. and I. Rasul (2006). "Social networks and technology adoption in Northern 
Mozambique." Economic Journal 116(514): 869-902. 
Beard, V. A. (2005). "Individual determinants of participation in community development in 
Indonesia." Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 
23(1): 21-39. 
Bebbington, A. and T. Carroll (2002). Induced social capital and federations of the rural poor 
in the Andes. The Role of Social Capital in Development: An Empirical 
Assessment. C. Grootaert and T. Bastelaer. Cambridge Cambridge 
University press. 
Bentler, P. M. (2006). EQS 6 Structural Equations Program Manual. Encino, CA, Multivariate 
Sofware, Inc. 
Besley, T., S. Coate and G. Loury (1993). "The Economics of Rotating Savings and Credit 
Associations." American Economic Review 83(4): 792-810. 
160 | References  
Bhandari, H. and K. Yasunobu (2009). "What is social capital? A comprehensive review of the 
concept." Asian Journal of Social Science 37(3): 480-510. 
Bigsten, A., P. Collier, S. Dercon, M. Fafchamps, B. Gauthier, J. W. Gunning, A. Oduro, R. 
Oostendorp, C. Patillo, M. Soderbom, F. Teal and A. Zeufack (2000). 
"Contract flexibility and dispute resolution in African manufacturing." 
Journal of Development Studies 36(4): 1-37. 
Boahene, K., T. A. B. Snijders and H. Folmer (1999). "An Integrated Socioeconomic Analysis 
of Innovation Adoption: The Case of Hybrid Cocoa in Ghana." Journal 
of Policy Modeling 21(2): 167-184. 
Bold, T., M. Kimenyi, G. Mwabu, A. Ng'ang'a and J. Sandefur (2013). Scaling-up what works: 
experimental evidence on external validity in Kenyan education. 
Bourdieu, P. (1986). The forms of capital. J.G. Richardson, Editor, Handbook of theory and 
research for the sociology of education. New York Greenwood. 
Bowles, S. and H. Gintis (2001). Social Capital and Community Governance, Santa Fe 
Institute. 
Bramoullé, Y., H. Djebbari and B. Fortin (2009). "Identification of peer effects through social 
networks." Journal of Econometrics 150(1): 41-55. 
Caliendo, M. and S. Kopeinig (2005). "Some practical guidance for the implementation of 
propensity score matching." Journal of Economic Surveys 22(1): 31-72. 
Carpenter, J. (2002). "Measuring social capital: Adding field experimental methods to the 
analytical toolbox." Social capital and economic development: Well-
being in developing countries: 119-137. 
Casey, K., R. Glennerster and E. Miguel (2012). "Reshaping Institutions: Evidence on Aid 
Impacts Using a Preanalysis Plan*." The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 127(4): 1755-1812. 
Cassar, A., L. Crowley and B. Wydick (2007). "The effect of social capital on group loan 
repayment: evidence from field experiments*." The Economic Journal 
117(517): F85-F106. 
Certification, S. C. o. t. S.-o.-K. A. o. S. a. (2012). Toward Sustainability: The Roles and 
Limitations of Certification. Washington, DC, RESOLVE, Inc. 
Christiaensen, L., L. Demery and J. Kuhl (2011). "The (evolving) role of agriculture in poverty 
reduction-An empirical perspective." Journal of Development 
Economics 96(2): 239-254. 
References | 161 
 
Claibourn, M. P. and P. S. Martin (2000). "Trusting and Joining? An Empirical Test of the 
Reciprocal Nature of Social Capital." Political Behavior 22(4): 267-291. 
Coleman, J. S. (1988). "Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital." The American 
Journal of Sociology 94: S95-S120. 
Colletta, N. and M. Cullen (2002). Social capital and social cohesion: case studies from 
Cambodia and Rwanda. The Role of Social Capital in Development: An 
Empirical Assessment. C. Grootaert and T. Bastelaer. Cambridge 
Cambridge University press. 
Conley, T. and C. Udry (2001). "Social learning through networks: The adoption of new 
agricultural technologies in Ghana." American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 83(3): 668-673. 
Conley, T. G. and C. R. Udry (2010). "Learning about a new technology: Pineapple in Ghana." 
American Economic Review 100(1): 35-69. 
Cook, K. S., R. Hardin and M. Levi (2007). Cooperation without trust?, Russell Sage 
Foundation. 
Dakhli, M. and D. De Clercq (2004). "Human capital, social capital, and innovation: A multi-
country study." Entrepreneurship and Regional Development 16(2): 
107-128. 
Dangbegnin, C., B. D. Tarfa, A. Mando, I. Y. Amapu, S. K. Ezui, B. Ahmed, M. K. Saleh and 
S. T. Abu (2011). Improved Maize –Legume production systems in 
Nigeria. Putting heads together: agricultural innovation platforms in 
practice. . S. Nederlof, M. Wongtschowski and F. van der Lee. 
Amsterdam, KIT Publishers. KIT Development, Policy & Practice. 
Dasgupta, P. (2005). "Economics of social capital." Economic Record 81(SUPPL. 1): S2-S21. 
De Hoop, T. (2011). How context matters for development effectiveness - A study into social 
norms and heterogeneous impacts. Social sciences. Nijmegen, Radboud 
University. PhD. 
De Hoop, T. and L. Van Kempen (2010). "Trust in health providers as a catalyst for malaria 
prevention: heterogeneous impacts of health education in rural Ghana." 
The Developing Economies 48(3): 376-404. 
De Hoop, T. and L. Van Kempen (2012). "How does Trust Matter for Cash Crop Adoption? 
Evidence from the Indian Himalaya." 
De Janvry, A. (2010). "Agriculture for development: New paradigm and options for success." 
Agricultural Economics 41(SUPPL. 1): 17-36. 
162 | References  
De Janvry, A. and E. Sadoulet (2002). "World poverty and the role of agricultural technology: 
direct and indirect effects." Journal of Development Studies 38(4): 1-26. 
Deaton, A. (2009). Instruments of development: Randomization in the tropics, and the search 
for the elusive keys to economic development, Princeton University, 
Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Research 
Program in Development Studies. 
Deaton, A. (2010). "Instruments, randomization, and learning about development." Journal of 
economic literature: 424-455. 
Dercon, S., J. De Weerdt, T. Bold and A. Pankhurst (2006). "Group-based funeral insurance in 
Ethiopia and Tanzania." World Development 34(4): 685-703. 
DFID. (2007). "Sustainable livelihoods guidance sheets." 2007, from 
http://www.livelihoods.org/info/info_guidancesheets.html#1. 
Diao, X., P. Hazell and J. Thurlow (2010). "The Role of Agriculture in African Development." 
World Development 38(10): 1375-1383. 
Duflo, E. and M. Kremer (2005). "Use of randomization in the evaluation of development 
effectiveness." Evaluating Development Effectiveness 7: 205-231. 
Durlauf, S. N. (2002). "Bowling Alone: a review essay." Journal of Economic Behavior &amp; 
Organization 47(3): 259-273. 
Durlauf, S. N. and M. Fafchamps (2005). Social Capital, Elsevier. 1: 1639-1699. 
Edwards-Jones, G. (2006). "Modelling farmer decision-making: concepts, progress and 
challenges." ANIMAL SCIENCE-GLASGOW THEN PENICUIK- 
82(6): 783. 
Ekboir, J. (2003). "Why impact analysis should not be used for research evaluation and what 
the alternatives are." Agricultural Systems 78(2): 166-184. 
Elder, S. D., H. Zerriffi and P. Le Billon (2012). "Effects of Fair Trade certification on social 
capital: The case of Rwandan coffee producers." World Development. 
Facility, S. a. T. A. P. o. t. G. E. (2010). Scientific and Technical Advisory Panel of the Global 
Environment Facility, UNEP. 
Fafchamps, M. (2004). Market institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa : theory and evidence. 
Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press. 
References | 163 
 
Fafchamps, M. and B. Minten (2002). "Returns to social network capital among traders." 
Oxford Economic Papers-New Series 54(2): 173-206. 
FARA (2004). Sub-Sharan Africa Challenge Programme. Accra, Ghana, Forum for Agricultural 
Research in Africa (FARA). 
FARA (2008). Sub Saharan Africa Challenge Program (SSA CP) - Medium Term Plan 2009-
2010. Accra, Ghana, Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa 
(FARA). 
FARA (2009). Sub Saharan Africa Challenge Program (SSA CP) - Impact Assesment Plan. 
Accra, Ghana, FARA. 
Farrow, A., C. Opondo, K. Rao, M. Tenywa, R. Njeru, I. Kashaija, R. Kamugisha, M. 
Ramazani, E. Nkonya, D. Kayiranga, L. Lubanda, L. Nabahungu, K. 
Kamale, J. Mugabo and S. Mutabazi (2011). Selecting sites to prove the 
concept of IAR4D in the Lake Kivu Pilot Learning Site, Sub Saharan 
Africa Challenge Program (SSA CP). 
Fearon, J. D., M. Humphreys and J. M. Weinstein (2009). "Can Development Aid Contribute 
to Social Cohesion after Civil War? Evidence from a Field Experiment 
in Post-conflict Liberia." American Economic Review 99(2): 287-91. 
Fehr, E. (2009). "On the economics and biology of trust." Journal of the European Economic 
Association 7(2‐3): 235-266. 
Feola, G. and C. R. Binder (2010). "Towards an improved understanding of farmers' 
behaviour: The integrative agent-centred (IAC) framework." Ecological 
economics 69(12): 2323-2333. 
Fukuyama, F. (1995). Trust: the social virtues and the creation of prosperity. New York, Free 
Press. 
Gallie, W. B. (1956). "Essentially contested concepts." Proceedings of theAristotelian 
Society(56): 167-198. 
Glaeser, E. L., D. I. Laibson, J. A. Scheinkman and C. L. Soutter (2000). "Measuring trust." 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 115(3): 811-846. 
Godfray, H. C. J., J. R. Beddington, I. R. Crute, L. Haddad, D. Lawrence, J. F. Muir, J. Pretty, 
S. Robinson, S. M. Thomas and C. Toulmin (2010). "Food security: the 
challenge of feeding 9 billion people." science 327(5967): 812-818. 
Granovetter, M. (2005). "The impact of social structure on economic outcomes." The Journal 
of Economic Perspectives 19(1): 33-50. 
164 | References  
Groenewald, S. and E. Bulte (2012). "Trust and livelihood adaptation: evidence from rural 
Mexico." Agriculture and Human Values: 1-15. 
Grootaert, C. and T. Bastelaer (2002). The Role of Social Capital in Development: An 
Empirical Assessment. Cambridge, Cambridge University press. 
Grootaert, C., D. Narayan, V. N. Jones and M. Woolcock (2004). Measuring social capital: An 
integrated questionnaire. World Bank Working Paper: 1-53. 
Gugerty, M. K. and M. Kremer (2002). The impact of development assistance on social capital: 
evidence from Kenya. The Role of Social Capital in Development: An 
Empirical Assessment. C. Grootaert and T. Bastelaer. Cambridge 
Cambridge University press. 
Guiso, L., P. Sapienza and L. Zingales (2004). "The Role of Social Capital in Financial 
Development." American Economic Review 94(3): 526-556. 
Guiso, L., P. Sapienza and L. Zingales (2006). "Does Culture Affect Economic Outcomes?" 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 20(2): 23-48. 
Guiso, L., P. Sapienza and L. Zingales (2010). Civic capital as the missing link, National Bureau 
of Economic Research. 
Haggblade, S., P. B. Hazell and P. A. Dorosh (2007). "Sectoral growth linkages between 
agriculture and the rural nonfarm economy." Transforming the rural 
nonfarm economy: Opportunities and threats in the developing world: 
141-182. 
Hair, J. F., W. C. Black, B. J. Babin and R. E. Anderson (2010). Multivariate Data Analysis - a 
global perspective. new Jersey, Pearson Prentice Hall. 
Hall, A., W. Janssen, E. Pehu and R. Rajalahti (2006). "Enhancing agricultural innovation: how 
to go beyond the strengthening of research systems." World Bank, 
Washington. 
Hawkins, R., W. Heemskerk, R. Booth, J. Daane and A. Maatman (2008). Integrated 
Agricultural Research for Development (IR4AD ) - Concept paper for 
FARA and SSA CP, ICRA and Royal Tropical Institute: 1-86. 
Heckman, J. J., J. Smith and N. Clements (1997). "Making the Most Out of Programme 
Evaluations and Social Experiments: Accounting for Heterogeneity in 
Programme Impacts." The Review of Economic Studies 64(4): 487-535. 
Hyden, G. (2001). "The social capital crash in the periphery: An analysis of the current 
predicament in sub-Saharan Africa." Journal of Socio-Economics 30(2): 
161-163. 
References | 165 
 
Isham, J. (2002). "The Effect of Social Capital on Fertiliser Adoption: Evidence from Rural 
Tanzania." Journal of African Economies 11(1): 39-60. 
Isham, J. and S. Kähkönen (2002). How do participation and social captial affect community-
based water projects? Evidence from Central Java, Indonesia. The Role 
of Social Capital in Development: An Empirical Assessment. C. 
Grootaert and T. Bastelaer. Cambridge Cambridge University press. 
Kaasa, A. (2009). "Effects of different dimensions of social capital on innovative activity: 
Evidence from Europe at the regional level." Technovation 29(3): 218-
233. 
Kaplan, D. (2009). Structural Equation Modeling: Foundations and Extensions. Newbury Park, 
SAGE Publications. 
Karlan, D. S. (2005). "Using experimental economics to measure social capital and predict 
financial decisions." American Economic Review 95(5): 1688-1699. 
Knack, S. and P. Keefer (1997). "Does Social Capital Have An Economic Payoff? A Cross-
Country Investigation*." Quarterly Journal of Economics 112(4): 1251-
1288. 
Knickel, K., G. Brunori, S. Rand and J. Proost (2009). "Towards a Better Conceptual 
Framework for Innovation Processes in Agriculture and Rural 
Development: From Linear Models to Systemic Approaches." The 
Journal of Agricultural Education and Extension 15(2): 131 - 146. 
Knickel, K., G. Brunori, S. Rand and J. Proost (2009). Towards a Better Conceptual 
Framework for Innovation Processes in Agriculture and Rural 
Development: From Linear Models to Systemic Approaches. INSIGHT 
Working Paper. 
Kolk, A. (2011). "Mainstreaming sustainable coffee." Sustainable Development. 
Krishna, A. and N. Uphoff (2002). Mapping and measuring social capital through assessment 
of collective action to conserve and develop watersheds in Rajastan, 
India. The Role of Social Capital in Development: An Empirical 
Assessment. C. Grootaert and T. Bastelaer. Cambridge, Cambridge 
University press. 
Kuit, M., F. van Rijn, V. Tu and P. Ahn (2013). The Sustainable Coffee Conundrum A study 
into the effects, cost and benefits of implementation modalities of 
sustainable coffee production in Vietnam. 
Kumlin, S. and B. Rothstein (2005). "Making and Breaking Social Capital." Comparative 
Political Studies 38(4): 339-365. 
166 | References  
Labonne, J. and R. S. Chase (2011). "Do community-driven development projects enhance 
social capital? Evidence from the Philippines." Journal of Development 
Economics 96(2): 348-358. 
Lancee, B. (2012). Immigrant Performance in the Labour Market: Bonding and Bridging Social 
Capital, Amsterdam University Press. 
Landry, R., N. Amara and M. Lamari (2002). "Does social capital determine innovation? To 
what extent." Technological Forecasting and Social Change 69(7): 681-
701. 
Leeuwis, C. and A. W. v. d. Ban (2004). Communication for Rural Innovation - Rethinking 
Agricultural Extension. Oxford, Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 
Leeuwis, C. and A. Van den Ban (2004). Communication for rural innovation: rethinking 
agricultural extension. Wageningen, Blackwell Science / CTA, Oxford  
Ligon, E. and E. Sadoulet (2007). "Estimating the effects of aggregate agricultural growth on 
the distribution of expenditures." Available at SSRN 1769944. 
Linton, A. ( 2005). "Partnering for sustainability: business-NGO alliances in the coffee 
industry." Development in Practice 15(3 & 4): 600-614. 
Lowder, S. K., B. Carisma and J. Skoet (2012). Who invests in agriculture and how much? An 
empirical review of the relative size of various investments in agriculture 
in low- and middle-income countries, Food and Agricultural 
Organization of the United Nations. ESA Working paper. 
Lynam, J., K. Harmsen and P. Sachdeva (2010). Report of the Second External Review of the 
Sub-Sahara Africa Challenge Programme (SSA-CP). Washington, 
CGIAR/ISPC Secretariat. 
Mackay, R. and D. Horton (2003). "Expanding the use of impact assessment and evaluation in 
agricultural research and development." Agricultural Systems 78(2): 143-
165. 
Mansuri, G. and V. Rao (2004). "Community-Based and -Driven Development: A Critical 
Review." World Bank Research Observer 19(1): 1-39. 
Marsh, A. (2007). "Diversification by Smallholder Farmers: Vietnam Robusta Coffee." 
Misselhorn, A. (2009). "Is a focus on social capital useful in considering food security 
interventions? Insights from KwaZulu-Natal." Development Southern 
Africa 26(2): 189 - 208. 
References | 167 
 
Monge, M., F. Hartwich and D. Halgin (2008). How change agents and social capital influence 
the adoption of innovation among small farmers - Evidence from social 
networks in rural Bolivia. IFPRI Discussion Paper. Washington 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). 
Narayan, D. and M. F. Cassidy (2001). "A Dimensional Approach to Measuring Social Capital: 
Development and Validation of a Social Capital Inventory." Current 
Sociology 49(2): 59-102. 
Narayan, D. and L. Pritchett (1999). "Cents and sociability: Household income and social 
capital in rural Tanzania." Economic Development and Cultural Change 
47(4): 871-897. 
Nederlof, S., M. Wongtschowski and F. van der Lee (2011). Putting heads together: agricultural 
innovation platforms in practice, KIT Publishers, KIT Development, 
Policy & Practice. 
Nguyen, T. and Q. Tuan (2012). Vietnam Coffee Semi-annual, USDA Foreign Agricultural 
Service - Global Agricultural Information Network. 
North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, institutional change and economic performance, Cambridge 
university press. 
Nunn, N. and L. Wantchekon (2011). "The slave trade and the origins of Mistrust in Africa." 
American Economic Review 101(7): 3221-3252. 
Pamuk, H., E. Bulte and A. Adekunle (2012). Decentralized Innovation Systems and Poverty 
Reduction: Experimental Evidence from Central Africa, Wageningen 
University. Development Economics Group. 
Pamuk, H., E. Bulte and A. Adekunle (2012). "Do decentralized innovation systems promote 
agricultural technology adoption: Experimental evidence from Africa." 
Food Policy forthcoming. 
Pargal, S., D. Gilligan and M. Huq (2002). Does social capital increase participation in 
voluntary solid waste management? Evidence from Dhaka, Bangladesh. 
The Role of Social Capital in Development: An Empirical Assessment. 
C. Grootaert and T. Bastelaer. Cambridge Cambridge University press. 
Pirotte, G., G. Pleyers and M. Poncelet (2006). "Fair-trade coffee in Nicaragua and Tanzania: 
A comparison." Development in Practice 16(5): 441-451. 
Poder, T. G. (2011). "What is Really Social Capital? A Critical Review." American Sociologist 
42(4): 341-367. 
168 | References  
Ponte, S. (2002). "The 'Latte Revolution'? Regulation, markets and consumption in the global 
coffee chain." World Development 30(7): 1099-1122. 
Pronyk, P. M., T. Harpham, J. Busza, G. Phetla, L. A. Morison, J. R. Hargreaves, J. C. Kim, C. 
H. Watts and J. D. Porter (2008). "Can social capital be intentionally 
generated? A randomized trial from rural South Africa." Social Science 
& Medicine 67(10): 1559-1570. 
Putnam, R. D. (1993). Making democracy work : civic traditions in modern Italy, Princeton 
University Press. 
Putnam, R. D. (2000). Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. 
New York, Simon & Schuster. 
Quibria, M. G. (2003). The Puzzle of Social Capital: A Critical Review. ERD Working Paper 
Manilla, Asian Development Bank. 
Raina, R. S. (2003). "Disciplines, institutions and organizations: impact assessments in 
context." Agricultural Systems 78(2): 185-211. 
Ravallion, M. (2005). "Evaluating anti-poverty programs." World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper Series, Vol. 
Robins, G., P. Pattison, Y. Kalish and D. Lusher (2007). "An introduction to exponential 
random graph (p*) models for social networks." Social Networks 29(2): 
173-191. 
Robison, L. J., A. A. Schmid and M. E. Siles (2002). "Is Social Capital Really Capital?" Review 
of Social Economy 60(1): 1-21. 
Rodrik, D., A. Subramanian and F. Trebbi (2004). "Institutions rule: the primacy of institutions 
over geography and integration in economic development." Journal of 
economic growth 9(2): 131-165. 
Röling, N. (2009). "Pathways for impact: scientists' different perspectives on agricultural 
innovation." International Journal of Agricultural Sustainability 7(2): 83-
94. 
Ruben, R., R. Fort and G. Zúñiga-Arias (2009). "Measuring the impact of fair trade on 
development." Development in Practice 19(6): 777 - 788. 
Ruben, R. and J. Heras (2012). "Social Capital, Governance and Performance of Ethiopian 
Coffee Cooperatives." Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics 
83(4): 463-484. 
References | 169 
 
Rubin, D. B. (1979). "Using Multivariate Matched Sampling and Regression Adjustment to 
Control Bias in Observational Studies." Journal of the American Statistical 
Association 74: 318-328. 
Rupasingha, A., S. J. Goetz and D. Freshwater (2006). "The production of social capital in US 
counties." The journal of socio-economics 35(1): 83-101. 
Sabatini, F. (2005). The empirics of social capital and economic development. A critical 
perspective, EconWPA. 
Sabatini, F. (2005). The Role of Social Capital in Economic Development. Investigating the 
Causal Nexus through Structural Equations Models, EconWPA. 
Sabatini, F. (2009). "The relationship between trust and networks. An exploratory empirical 
analysis." Economics Bulletin 29(2): 661-672. 
Sabatini, F. (2009). "Social capital as social networks: A new framework for measurement and 
an empirical analysis of its determinants and consequences." Journal of 
Socio-Economics 38(3): 429-442. 
Sapienza, P., A. Toldra‐Simats and L. Zingales (2013). "Understanding trust." The Economic 
Journal. 
Snijders, T., C. Steglich and M. Schweinbergerm (2007). Modeling the co-evolution of 
networks and behavior. Longitudinal models in the behavioral and 
related sciences. New Jersey, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates: 41-71. 
Tabellini, G. (2005). Culture and Institutions: Economic Development in the Regions of 
Europe, CESifo Group Munich. 
Thöni, C., J.-R. Tyran and E. Wengström (2012). "Microfoundations of social capital." Journal 
of Public Economics 96(7): 635-643. 
Uphoff, N. and C. M. Wijayaratna (2000). "Demonstrated Benefits from Social Capital: The 
Productivity of Farmer Organizations in Gal Oya, Sri Lanka." World 
Development 28(11): 1875-1890. 
Utting-Chamorro, K. (2005). "Does fair trade make a difference? The case of small coffee 
producers in Nicaragua." Development in Practice 15(3-4): 584-599. 
van Rijn, F., K. Burger and E. den Belder (2012). "Impact assessment in the Sustainable 
Livelihood Framework." Development in Practice 22(7): 1019-1035. 
van Rijn, F. C. and E. Nkonya (2012). The impact of agricultural extensions services on social 
capital: an application to the Sub-Saharan African Challenge Program in 
170 | References  
Lake Kivu region. Wageningen, Wagening University (WUR), 
International Food and Research Policy Institute (IFPRI). 
Vollan, B. (2012). "Pitfalls of Externally Initiated Collective Action: A Case Study from South 
Africa." World Development 40(4): 758-770. 
Voors, M. J., E. E. Nillesen, P. Verwimp, E. H. Bulte, R. Lensink and D. P. Van Soest (2012). 
"Violent conflict and behavior: a field experiment in Burundi." The 
American Economic Review 102(2): 941-964. 
Wasserman, S. and P. Pattison (1996). "Logit models and logistic regressions for social 
networks: I. An introduction to Markov graphs and p*." Psychometrika 
61(3): 401-425. 
Williamson, O. (2000). "The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead." 
Journal of Economic Literature 38(3): 595-613. 
Wollebæk, D. and P. Selle (2003). "Participation and Social Capital Formation: Norway in a 
Comparative Perspective1." Scandinavian Political Studies 26(1): 67-91. 
Woolcock, M. (1998). "Social capital and economic development: Toward a theoretical 
synthesis and policy framework." Theory and Society 27(2): 151-208. 
Woolcock, M. (2010). "The Rise and Routinization of Social Capital, 1988–2008." Annual 
Review of Political Science 13(1): 469-487. 
Woolcock, M. and D. Narayan (2000). "Social Capital: Implications for Development Theory, 
Research, and Policy." World Bank Research Observer 15(2): 225-49. 
Woolcock, M., S. Szreter and V. Rao (2011). "How and why does history matter for 
development policy?" Journal of Development Studies 47(1): 70-96. 
Wooldridge, J. M. (2003). "Cluster-sample methods in applied econometrics." The American 
Economic Review 93(2): 133-138. 
World Bank, W. B. (2007). World development report 2008: Agriculture for development, 
World Bank. 
World Bank, W. B. D. D. G. (2012). World Development Indicators 2012, World Bank-free 
PDF. 
World Development Report (2009). Agribusiness and Innovation Systems in Africa, World 
Bank. 
References | 171 
 
Yujiro, H. (2009). "Social Capital, Human Capital and the Community Mechanism: Toward a 
Conceptual Framework for Economists." The Journal of Development 
Studies 45(1): 96-123. 
Zak, P. J. and S. Knack (2001). "Trust and growth." Economic Journal 111(470): 295-321. 
172  
 
173 
Summary 
In this thesis, I show that social capital has an important role in the evaluation of development 
initiatives targeting agricultural innovation. Social capital and agricultural innovation are 
naturally linked from an innovation system perspective in which innovations result from the 
integration of knowledge from various actors and stakeholders. In chapter 1, I identify the 
three research questions upon which this thesis is based. First, how are social capital and 
agricultural innovation related? Second, can development initiatives increase agricultural 
innovation by building social capital? Third, does the initial level of social capital increase the 
success of these development initiatives in enhancing agricultural innovation? These question 
mainly relate to the increasing number of policies, programs and project that include 
beneficiaries in the design, management and decision making process.  
In chapter 2, I elaborate on the main concepts underlying this thesis including social 
capital, how it relates to development initiatives in the agricultural sector, and how it can be 
measured. I broadly define social capital as the participation of individuals in formal and 
informal networks, the norms that define these networks and the trust these individuals have 
within and outside these networks. Participation in networks is structural social capital, 
whereas norms and trust within and between these networks is cognitive social capital. I 
distinguish four dimensions of social capital: structural bonding, structural bridging, cognitive 
bonding and cognitive bridging. In this thesis bonding and bridging social capital is akin to 
social capital inside and outside the village. Agricultural innovation is defined in terms of 
improved land and crop management practices, an important area of agricultural innovation 
for small scale producers. 
In chapter 3 till 7, I empirically investigate the relationships between social capital, 
agricultural innovation and two types of development initiatives. The first initiative is the 
implementation of agricultural research through the Integrated Agricultural Research for 
Development (IAR4D) approach. IAR4D was adopted by the Sub Saharan African Challenge 
Program (SSA CP) and implemented in eight different countries.  The core of this approach is 
the development of Innovation Platforms (IPs), which can be described as an informal 
coalition and alliance of conventional agricultural research and development actors. Using the 
semi experimental data collected in this context, I could investigate the important role of social 
capital in different contexts. The second type of initiative is implementation of sustainable 
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certification schemes through group-based experimental learning approaches. I investigate four 
sustainable coffee projects in Vietnam, of which two adopted the interactive Farmer Field 
School training approach. The data of these four projects allow me to verify some of the 
conclusions in a different context and for a different development initiative. 
In chapter 3, I use baseline data from the IAR4D initiative to explore the association 
between different forms of social capital and uptake of various agricultural innovations, for a 
sample of 2500 households in seven countries in SSA. I find that structural bridging social 
capital is associated with more extensive adoption of agricultural innovations. This result is 
true for the pooled model as well as for four of the seven country models. This form of social 
capital captures agriculture-related links creating access to knowledge and resources and is 
considered an important dimension of economic development. I find a negative association 
between cognitive bonding social capital and the innovation index. This finding could 
represent a potentially harmful side of social capital in terms of agricultural innovation.   
In chapter 4, I investigate the impact of IAR4D on social capital. I narrow my focus 
on the border region between Rwanda, Uganda and the DRC. Because the SSA CP data set 
consist of randomized data of participating and non-participating villages, before and two years 
after implementation, I can investigate the impact of the program. Many participatory projects 
in rural Africa are efforts to enhance development indirectly by promoting cooperation in 
formal or informal networks, and by encouraging trust and norms of behaviour towards 
mutually beneficial action. But it remains unclear whether external interventions can actually 
influence social capital, especially in the short term. I show that IAR4D has had a positive 
impact on structural bridging social capital in DRC and Uganda. There was no impact on 
structural bridging social capital in Rwanda, or on the other dimensions of social capital. 
Finally, I showed that traditional agricultural extension has been less successful in increasing 
structural social capital than IAR4D. 
In chapter 5, I use data from a survey I conducted among IP coordinators to measure 
the extent to which IPs were implemented according to the principles of IAR4D across the 
three sub regions. Linking these data to the main survey data, I find that the extent to which 
IPs were implemented according to IAR4D principles  is associated with the success of 
IAR4D in increasing the level of household food security, although not through increased 
adoption of agricultural innovation or increased levels of social capital at household level. 
Looking at the sub-components of these principles, especially involvement of IP stakeholder is 
crucial. Tentative results suggest that this involvement is higher in communities with a higher 
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level of education, a higher percentage of female headed households, and a higher level of 
village social capital. 
In chapter 6, I analyse how different indicators used to represent social capital are 
related in the border region between Rwanda, Uganda and the DRC. I focus on the 
relationship between various indicators of trust, an important component of cognitive social 
capital, and group membership, an important component of structural social capital. The 
indicators used are based on questions I added to the follow up survey of the SSA CP in 2010. 
I find that different indicators of trust and group membership cannot be empirically captured 
by an overarching social capital factor, and are not even necessarily associated to each other.  
In chapter 7, I present evidence that the relationship between social capital and 
agricultural innovation is not only evident for the IAR4D approach, but also for a different 
development initiative in a different context: sustainable coffee certification in Vietnam. I use 
data collected among 240 randomly selected project participants and 150 comparable farmers 
that did not participate in the projects. I focus on the role of bonding and bridging cognitive 
social capital, defined as trust. I find a significant positive relation between trust and the uptake 
of sustainable agricultural training practices. This relationship mostly results from high levels of 
bridging trust, and is even higher in combination with high levels of bonding trust. I also find 
tentative evidence that participation in the sustainable coffee projects positively influenced 
bonding trust in one project whereas it negatively influenced bridging trust in another project. 
In chapter 8, I give an overview of the three main findings. First, social capital is 
associated with agricultural innovation. Second, development initiatives can influence social 
capital. Third, the existing level of social capital is associated with the success of development 
interventions. However, the effect was not necessarily positive and depends greatly on the 
dimension of social capital.  
I also present several implications for policy. First, stimulating social capital, especially 
bridging social capital, may be a natural leverage point for policy makers to promote 
agricultural development. Second, increased levels of social capital can indeed be an outcome 
of development initiatives, either intentionally or not. At the same time, I show that this 
impact requires specific efforts and is not necessarily positive. The third implication is that 
social capital matters for the success of certain development initiatives, either as a source of 
heterogeneous implementation or impact.  Fourth, it is vital to take into account the multi-
dimensional nature of social capital and the fact that these dimensions might have different 
relations to agricultural innovation and development initiatives. Combined these implications 
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mean that indicators of social capital should be included in the design and evaluation of 
agriculture-related development initiatives. 
Finally, I give suggestion for future research. First, to further unravel the chains of 
causation between different dimensions of social capital, agricultural innovation, and 
development initiatives. Second, to validate the indicators and indices of social capital using 
experimental games, more advanced survey questions, or better embedding them in existing 
theories. A third area of future is to advance in the measurement of innovation as a truly 
interactive and participatory process. Fourth, to address whether the importance of social 
capital, as a catalyst for success or as an outcome variable, depends on the nature of the 
development initiatives or the context in which it is implemented. Finally, research yet has to 
address the long-run effect of development initiatives on social capital. 
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Samenvatting 
In dit proefschrift laat ik zien dat sociaal kapitaal een belangrijke rol speelt bij de evaluatie van 
ontwikkelingsinitiatieven gericht op agrarische innovatie. Vanuit een innovatiesysteem 
perspectief, waarin innovaties voortkomen uit de integratie van kennis van verschillende 
belanghebbenden, zijn sociaal kapitaal en agrarische innovatie van nature gekoppeld. In 
hoofdstuk 1 formuleer ik de drie onderzoeksvragen waarop dit proefschrift is gebaseerd. Ten 
eerste, hoe zijn sociaal kapitaal en agrarische innovatie aan elkaar verbonden? Ten tweede, 
kunnen ontwikkelingsinitiatieven agrarische innovatie verhogen door het stimuleren van sociaal 
kapitaal? Ten derde, is het oorspronkelijke niveau van sociaal kapitaal belangrijk voor het wel 
of niet slagen van deze initiatieven in het verbeteren van agrarische innovatie? Deze vragen 
gelden met name voor het toenemende aantal programma’s en projecten die de begunstigden 
betrekken in het ontwerp, het beheer en de besluitvorming. 
In hoofdstuk 2 ga ik in op de belangrijkste concepten achter dit proefschrift 
waaronder sociaal kapitaal, hoe sociaal kapitaal zich verhoudt tot ontwikkelingsinitiatieven in 
de agrarische sector en hoe het kan worden gemeten. Ik definieer sociaal kapitaal in de brede 
zin als de participatie van individuen in formele en informele netwerken, de normen die binnen 
deze netwerken gelden en het vertrouwen van deze individuen binnen en buiten deze 
netwerken. Deelname aan netwerken is structureel sociaal kapitaal, terwijl normen en 
vertrouwen binnen en tussen deze netwerken cognitief sociaal kapitaal is. Ik onderscheid vier 
dimensies van sociaal kapitaal: structureel verbindend, structureel overbruggend, cognitief 
verbindend en cognitief overbruggend. In dit proefschrift is het onderscheid tussen verbindend 
en overbruggend sociaal kapitaal gelijk aan het onderscheid tussen sociaal kapitaal binnen en 
buiten het dorp. Agrarische innovatie wordt gedefinieerd in termen van verbeterd grond- en 
gewasbeheer, een belangrijk onderdeel van agrarische innovatie voor kleinschalige 
producenten. 
In hoofdstuk 3 tot 7 presenteer ik empirisch onderzoek naar de relatie tussen sociaal 
kapitaal, agrarische innovatie en twee soorten ontwikkelingsinitiatieven. Het eerste initiatief is 
de implementatie van een aanpak genaamd "Integraal Landbouwkundig Onderzoek voor de 
Ontwikkeling" (Integrated Agricultural Research for Development (IAR4D)). IAR4D werd 
door het Sub Saharan African Challenge Program (SSA CP) in acht verschillende landen 
geïmplementeerd via het Forum van Lanbouwkundig Onderzoek in Afrika (Forum of 
Agricultural Research in Africa (FARA)). De kern van deze aanpak is de ontwikkeling van
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Innovatie Platforms (IP's). IPs kunnen worden omschreven als informele coalities en allianties 
van conventionele landbouwkundig onderzoeks- en ontwikkelingspartners. Met behulp van de 
semi-experimentele implementatie van de IPs en de daarbij behorende dataverzameling, kon ik 
de belangrijke rol van sociaal kapitaal in verschillende contexten onderzoeken. Het tweede 
soort initiatief is de implementatie van duurzame koffieprojecten door middel van 
experimentele leermethoden. Ik onderzoek vier koffieprojecten in Vietnam, waarvan twee de 
interactieve Farmer Field School trainingsaanpak gebruikten. De analyses van deze projecten 
stelt mij in staat een aantal van de conclusies van IAR4D te verifiëren met ander 
ontwikkelingsinitiatieven en in een andere context. 
In hoofdstuk 3 gebruik ik de gegevens uit de nulmeting van het IAR4D initiatief voor 
een steekproef van 2500 huishoudens in zeven landen in SSA om de relatie tussen de 
verschillende vormen van sociaal kapitaal en het gebruik van diverse agrarische innovaties te 
verkennen. Ik kan vaststellen dat structureel overbruggend sociaal kapitaal is gerelateerd aan 
meer agrarische innovaties. Dit resultaat geldt voor het model geschat over de totale steekproef 
evenals de schatting van vier van de zeven landmodellen. Deze vorm van sociaal kapitaal, 
gemeten als de landbouw gerelateerde connecties, wordt beschouwd als een belangrijke 
dimensie van economische ontwikkeling doordat het leidt tot toegang tot kennis en andere 
middelen. Ik stel vast dat er een negatieve relatie is tussen cognitief verbindend sociaal kapitaal 
en landbouwkundige innovatie. Deze bevinding laat zien dat er een potentieel schadelijke kant 
is van sociaal kapitaal op het gebied van agrarische innovatie. 
In hoofdstuk 4 onderzoek ik de invloed van IAR4D op sociaal kapitaal. Ik verklein 
mijn focus op het grensgebied tussen Rwanda, Oeganda en de Democratische Republiek van 
Congo (DRC). Omdat de SSA CP dataset bestaat uit gegevens van deelnemende en niet 
deelnemende dorpen, vóór en twee jaar na de implementatie, kan ik de impact van het 
programma onderzoeken. Veel participatieve projecten in landelijk Afrika richten zich op het 
bevorderen van wederzijds voordelige samenwerking en onderling vertrouwen. Maar blijft het 
onduidelijk of externe interventies hier daadwerkelijk aan bij kunnen dragen, met name op de 
korte termijn. Ik laat zien dat IAR4D in de DRC en Oeganda een positieve impact heeft gehad 
op structureel overbruggend sociaal kapitaal. Er was geen impact meetbaar op structureel 
overbruggend sociaal kapitaal in Rwanda, of op de andere dimensies van sociaal kapitaal. Tot 
slot concludeer ik dat de traditionele landbouwvoorlichting minder succesvol is in het 
bevorderen van structureel sociaal kapitaal dan IAR4D. 
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In hoofdstuk 5 gebruik ik de gegevens van een enquête die ik heb uitgevoerd onder 
de coördinatoren van de IPs om te meten in welke mate de IP's werden uitgevoerd in 
overeenstemming met de principes van IAR4D. Door deze gegevens te koppelen aan de 
gegevens uit de SSA CP dataset, concludeer ik dat de mate waarin de IPs zijn geïmplementeerd 
volgens de IAR4D principes verband houdt met het succes van IAR4D in het verhogen van 
het niveau van voedselzekerheid op huishoudniveau. Echter is er niet vastgesteld dat dit effect 
voortkomt uit de invoering van agrarische innovatie of het verhoogde niveaus van sociaal 
kapitaal. Er zijn voorzichtige aanwijzingen dat de intensiteit van betrokkenheid, een belangrijk 
onderdeel van de IAR4D principes, deels kan worden verklaard door het oorspronkelijke 
niveau van sociaal kapitaal op dorpsniveau. 
In hoofdstuk 6 analyseer ik hoe de verschillende indicatoren die gebruikt worden om 
sociaal kapitaal te meten aan elkaar gerelateerd zijn in het grensgebied tussen Rwanda, Oeganda 
en de DRC. Ik focus op de relatie tussen de verschillende indicatoren van vertrouwen, een 
belangrijke component van cognitieve sociaal kapitaal, en deelname in een groep, een 
belangrijke component van het structurele sociaal kapitaal. De indicatoren zijn gebaseerd op de 
vragen die ik heb toegevoegd aan het vervolg onderzoek van de SSA CP in 2010. Ik constateer 
dat verschillende indicatoren van vertrouwen en deelname in groepen niet empirisch kunnen 
worden ondervangen door een overkoepelend sociaal kapitaal “factor” en dat ze zelfs niet per 
se verband met elkaar houden. 
In hoofdstuk 7 presenteer ik bewijs dat de relatie tussen sociaal kapitaal en agrarische 
innovatie niet alleen evident is voor de IAR4D aanpak, maar ook voor een andere 
ontwikkelingsinitiatief in een andere context: duurzame koffiecertificering in Vietnam. Ik 
analyseer gegevens van 240 willekeurig geselecteerde projectdeelnemers en 150 vergelijkbare 
boeren die niet deelnemen aan de projecten. Ik focus op de rol van bindend en overbruggend 
cognitief sociaal kapitaal, geoperationaliseerd als vertrouwen. Ik stel vast dat er een significant 
positief verband is tussen vertrouwen en de introductie van duurzame agrarische praktijken. 
Deze relatie komt met name voort uit een hoge mate van overbruggend vertrouwen, vooral in 
combinatie met een hoge mate van bindend vertrouwen. Ik vind ook voorzichtige 
aanwijzingen dat deelname aan één van de projecten een positieve invloed heeft gehad op 
bindend vertrouwen, terwijl het een negatieve invloed heeft gehad op overbruggend 
vertrouwen in een ander project. 
In hoofdstuk 8 geef ik een overzicht van de drie belangrijkste bevindingen. Allereerst 
is sociaal kapitaal verboden met agrarische innovatie. Ten tweede kunnen 
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ontwikkelingsinitiatieven sociaal kapitaal beïnvloeden. Ten derde is het bestaande niveau van 
sociaal kapitaal een factor in het succes van ontwikkelingsinitiatieven. De effecten zijn echter 
niet per definitie positief en afhankelijk van de dimensie van sociaal kapitaal. 
Ik opper ook verschillende implicaties voor programma’s en beleid. Ten eerste kan 
het stimuleren van met name overbruggend sociaal kapitaal een natuurlijke aangrijpingspunt 
zijn voor beleidsmakers om agrarische ontwikkeling te stimuleren. Ten tweede kunnen 
ontwikkelingsinitiatieven, gepland of ongepland, leiden tot meer sociaal kapitaal. Tegelijkertijd 
laat ik zien dat dit effect specifieke inspanningen vereist en niet noodzakelijkerwijs positief is. 
De derde implicatie is dat sociaal kapitaal belangrijk is voor het succes van bepaalde 
ontwikkelingsinitiatieven, als een bron van heterogene implementatie of impact. Ten vierde, 
het is essentieel om rekening te houden met het multidimensionale karakter van sociaal kapitaal 
en het feit dat deze dimensies verschillend zijn verbonden met agrarische innovatie en 
ontwikkelingsinitiatieven. Tezamen betekenen deze implicaties dat het goed zou zijn als de 
indicatoren van sociaal kapitaal worden opgenomen in het ontwerp en de evaluatie van 
landbouw gerelateerde ontwikkelingsinitiatieven. 
Tot slot geef ik suggesties voor toekomstig onderzoek. Ten eerste, het verder 
ontrafelen van de oorzaak-en-gevolgketen tussen verschillende dimensies van sociaal kapitaal, 
agrarische innovatie en ontwikkelingsinitiatieven. Ten tweede, het valdieren van de indicatoren 
van sociaal kapitaal met behulp van experimentele onderzoeksmethoden, meer geavanceerde 
enquêtevragen, of door het integreren met bestaande theorieën. Ten derde, het meten van 
innovatieprocessen als daadwerkelijk interactieve en participatieve processen. Ten vierde zou 
toekomstig onderzoek zich kunnen richten op de vraag hoe het belang van sociaal kapitaal, als 
katalysator voor succes of als een uitkomst variabele, afhankelijk is van de aard van de 
ontwikkelingsinitiatieven of de context waarin het wordt geïmplementeerd. Tot slot is er nog 
volop behoefte om de langetermijneffecten van ontwikkelingsinitiatieven op sociaal kapitaal te 
onderzoeken.
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